# NEG---Cyborg Writing

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## Case

### 1NC -- Turn -- Reform Good

#### They cause violent to roll-back LBGTQ gains. They also hamper external gains for racial and gender groups.

Levi & Shay 12 [Jennifer Levi and Giovanna Shay. Jennifer Levi is the director of the Transgender Rights Project of GLAD (Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders). Jennifer has participated in successful efforts to pass transgender-inclusive antidiscrimination laws throughout New England. Giovanna Shay is a co-chair of the Corrections Committee of the American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section. She has participated in institutional change litigation involving prisons, as well as efforts to enforce the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA) and amend the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). Both serve on the faculty of Western New England University School of Law. - “The dangers of reform” - Source: The Women's Review of Books. 29.4 (July-August 2012): p30. Info Trac database]

In his recent book, Normal Life, Dean Spade, a law professor at Seattle University School of Law and noted transgender activist, criticizes several law-reform movements, including those to improve prison conditions, win marriage equality for same-sex couples, and ensure that hate crimes and antidiscrimination laws include transgender people. Spade finds fault with LGBTQ rights organizations' efforts to win mainstream acceptance, arguing that instead of pursuing an equality agenda, they should focus on changing "the distribution of life chances," by "demand[ing] radical redistribution of wealth and an end to poverty." Spade's critique has the most force in the context in which it originated--calling for an end to what David Garland first described as mass incarceration, the system many refer to as the "prison industrial complex." It is less persuasive when applied to the realm of free-world LGBTQ rights. Spade's perspective is shaped by the prison-abolitionist movement, as well as, he says, by critical race theory and "woman of color feminism." In 2002, Spade founded the Sylvia Rivera Law Project (SRLP), which provides free legal services to transgender and gender nonconforming people, and whose mission, according to its website (slrp.org/about), is "to guarantee that all people are free to self-determine their gender identity and expression, regardless of income or race, and without facing harassment, discrimination, or violence." Normal Life is rooted in this experience, and fits comfortably within a series of recent prison-abolitionist works focusing on the experiences of queer and transgender people, including Queer (In)Justice: The Criminalization of LGBT People in the United States (2010), and Captive Genders: Trans Embodiment and the Prison Industrial Complex (2011), a collection of essays to which Spade contributed. Spade writes that his purpose in Normal Life is to describe a "critical trans politics ... that demands more than legal recognition and inclusion." Arguing that equality of life chances, or distributive justice, cannot be achieved through law reform alone, he calls for a broader agenda: "prison abolition, the elimination of poverty, access to full health care, and an end to immigration enforcement." These goals, he submits, "cannot be conceptualized or won within the realm of US law." Citing the work of critical race theorist Alan Freeman, Spade questions the focus of antidiscrimination law on violations of individual rights, which, he argues, tends to obscure more systemic and structural kinds of disadvantage. Instead of pursuing a rights-based law reform strategy, Spade writes, the trans movement should focus on "population-level operations of power," such as ending mass incarceration. The models he recommends for pursuing "transformative change" will resonate with those familiar with the work of organizers such as "rebellious lawyering" proponent Gerry Lopez, Brazilian educational reformer Paolo Freire, or civil rights campaigner Ella Baker: "[M]eaningful change," Spade says, "comes from below," and "those most directly impacted" should lead the fight. Normal Life's leftist critique of liberal reform has deep roots in the history of US social movements. For example, in his book Stories of Scottsboro, James Goodman describes how, in 1931, during the trial of the Scottsboro Boys (nine African American teenagers falsely accused of raping two white women), leaders of the International Labor Defense (ILD) organization attacked the NAACP as "an instrument of the white capitalist class for the perpetuation of the slavery of the negro people." ILD members marched with signs equating "lynchers, reformers, and enemies of the Negro people." Then as now, leftists viewed the racialized criminal-punishment system as a tool of broader economic oppression. Spade writes that advocates seeking to remedy prison conditions should beware of inadvertently strengthening the prison system. He explains: We must avoid proposals that include constructing buildings or facilities to house trans prisoners, to hire new staff, or make any other changes that would expand the budget and/or imprisoning capacities of the punishment system. He goes on to say, "[W]e must ensure that legal work is always aimed at dismantling the prison industrial complex ... [k]nowing that the system is likely to try to co-opt our critiques to produce opportunities for expansion." This is essentially the criticism of prison reform leveled by Angela Y. Davis in her 2003 book, Are Prisons Obsolete? She argues that, despite the good intentions of advocates, prison reform can produce more prisons--new and sanitized versions built to reduce overcrowding. Davis warns that discussions of prison reform focus "almost inevitably on generating the changes that will produce a better prison system." Although some reforms may be significant, she writes, "frameworks that rely exclusively on reforms help to produce the stultifying idea that nothing lies beyond prison." It is not only prison abolitionists who share Spade's concern about the unintended consequences of prison reform. The sociologist Heather Schoenfeld writes that prison-conditions litigation in Florida contributed to a prison building boom there. Other commentators--including James Jacobs, Malcolm Feeley, and Van Swearingen--argue that prisoners' rights litigation contributed to the "bureaucratization" of prisons, consolidating administrators' power even as it asserted prisoners' rights. Examples of double-edged US criminal-punishment reforms extend well beyond prison conditions. As described by Kate Stith and Steve Y. Koh (in "The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines," Wake Forest Law Review, 1993), some of the initial proponents of federal sentencing guidelines were liberal academics and judges, who wanted to rationalize sentencing to make it fairer and more consistent. Unfortunately, as innumerable commentators have recounted, the implementation of the guidelines produced draconian sentences, ultimately contributing to the growth of US prisons. In adopting an all-or-nothing approach, however, Spade fails to acknowledge ways in which the liberal prisoners' rights movement has helped to advance critical trans politics. At a minimum, prison-reform litigation generated information, through civil discovery, that advocates used to draw attention to prison conditions. Access to prisoners has been facilitated by the minimal legal protections and professional norms that the prisoners' rights movement helped to achieve. Rather than undermining the radical project that Spade promotes, liberal law-reform efforts arguably laid foundations for the prison-abolitionist movement. As for hate crimes prohibitions, Spade writes that they "strengthen and legitimize the criminal punishment system," which targets poor people of color and singles out poor trans people of color for particular harassment. "Changing what the law explicitly says about a group," he points out, "does not necessarily remedy the structured insecurity faced by that group." We ourselves are agnostic on the question of hate crimes penalties for crimes against LGBTQ people: the exclusion of sexual orientation and gender identity from existing laws not only minimizes the seriousness of anti-LGBTQ violence but also nearly guarantees a dearth of law enforcement resources. Nevertheless, we are also acutely aware of the danger of expanding the already massive criminal-punishment system in any way. In the context of mass incarceration, in which reform can produce ever cleaner and more technologically advanced human warehouses, Spade's arguments are well-taken. His critique is less persuasive when he moves into the broader arena of LGBTQ rights. Spade believes that law reform is at odds with distributive justice. In his view, advocacy that departs from the idealized approach he champions harms the transgender community. While we laud his critique of some elements of liberal law reform, we disagree with his zero-sum frame. Law reform is only one piece of a strategy. It cannot achieve everything, but it is sometimes a necessary precondition to reaching other goals and, at a minimum, is not a causative element for diminished opportunities and status. A transgender equality movement that includes expansion of antidiscrimination laws and marriage equality among its goals is coextensive with the project of "transformative change." Spade argues that antidiscrimination laws "create the false impression that ... fairness has been imposed, and the legitimacy of the distribution of life chances restored." But such protections merely ensure that a person's sexual orientation or gender identity cannot be an obvious basis for an adverse employment action. They are nowhere near broad enough to promise substantive equality, for transgender people or anyone else. However, excluding gender identity and sexual orientation from existing employment protections is far more damaging than committing the resources for the advocacy required to expand them. In addition, organizing to pass antidiscrimination laws has activated and radicalized LGBTQ advocacy organizations. The California-based Transgender Law Center (incubated by the National Center for Lesbian Rights) and the Massachusetts Transgender Political Coalition (first envisioned by GLAD staff members and interns) are two examples of the generativity of liberal law reform efforts. Both organizations share many of the distributive justice goals of SRLP. Spade is not the first to criticize the movement for marriage equality for same-sex couples. In "Arguing Against Arguing for Marriage" (University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 2010), Shannon Gilreath claims that "marriage is dangerous for Gays conceptually, in its patriarchal and heteropatriarchical foundations." In less absolute terms, Katherine Franke writes in the New York Times (June 23, 2011) that same-sex marriage is a "mixed blessing," which may undermine other arrangements that LGBTQ people have used to "order our lives in ways that have given us greater freedom than can be found in the one-size-fits-all rules of marriage." Spade goes too far in applying the same critique to both prison reform and marriage equality. Removing gender discrimination from the institution of marriage does not strengthen it in the way that modifying the criminal-punishment system reinforces mass incarceration. The institution of marriage has an evolving social meaning. Extending it to lesbians, gay men, bisexual and transgender people reaffirms our human dignity. Even the most steadfast critics of the marriage-equality movement--including the lesbian activists and law professors Nancy Polikoff and the late Paula Ettelbrick--have acknowledged that critiques of marriage and the marriage equality movement need not be on a collision course. In addition, Spade ignores law-reform efforts spearheaded by LGBTQ legal organizations other than those focused on hate crimes, anti-discrimination, and marriage. These include challenges to discriminatory health care access and to prison regulations that deny essential medical care to transgender inmates; immigration reform advocacy; and support for transgender students and homeless LGBTQ youth. To ignore these efforts is to miss the ocean for the tidal pool beside it.

#### The claim that reform, or learning about it, produces queer subjects in any structurally predictive way actually inhibits queer becoming---particular demands for reform enables queer flourishing

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I begin with this general sense of queer youth and the complicated relationship they have to queer adults to draw attention to the everyday complexities that go into being and becoming queer in the twenty-first century. It is, to put it simply, not a straightforward process or experience. I forgo specificity to think broadly about the diverse ways in which queer youth, in varied contexts and realities, are generally going about their day and becoming in relationship to the broader worlds they inhabit. They are, by means of being youth, going about their days thinking less about many of the issues queer scholars engage—including myself in the coming pages—and more about the possibilities and limitations that lie before them. They, with their youthful zest, see a world filled with potential and possibility. It is not a perfect world, as queer youth inching toward an explicit queer relation to the world are far from ignorant of the issues queerness raises in and for their lives. However, it is a world that they are increasingly sure they have a right to inhabit, engage, and transform. They are, unlike other generations, asserting themselves earlier in life and, as such, could benefit from queer opportunities that connect them with queer generations (a topic for the next chapter).

This is, for me, a hopeful image of queer youth and an image that I try to hold with me in my own daily engagements where conversations, by and large, focus on queer youth as victims. It is also the image that propels the purpose of this book—a book that as you will read builds upon decades of queer scholarship that has pushed and prodded the world to become kinder to queers (to put it quite simply). After decades of generating queer scholarship that honors (often perversely) queerness, emerging generations have expanded opportunities to come into presence. To be clear, while I hold this image of queer youth with me, this book is not about queer youth, but about the histories and futures of queer realities that were once youthful and a push for recognizing unseen queer potentials in the youth of the future. This may, for some, sound a bit wishy-washy. The lack of specificity might read unsure or unaware of the specific challenges and realities queer youth and adults face in the present. And this may be the case—I am not an expert in specific realities beyond my own and those within my vicinity. My refusal to specify here is a recognition that queerness—at its heart—is ever shifting and difficult to pin down. Any specific mention of a queer youth, for instance, one who became prom king (or queen) or one who recently committed suicide, would already begin to foreclose other queer possibilities and the complexities therein. For me, the move to specify also feels like a move to use a queer youth to make an argument. I sense queer youth—particularly queer youth who are victimized, bullied, or commit suicide—are taken up in the grind of the media and academy to become a “cause,” often simplified or reduced to a particular talking point. There is, to be sure, a political salience to this and one I myself will take up on several occasions. However, I begin with and honor the general because for me it is helpful in allowing readers to read in their own specifics, in their own contexts, given the diversity of experiences and intersectional realities of our lives. Additionally, I am a “generalist” in education, so I tend toward the general “big picture,” leaving specificity to those more suited to such work. For now, as readers, hopeful queers might see their optimism reflected back at them, but with a recognition that there is work to be done; while pessimistic queers might scoff at such optimism while secretly realizing the world can (and should) be different. Bored queers may simply remain bored, bored by the incessant academizing of queer experiences. But, back to the issues at hand—childhood, children, and queerness.

When I was a child, Whitney Houston taught me that it was her belief “the children are our future.”1 It was an important lesson for me as a child, because I was allowed to imagine the future. I was the future and it was important to teach me well so that I, and other children, could lead the way in that, what seemed then, rather distant future. The future is, to be sure, a rather complicated concept. I am here in the future of my then-imagined childhood, although it is both more and less fabulous than I could have imagined. The future is always there, in the distance, and there are always more children for whom that future is. However, which children are allowed to be children and have a future is, as significant scholarship has shown, quite narrow (Greteman & Wojcikiewicz, 2014; Letts & Sears, 1999; Meiners, 2017; Pritchard, 2013; Weems, 1999).

Children, particularly queer children, and the future have been something educational scholars and queer theorists have contemplated for some time. In this chapter, I assemble some of the ways in which queer children and the future have been contemplated to build upon such work in further elucidating what I am calling “queer thrival.” If children are our future—and in some sense, they always are—the ways in which we imagine or are allowed to imagine both “children” and the “future” greatly impact the ways in which those very concepts come to function in our daily work, particularly in education. In assembling previous work addressing children, the future, and queerness, I attend closely to such work that exposed—through their paranoia—the violence, the limits, and challenges faced by queerness in education. Such paranoia has been central in recognizing the challenges queer youth face, yet changes have happened that would do well to be engaged to not only push for the safety of queer youth, but their ability to thrive. We need, to harken back to the last chapter, heterogeneous reading practices that recognize the contributions of paranoid readings while opening space for contingently, reparative readings and their possibilities.

Queerness and Challenges to Liberalism

The challenge of children “growing up” is central to the work of schools where children are presumably taught well to lead the way when they become “grownups.” We know for sure, however, that many students are not taught well and are never able to lead the way due to any number of cultural, institutional, interpersonal, and disciplinary barriers (Collins, 2010). Students that are in such a marginalized position are, at the same time, more often than not, the students that push the limits, demanding recognition and access through various means—be that walk-outs, protests, or other forms of resistance. It is in fact, as we have seen since desegregation, children who lead the way into hostile environments so that the future has the possibility of being different. While there are demands to protect children and arguments made “for their own good,” I suspect history shows us that children, when faced with adversity, are able to survive and thrive, leading the way not there in some imagined future but in their present, as they demand they have a future. This is not meant to romanticize children or childhood, but to call attention to the material lives of children who we have historically seen push the limits of democratic liberalism.

Cris Mayo (2006) recognized the need to push the limits of liberalism in education because, “liberalism has been suspiciously unwilling to extend its analysis of freedom to sexual freedom, its embrace of autonomy to queer critique, its sense of progression toward new possibilities to queer futurities” (p. 471). Liberalism, to put it bluntly, has been uninterested in queerness. In liberal discourses, as Mayo noted,

There is a tension between discussing how people, such as lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (lgbt) people, might be recognized by law and given (or denied) certain legal rights on the basis of their identity and how queer people, not always fully recognizable as inhabiting particular identity categories, might also live their potentials. (p. 469)

Liberalism requires recognizable identities by which to protect. Recent gains in LGBT rights illustrate this requirement as LGBT persons have gained rights and recognitions, be it to marriage, the military, or anti-discrimination. Yet, queer—as a political stance—is tasked with pushing against such recognitions and norms (Ford, 2007). LGBT people are a voting block more and more recognized through LGBT advocacy groups. Queer people, on the other hand, fall outside and beyond such recognitions to illustrate the persistence of exclusion and the possibility for alternatives. Or, as Puar (2007) illustrated, LGBT rights can be used as a cudgel against other queer forms of being.

Mayo focused part of her argument on the issue of gay marriage as a struggle for access to a particular liberal institution. While gay marriage may be, from certain queer vantage points, quite conservative, on an educational level, it is an issue that opened some possibilities for queer students in seeing a queer future. “The drawback,” Mayo (2006) noted, “ paralleling gay rights with marriage rights is that while kids may eventually decide to enter into unions, that is not the only form of gay (or, for that matter, heterosexual) life open to them” (p. 485). However, something is better than nothing, particularly because no “thing” can encapsulate all queer possibilities. The issue is that some things become sanctioned by the state and, in becoming so, present a double-edged sword—both providing approval for types of relationships while also imposing a penalty on those who refuse such approval. To be sure, any given time will see some battles waged as they gain traction (and funding) while others unable to break through. The task, particularly for education, is to grapple with broadening possibilities, both those limited in scope and those more radical. This, however, cannot be done without the insights and views of youth themselves. We need to provide youth more agency in decision making, not less, particularly if they are, themselves, “our future.” As Mayo noted, “access to queer possibilities and futures is not just a right crucial to queer adults, it is critical to queer youth, for their current flourishing as well as for their future participation in communities and as citizens” (p. 486).

Queer youth and adults cannot only access narratives of their marginalization. Such narratives inform them, more often than not, that there is no future. Yes, it is true that for most of education’s recent past, queer children have been denied access to representations and access to queer futures, but with the explosion of youth expression on social media and elsewhere, such denials look more and more outdated. Queer youth have faced innumerous forms of physical violence and emotional turmoil, as illustrated by, for instance, GLSEN’s School Climate Research, for close to 20 years. However, there is need to address such research and push beyond it, not to deny such realities but work to change them (Thorpe & Greteman, 2015). “Arguably ,” Mayo (2006) concluded:

queer communities are populated by paradigmatically modern citizens, and, as much as one may tire of citing dire statistics and want instead to point to innovations and resiliency among queer youth, it remains a fact that liberal theory and the liberal state need to provide more support for queer possibilities, through education and other institutions, and to recognize the particular challenge to traditional family forms, autonomy, and sexuality that queer youth bring. (p. 487)

The liberal state—whether one cites dire statistics or examples of resiliency—has work to do. The future for queerness has looked rather grim for some time, in part, because the liberal state has failed to attend to queer possibilities and institutional support. However, queerness has also survived into and against such threats and assaults. It has benefited from the liberal state’s slow movement while continuing its slow march demanding that queerness stays.

Kevin McDonough (2007), took up Mayo’s challenges to liberalism and explored the possibility of liberalism in addressing the challenges that queer youth raise for schools. “Can the common school ideal, and the liberal political principles that underwrite it,” McDonough (2007) asked, “coherently accommodate reasonable and legitimate forms of moral and cultural diversity, especially those forms that have historically been marginalized, discriminated against, or excluded” (p. 795)? The demands of queer people and queer communities have, for decades now, pushed up against the liberal political principles that ground American public education. And these demands have over those very decades seen some progress in achieving some forms of recognition and rights.

McDonough is, however, skeptical of an uncritical embrace of queer recognition for fear that such an embrace will get “distorted into forms that are both anti-liberal and against the best interests of queer children” (p. 797). This is a key skepticism, as he argued, given that

if identities are poorly understood then the danger may arise that schools will socialise children into pre-existing moulds based on educators’ distorted and inauthentic conception of what a queer identity should be, rather than leaving children free to choose and endorse their own conceptions of queerness through an examination of how queer people actually might live worthwhile lives. (p. 797)

One of the matters at hand, for McDonough, is not limiting the queerness of children to those that are imagined to potentially grow up to be queer adults. “It is precisely because we cannot pick out beforehand which children will be [queer],” he maintained, “that all children require exposure to alternative models of identity, including queer models, upon which to base their individual sexual identities” (p. 798). No one, as we remember from the introduction, is born queer. Rather, one must decide to become queer and such a decision requires lessons in such matters.

Queerness is then a matter that must be visible to all as a possible way of becoming in the world, recognizing that there are also other ways of becoming in the world, often that are yet known, to be created by new generations. The simple task, in all of this, may be that the rule of becoming is that we shouldn’t be mean to those who decide to live and join and create the diverse possible ways of being and becoming in the world. This was a lesson Kate Bornstein offered in her contribution to the “It Gets Better Campaign” started in 2010 after a spate of queer youth suicides. While there have been important critiques of this project (see Gilbert, 2014), Bornstein refused to tell youth “it gets better” because she is not sure it does. Rather, she offered youth advice to stay alive to find out if it would, the one rule being “don’t be mean.” Of course, such a simple task is not in fact that simple, as all kinds of institutional, structural, cultural, and interpersonal barriers emerge that impact the lives of those who become in ways rarely, if at all, recognized. Meanness seems to be more palatable and easier to engage in than kindness. After all, we do prefer Mean Girls, which ironically ends quite kindly.

McDonough’s argument developed a prima facie reason that queer children’s autonomy “depend[s] on actual engagement with queer options” (p. 800). It is necessary, in other words, that queer children gain access to queer options in order to imagine possible futures. To not have such access denies children opportunities to encounter a wide range of possibilities by which to develop and see their own futures. Quoting McDonough:

If the communities of which children are a part (here I do not just mean those children who turn out to be queer, but all children) fail to include expansive visions of queer possibilities, then the ability of queer children (i.e. those who turn out to be unable to live their lives as heterosexuals) to develop into independent practical reasoners will be constrained to the extent that they will be unable to link up their reasoning to realistic and expansive ‘imagined futures’ involving valuable and worthwhile queer roles, communities, and identities. (p. 801)

His argument that expansive possibilities are necessary, particularly for liberal education, connects us back to the subjectification function of education. Schools inevitably play a significant role in the ways students can imagine their futures. And for much of the history of American public education, what futures are open to students has been limited.

When it comes to providing students—queer and otherwise—actual engagement with queer roles, communities, and identities, however, a number of issues have emerged. For McDonough these included the reality that queer communities are often few and far between and located primarily in urban areas; that queer communities are often viewed disapprovingly by parents and society; and that queer children often come from families that are disapproving of queerness (p. 802). Such issues are, I sense, still present, but I want to suggest that there have been gains in accessibility to engaging queer roles, communities, and identities. It is, in fact, one of the purposes of this book to highlight such gains in order to further push for and cultivate ways in which schools could provide queer lessons for their students. It may be, in part, following Airton’s (2013) advice—more fully addressed shortly—to “leave ‘those kids’ alone” (p. 532).

Diverse queer lessons are, for me, less about reiterating the data that illustrates “hatred in the hallways” or reproducing the paranoid arguments that queer students and teachers have enemies. We’ve been hearing that for decades . Eric Rofes (1983), in “I Thought People Like That Killed Themselves”: Lesbians, Gay Men, and Suicide, offered an assessment of then emerging discourses on suicide and homosexuality. “Perhaps the most pernicious trick played on lesbians and gay men,” according to Rofes , “has been the creation of the dual myth of homosexual suicide” (p. 1). This dual myth “asserts that lesbians and gay men not only commit suicide at a rate higher than society-at-large, but that somehow a person’s homosexuality is itself the source of self-destruction” (p. 1). Rofes , to be clear, is not contesting the reality of “gay” suicide, but drawing the reader’s attention to the ways in which arguments centered on suicide and homosexuality are intimately tied to the discourses of the time, particularly those of the medical profession and media. The futures that were visible to queer people (then defined largely as gay and lesbian) were quite narrow. The gay liberation movement was little over a decade old and the known AIDS epidemic in its infancy. The social world, with its homophobia and violence against queer people—notably through expert discourses—was literally killing queers, but blaming such deaths on queer individuals. Rofes refused such a place for gay men and lesbians, offering insights on intervention, postvention, and prevention for the living taken from the dead.

Such queer lessons were, returning to McDonough, provided in recognition that to envision “queer futures,” there are things that education can and should do, both in making sure queer youth survive the precariousness of childhood and can thrive. School is, after all, one institution among many that, to go back to Mayo’s earlier comment, needs to provide support to queer youth—be this at the K-12 level or higher education. Schools, as spaces where people meet diverse ideas and practices, continue—despite or in spite of neoliberal rationalities—to be spaces where futures can be envisioned. It is, to be sure, a challenge to broaden such futures given neoliberal rationalities, but try we must.

### 1NC -- Turn -- Queer Sameness

#### The fetishization of difference ironically collapses into a singular sameness, as the dominant culture’s white supremacy comes to regulate queerness into an ideal. This works to mystify racial and colonial violence, furthering marginalizing people of color.

Perez 5 [Hiram, Associate Professor of English at Vassar College, “You Can Have My Brown Body and Eat It, Too!” *Social Text* 23.3/4 (Fall/Winter 2005): 171-191]

The category "Latino," used as a racial descriptor rather than a political affiliation, is nearly as vague as "brown." Consider, for example, how easily "Latin" (or for that matter, "Spanish" and "Hispanic") may substitute for "Latino." However, most uses of "Latina/o" disregard the politics of that ambiguity, together with the differences that the category itself already collapses. Remarkably, queer theory understands the politics of difference as fundamental to its practice, yet it can participate in the circulation of categories like "Latin" without appreciating in the least its function within a complex web of identifications and desires. While the variations on the category "Latina/o" collapse innumerable differences, queer theorizing seems for the most part quite content to let that sameness alone. "Queer" needs to interrogate its own investments in sameness. Ironically, these investments deploy the rhetoric of difference precisely so that the presumed anti-identity of queer might dissimulate profiting by sameness. By this means, establishmentarian queer theory has colluded in rendering material and psychic violences of racialization unintelligible. I agree that communities are bound by fictions, but that does not diminish the violences enacted in constituting those communities. Queer theory has exchanged too hastily the politics of identity for the politics of difference. To combat oppression it is necessary to theorize how communities are bound by shared fantasies and desires, in other words, how they are bound at some level by sameness. This is especially crucial where sameness makes itself transparent, as it does with whiteness. Sometimes, people are not so different from one another. Queer theory, when it privileges difference over sameness absolutely, colludes with institutionalized racism in vanishing, hence retrenching, white privilege. It serves as the magician's assistant to whiteness's disappearing act. Hanson acknowledged that he had anticipated my response and had heard exactly the same protest before. Oddly, these repeated protests only invalidate one another. I should in fact feel shamed at this revelation of the commonplace nature of my thinking. Hanson's accusation constitutes a defensive posture, a way to dismiss criticism. However, I think the solace I received (much of it from white lesbian theorists) may similarly indicate a form of defensiveness. I absolutely experienced solidarity with white lesbian theorists at the conference, but there was also from some an expression of solace that I think masqueraded (and only just barely) as solidarity.231 am sure that reactions to the dispute between Hanson and me had to have been more complicated than the (apparent) polarization, the taking of sides that occurred after the final roundtable. But I also wonder if that] (apparent) polarization did not in fact need to happen to preserve the status quo, to further bind queer theory's white indivisibility. As I alternately inhabited the body of an intransigent and vulgar savage as well as that of a noble one (depending on where you sat), as I performed my brownness—and what choice did I have really, fated to my performance of the unsophisticated and banal—I understood the rupture I witnessed as one that needed to happen in order to fortify that white body of queer theory, to strengthen its immunity against foreign agents. I did experience genuine intellectual engagement with colleagues. Otherwise, I would not waste my energy formulating this critique. However, that engagement was subsumed by a reductive polarization; like the brown body (poor Mario's, Kiko's, my own, and, most important, the brown body missing in action), it was an obligatory sacrifice to the status quo of Gay Shame's queer theorizing. Although the ironies of Ellis Hanson's presentation were lost on me, I was keenly aware of another much crueler irony. The brown body in his schoolboy uniform, invited into the university classroom of a cosmopolitan gay male fantasy for a game of show and tell, remains simultaneously shut out of the university classroom. Increasingly, the brown body finds itself expelled from civil society—if not expelled outright from the nation. Seeing Kiko up on the screen, his dick hanging out of his khaki shorts, made the absence of gay men and lesbians of color at the conference all that much more pronounced. The brown body is variously sacrificed at the exigencies of white privilege and white desire. As peculiar as this may sound, I am not convinced that institutionalized forms of queer theory really care to investigate desire. An established group of queer theorists remain quite riled, understandably, about the normalization of queer. However, queer theory resists the critique of its own even more alarming normalizations. The dominant queer culture, like any dominant culture, demands assimilation. Queer theory does not want to be normalized, but neither does it want to be queered. Unruly subjects are expelled to its margins. This expulsion is telling. Establishmentarian queer theory, despite its oft-professed revulsion at mass culture assimilation, has also quite comfortably settled at the center or, rather, that comfortably furnished space just left of center. We would be deluded to think that queer theory is not invested in protecting the institutional structures that have accommodated it, including, most significantly, white patriarchal structures of knowledge. This does not call for abandoning the field but rather for greater vigilance, imagination, and accountability, as well as a reinvigorated inquiry into the complex trajectories of desire and identity.

### 1NC -- Turn -- Two Spirit

#### The gender binary is a settler colonial invention, only by starting our analysis at the subjugation of the Two-Spirit can we have an effective queering of discourse

Singer No Date [Phoenix A., former Transgender Justice Policy Fellow at Basic Rights Oregon and Indigenous and transgender activist. *Colonialism, Two-Spirit Identity, and the Logics of White Supremacy.* Portland State University.]

Before the colonization of this land, there were as many as six traditional gender orientation roles among numerous tribes (Cameron, 124). However, due to boarding schools erasing these traditions through the Christianization of those who would later become the Elders within our community, the Christianized related the existence of the Two-Spirit as sin (Cameron,124) and this is because we have internalized the dominant culture’s concepts of gender and sexuality (Driskill, 55). The Western Gender Binary is thus superimposed upon all cultures and their histories seen through the gaze of not only male dominance but a male/female paradigm that does not account for the existence of third, fourth, fifth and even more varieties of non-male/female expressions and identities. Colonization, as previously elaborated upon, brought to Indigenous societies the patriarchy and beliefs of natural male dominance. But an overlooked aspect of the patriarchy - this Western gender binary, also found its way impacting Indigenous thought through the process of colonization. The Western Gender Binary does not see the Two-Spirit, the Western Gender Binary only sees a Man acting in “Unmanly” ways or a Woman acting in “Unwomanly” ways. What has resulted from this has been our very own communities becoming hostile to Gay, Lesbian, Bi/Pan, Trans\* and Two-Spirit Indigenous peoples due to the influence of violent and assimilative colonialism. Many of these people not being accepted by their own families, by their own tribes, even those with traditions normalizing their existences. A further demonizing of Native bodies occurs when the Native refuses to conform to the invading culture’s normative behaviors of gender expression. The influence of Western culture on the erasure of Indigenous “Queer” and Two -Spirit peoples has created a system of sexual assault, homophobia and transphobia used against our peoples, entangled with the history of colonialism (Driskill, 51). As part of the settler mentality, we can see these actions as colonial violence against the Two-Spirit (ibid) and are also the results of genocide (Driskill, 52). To reiterate previous statements, the Western gender binary is a form of superimposed and universalized colonialism upon Indigenous bodies and minds. Often, the fight for decolonization fails to include or may even openly alienate and exclude Indigenous “Queers,” Two -Spirits, non-cisnormative and non-heteronormative individuals. Even amongst those attempting post colonialism, the adverse effects of gendered colonialism finds itself difficult to erase from the consciousness. Be that as it may one not achieve decolonization without also including an eradication of the Western gender binary. Healing our identities is part of the ongoing process of decolonization (Driskill, 51) because besides our land, our identities are colonized as well (Driskill, 52) and expressing our identities as Two-Spirit peoples is to resist colonialist definitions defining who we are while also proclaiming ourselves sovereign from the identities of the white dominated LGBTQ rights movement (ibid). Two-Spirit is a term used to describe our experiences of intersecting oppressions (race, colonialism, queerness, sexuality transgenderism, two-spirit identity) and is therefore a culturally specific term which cannot be transferred into other cultures (Cameron, 126). Colonization operates as a mechanism of white supremacy which as previously defined is built around paranoia, white solidarity and consensus, white exclusiveness (“otherizing”), defensiveness, colonial aggression and violence. As has been described, white supremacy and settler-colonialism not only colonizes the bodies of Indigenous peoples, but their minds as well. This has effectively been done through the erasure of traditions and introduction of patriarchy imposed upon Indigenous peoples in the boarding schools. Settlers want the Indigenous person to “disappear” and history has shown they’ve attempted this not only through physical genocide but cultural genocide as well. This disappearance of Native peoples includes those often most threatening to patriarchy and Western culture, the Two-Spirit. White supremacy through violence has sought the destruction of the Two-Spirit. White supremacy through paranoia, considering the Two-Spirit to be sin have sought the destruction of the Two-Spirit. White supremacy through white solidarity and consensus has imposed its Western concept of sexuality and gender upon Indigenous peoples, seeking the destruction of the Two-Spirit. Assimilation and annihilation have been tools at the hands of the settler-colonialists to erase Indigenous peoples as people and as a unique set of cultures residing in the United States. Existing is therefore resistance.

### 1NC -- Turn -- Identity

#### Illegibility is insufficient to disrupt heterosexual space and actively shuts down identitarian resistance which is comparatively more effective than the aff

Latchford 14 (Frances J, Associate Professor in the School of Gender, Sexuality and Women’s Studies at York University in Toronto, “Unidentified Remains: The Impolitics of Non-Identity”, Atlantis, Vol. 36, No. 2) DB

Unidentified queers render invisible the possibilities that are queer. As unknown possibilities, unidentified queers reinforce, rather than interrupt, the boundaries of heterosexuality. Moreover, as heterosexuality operates outside as much or more than it does inside queer spaces, a consistent refusal to identify as “queer” is a lost opportunity to resist heterosexuality within its own fields of operation; in contexts that are not queer, heterosexual subjectivity is presumed in the absence of some other identification. Therefore, if queer practice does not exceed queer contexts and the self refuses to be “gay,” “lesbian,” “bisexual,” “trans,” or “queer” in heterosexual contexts, heterosexuality simply knows no resistance. Obviously, the enactment of queer practices in heterosexual spaces (e.g., S&M or fisting in the boardroom) is as impractical as it politically dangerous, but this is just another reason the affirmation of identity is more effective as resistance in so many contexts.

#### That entrenches whiteness and color-blind racism

-at: opacity

Latchford 14 (Frances J, Associate Professor in the School of Gender, Sexuality and Women’s Studies at York University in Toronto, “Unidentified Remains: The Impolitics of Non-Identity”, Atlantis, Vol. 36, No. 2) DB

Foucault and, all too often, queer theory treats the politics of non-identity as uniformly accessible, an uncritical assumption for which both are taken to task. Foucault is reproached for the “sexist focus in his work [that] cannot be solved simply by adding women to his analysis” and this exposes the need “to fundamentally reconsider the way in which his focus on men alone skews some of [his] insights,” a need queer theory also frequently ignores (Mills 2003, 7). For similar sorts of reasons, queer theory is said by David M. Halperin and Valerie Traub (2009) to “despecify the lesbian, gay, bisexual, trangender or transgressive content of queerness, thereby abstracting ‘queer’ and turning it into a generic badge of subversiveness, a more trendy, nonnormative version of ‘liberal’ or ‘oppositional’” practice (17); this observation also has implications for queerness as an unconscious mode of whiteness. Indeed, there is some “alarm over queer theory’s wholesale transition from gender to sexuality as the proper object of its analysis,” as Perez (2005) has noted while drawing on Judith Butler, because queer theory’s increasing neglect of women and gender is not irrelevant to its neglect of race and vice versa (173). In part, these effects are due to the ways Foucault’s theories, as queer theories, have almost completely enframed contemporary queer thought and being. Another problem queer non-identity politics obfuscates is its role in the maintenance of whiteness as a pre-condition for subject effacement: it entails a de facto colour-blind liberalism or racism. On the one hand, “‘queering’ … is both a protest against foreclosure of possible inclusion and a demand that the liberal (white, yuppified, Western) gay and lesbian establishment recognize the ‘subalterns’ in its midst” (Hawley 2001, 6). On the other, it “colludes with institutionalized racism in vanishing, hence retrenching, white privilege” simply because it “has exchanged too hastily the politics of identity for the politics of difference” (Perez 2005, 187). Like Foucault, “‘[q]ueer theory’ has promised to complicate assumptions about routes of identification and desire” (Butler and Martin 1994, 3). In practice, however, the idea that queerness presents those who enter its spaces with the same opportunity for “limitless anonymous encounters” and subject effacement, belies a liberal, colour-blind assumption that people who enter queer spaces are equally welcomed, desired, and entitled to act on desire: this is the paradoxical, invisible foundation of queerness—it too readily refuses interruptions of whiteness at the same time that it opens onto the possibility of (white) sexual de-subjectification. Where queer anti-identity politics may afford white queers an opportunity at effacement, it may not so readily do so for queers of colour when whiteness dominates queer space. And in unique instances where queer space is not predominantly white, but racialized, it can still fail to do so for Indigenous queers, because queer spaces are just as likely to be dominated by the broad unconsciousness of settlers. As Andrea Smith (2011) argues, what can also “disappear within queer theory’s subjectless critique [is] settler colonialism and the ongoing genocide of Native peoples … queer theory (even queer of color critique), then, rests on the presumption of the U.S. settler colonial state” (47). Sara Ahmed (2010) writes that “[y]ou learn to see yourself as you are seen by those who can inhabit the familiar, because they can recede into its form” (86). Where the queer familiar is white and/or settled, queers who are of colour or Indigenous are less likely to be seen or allowed to see themselves as equally susceptible to the infinite possibility of self; their difference as racialized and Indigenous subjects in a queer, white, and settled familiar will not be read or operate as non-identity, because racialized and Indigenous queerness is visibly qualified in ways that queerness unqualified (i.e., as invisible whiteness) is not. In other words, the queer condemnation of visibility politics fails to recognize that invisibility politics is still a privilege afforded primarily to white queers.

### 1NC -- Turn -- Binaries Not Violent

**Binaries aren’t inherently violent**

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There seems to be a widespread consensus among current literary critics that there is a problem with binaries, so much so that even the word "binary" itself has taken on a strong pejorative connotation. To begin with, then, I should go on the record as saying that even though the hemiolic strategy that I develop in this chapter sets out to redescribe binary structures using ternary strategies, **I am by no means opposed to all binaries** whatsoever. Many of them, in fact, seem to me to be entirely unproblematic, if not wholly indispensable: for example, I have no misgivings at all when it comes to flipping light-switches that place "off" and "on" in binary opposition to each other; I am not at all concerned that my computer saves my work in an enormous chain of 1’s and 0’s; I feel no compulsion to seek out creative alternatives to "heads" or "tails" during a coin-toss; and so on. The world is full of a great many wholly **sensible binary oppositions**, I suggest, and thus one of the shortcomings that I frequently find in post-structuralist and deconstructive critiques of binary thinking is the knee-jerk (or even essentialist?) assumption that binaries are somehow problematic "violent hierarchies" by their very nature. Furthermore, I think it is important to acknowledge that the term "binaries" is used to represent quite a varied range of dyads: not just dichotomous oppositions, but also more open-ended competing alternatives, and even at times dyads that seem to me to be wholly complementary pairs of ideas. We might see a confusion of this sort, I suggest, at the core of Anna Maria Cimitile's argument in Shakespearean Orders, which offers a deconstructive reading of how Shakespeare's plays subvert a whole range of binaries that she envisions as being parallel to one another, including nature and culture, good and evil, justice and mercy, matter and spirit, filiation and usurpation, and commerce and law (23). I would argue in response that there seem to be crucial differences to be found between these dyads. Good and evil, for example, quite clearly form a dichotomous binary opposition, whereas justice and mercy seem to present us with a much more ambiguous pair of partly-competing alternatives, and commerce and law in turn seem to be little more than two vaguely related concepts that Cimitile considers alongside each other. Surely, I suggest, these dyads are not all "binaries" in the same way, structured on a model of presence and absence. I greatly appreciate the work that the past generation of critical theorists has done in drawing attention to the ways in which violent hierarchies of social power are often constructed and maintained through particular binary oppositions in language. However, at the same time, I am far from persuaded by the strategies that both the post-structuralists and the deconstructivists have adopted in their attempts to address this concern. It seems to me that the usual post-structuralist strategy of **inverting binaries** in order to privilege whatever position had previously been marginalized does **little** to overcome the problem of binaries, since the inversion of a binary **preserves it intact**. An upside-down binary, after all, is undoubtedly still a binary nonetheless. This is, as I understand it, the thrust of the complex and convincing argument that Derrida develops against Foucault in "Cogito and the History of Madness." To make the same point much more prosaically, however, I am reminded of the famous quip that the cartoonist Bob Thaves made about Ginger Rogers, namely that she was a better dancer than Fred Astaire because she managed to do everything that he did, only backwards and in high heels. I sometimes find myself thinking the same thing about Foucault and Descartes. Foucault, of course, undoubtedly comes across as the more compelling philosopher as he tackles Enlightenment metaphysics so daringly and so stylishly, but it seems to me that in the end what Foucault is doing is very much the same old song and dance that Descartes did, only backwards and in high heels.9 In cases where binary thinking really is a problem, the post-structuralist response challenges the hierarchy within a binary, privileging the marginalized and validating the undervalued, and although I see this as a worthwhile task in its own right, I do not see how it enables us to overcome the problem of the binary itself.

### 1NC -- Turn -- Lesbianism <3

#### Queer theory collapses lesbian theory and asserts violent hegemony over the knowledge industry – this reinscribes categories and makes a broad movement impossible

**Goodloe 94** [Amy, instructor of digital writing and new media storytelling for the Program for Writing and Rhetoric at CU Boulder, “Lesbian-Feminism and Queer Theory: Another “Battle of the Sexes?”, Amy Goodloe Blog, 1994, http://amygoodloe.com/papers/lesbian-feminism-and-queer-theory-another-battle-of-the-sexes/, 08/01/14]

Over the past decade scholarship on lesbian and gay issues has rapidly increased not only in scope and size but also in level of acceptance as "valid" research within the academy. Although lesbian-feminist theory has long been a part of the academic field of women's studies, only recently has it begun to gain a degree of critical autonomy, a development that has been attributed to the need of some lesbian theorists to define their projects over against those of both feminist theory and the new darling of academia: "queer theory." While lesbian theory diverges in some important ways from feminist theory, it's opposition with queer theory is, I would argue, much greater and more fundamental, to the extent that the two may be wholly incompatible as politically useful theoretical positions. Not all lesbian theorists would agree, however, as the most recent work on these issues attests; even when lesbian theorists wholeheartedly embrace queer theory, they are often reluctant to give up on some of the basic premises of lesbian feminism. This, I believe, suggests that lesbian-feminism provides a certain type of social and political analysis that is not available through queer theory, a case I intend to make through a critical review of some of the scholarship on these issues produced over the last five years. Some of the issues that divide lesbian-feminists and queer theorists are the very issues that threatened to divide lesbians from feminists in the early stages of the women's movement[1]. The practice of identity politics, with its concern for the nature and boundaries of identity, has been central to most social movements of the past few decades, with perhaps the most visible example being that of the Black Power movement. Identity politics assumes a coherent, unified, and stable identity on the basis of which individuals should not be discriminated against; while activists concerned with ending racism and classism have used identity politics with some success, gender and especially sexuality pose a more difficult problem, as we will see in the work of both lesbian-feminists and queer theorists. Another related issue that divides these two critical perspectives is the nature and function of the sex/gender system; for lesbian-feminists, sex and gender are conceptually interdependent categories, best exemplified by the institution of compulsory heterosexuality, but for queer theorists, sex and gender are and must be conceptually distinct, which opens up the possibility for an analysis of homophobia that excludes the role of sexism[2]. Lesbian-feminists and queer theorists also come to heads over the meaning of "sexual difference," the construction of identities through hierarchical, binary gender roles, and what it means to be "anti-normative." These are but some of the issues that scholars have recently taken up, as a way both of understanding the historical role and importance of lesbian-feminist theory, and of coming to terms with the emergence of queer theory. Arlene Stein's article, "Sisters and Queers: the Decentering of Lesbian Feminism" (1992), offers a brief but thorough account of the history and development of lesbian-feminism, as well as an analysis of the fallout from lesbian feminism's recent encounter with queer theory. According to Stein, the recent increase in lesbian visibility and diversity has led lesbian feminists to reconceptualize what is meant by "lesbian community," since it seems more accurate to refer to lesbian "communities," and to recognize that not all of these communities will identify as feminist (35). But this has certainly not always been the case, and in order to understand the hegemony that lesbian feminism has had over constructions of lesbian identity, Stein reviews the basic assumptions of lesbian feminism as a political philosophy. Early lesbian feminism developed in an attempt to counter the dominant medical construction of lesbianism as the congenital defect of "inversion." The medical model clearly suggested that lesbianism was a biological trait, albeit a defective one, and early homosexual rights advocates used this evidence to claim that lesbians should be pitied for their condition rather than oppressed because of it (37). With the rise of the women's movement in the seventies came an increasing dissatisfaction with the association of lesbianism with biological "abnormality," as early feminists began to analyze other explanations for the existence of lesbians. The theory that came to dominate early lesbian feminism was that lesbians were those who resisted the regime of compulsory heterosexuality, that they, unlike heterosexual women, refused to become part of the male economy by choosing to identify only with other women; thus was born the concept of the "woman-identified woman."[3] Lesbian feminist activists in the seventies claimed not only that lesbianism had nothing to do with a medical, or biologically "essential" condition, but that it was, in fact, a choice available to all women, and a choice that any woman aware of the oppressive nature of heteropatriarchy would make. While lesbian feminism at first sought to "liberate the 'lesbian' in every woman" (38), the movement soon found itself faced with the dilemma of identity politics. In order to gain political ground, lesbian feminists felt the need to fix lesbian identity as somewhat stable and coherent, in order to classify lesbians as a "minority" deserving of protection against discrimination, but the boundaries of this identity were fairly narrow, and excluded those whose experience of being lesbian didn't measure up to the feminist "ideal" (45). The tension produced by this move, away from recognizing lesbianism as a personal and political choice and towards a more essentialist understanding of lesbian identity (ironically not too far removed from the medical models), sowed the seeds for the demise of lesbian feminism as a powerful political force in the eighties, although it also opened up the possibility for more specifically lesbian varieties of political analysis, such as those taken up by the sex-radicals of the early eighties (48).[4] Towards the late eighties, Stein observes, lesbian feminism and lesbian politics in general were separate entities, often with contradictory assumptions and political aims. While the lesbian feminist analysis of oppression assumed an inherent link between sex and gender -- arguing, in the words of Suzanne Pharr, that "homophobia is a weapon of sexism” [5] -- other kinds of lesbian analysis (some of which also insisted on being considered feminist) argued for the "relative autonomy of gender and sexuality, sexism and heterosexism" (50). This latter position more closely resembles that taken by many queer (male) activists in the late eighties and early nineties, with whom these lesbians would come to identify as a way of marking their difference from "traditional" lesbian feminism. "Queerness," for these gay men and lesbians, is understood as "a non-normative sexuality which transcends the binary distinction homosexual/heterosexual to include all who feel disenfranchised by dominant sexual norms" (50). Stein's primary critique of this newly emerging "queer" theory is that it fails to adequately "compensate for real, persistent structural differences in style, ideology, and access to resources among men and women" (50). In other words, it privileges sexuality, in both political analysis and cultural expression, over gender, and thereby threatens to erase or reduce the gender-bound experience of lesbians as women. While feminism may have failed to adequately address the multiplicity of sexual difference in its analysis of the sex/gender system, she argues, the new "queer theory" fails to address gender at all, which makes it an arguably less effective political philosophy for many lesbians. But a possible benefit of the clash between lesbian feminism and queer theory is that lesbian feminists have had to rethink their commitment to the belief in the primacy of the sex/gender system over other forms of oppression, to the extent that they have begun to theorize lesbianism as a provisional identity "situated in a web of multiple oppressions and identities "(51), taking into account differences of race, class, ethnicity in ways that queer theory has so far failed to do. According to Stein, then, this newer version of lesbian feminism, which has shifted away from an exclusive focus on gender towards an understanding of multiple oppressions, is a more "decentered" movement, which "may present new democratic potential" (52). Not all lesbian-feminists have let queer theory off the hook quite so easily, though. While Stein argues that a newly "redesigned" lesbian feminism is more politically useful to lesbians than queer theory, she does not critique the assumptions and indeed arrogance of queer theory to the extent that other scholars have. This is perhaps in part due to the most recent developments in queer theory which Stein may not have been aware of in 1992; by 1994, however, lesbian scholars have become acutely aware of the hegemony that queer theory threatens to hold over all studies of gender and sexuality in the academy, and have thus launched into full-scale critiques of its totalizing tendencies. Perhaps the most scathing critique comes from Sheila Jeffreys, whose work is not always received well by non lesbian feminist scholars because of her tendency to claim to speak for all lesbian feminists, when in fact she only speaks for a particularly radical group. In her most recent article, "The Queer Disappearance of Lesbians: Sexuality in the Academy" (1994), Jeffreys states simply, "The appearance of queer theory and queer studies threatens to mean the disappearance of lesbians" (459). Jeffreys' concern, like that of so many lesbian feminists, is that queer theory threatens to offset the advances made by feminism by failing altogether to recognize its impact in shaping contemporary understanding of sexuality and gender; queer theory, she argues, is "feminism free" (459). Despite its supposedly counter-normative associations, Jeffreys believes the word "queer" has come to signify white gay male, which renders any project associated with this signifier simply "more of the same," while masquerading as "new and uniquely liberating" (469). Thus, unlike Stein, whose critique of queer theory is relatively mild in comparison, Jeffreys accuses this new theoretical discourse of deliberately reinscribing the very oppression(s) that feminists and lesbian feminists have been fighting against for years, in order to privilege (homo)sexuality and gay male culture as the epitome of the "anti-discourse" made so much of by postmodern theory. Central to Jeffreys' critique is that queer theory privileges and indeed naturalizes the masculine in a way that runs counter to the aims and goals of most forms of feminism. The notion of "camp" or "drag," which Jeffreys sees as one of the key concepts of queer theory, is built on gay male notions of performative femininity, which not only excludes biological women but enshrines the dominant construction of masculine as the binary opposite of feminine; a drag queen's enactment of femininity for the pleasure of other men, rather than calling into question the performative nature of all gender roles, instead fixes perceived sexual difference at the core of desire, a claim early lesbian feminists were most anxious to refute. According to Jeffreys, then, while queer theory may claim to expand the limits of gender by "playing" with the terms that constitute it -- by supposedly separating femininity from the female body in the persona of a drag queen, for example -- it in fact fails to account for the sexism inherent in the terms as they are constituted by the dominant culture. A man "playing at" being a coy, submissive woman, for the benefit of other men, is hardly a vision of sophisticated gender analysis to most lesbian feminists -- which is not to criticize drag queens in and of themselves, so much as to point out the inadequacy of drag as core theoretical concept. Jeffreys also criticizes the tendency of queer politics to "[accept] and [celebrate] the minority status of homosexuality." This, she believes, is a politics "which is in contradiction to lesbian feminism" (469) because of its insistence on a stable, coherent albeit counter-normative identity. She continues: Lesbian feminists do not see themselves as being part of a transhistorical minority of 1 in 10 or 1 in 20, but as the model of free womanhood. Rather than wanting acceptance as a minority which is defined in opposition to an accepted and inevitable heterosexual majority, lesbian feminist theorists seek to dismantle heterosexuality, and one strategy is the promotion of lesbianism as a choice for women. (469)

#### Queer theory assumes a male identity—turns the movement

Jeffreys 94 [Sheila, Associate Professor of Political Science at University of Melbourne, “The Queer Disappearance of Lesbians: Sexuality In the Academy,” Women’s Studies International Forum, 1994, JSTOR, 08/01/14]

The appearance of queer theory and queer studies threatens to mean the disappearance of lesbians. The developing field of lesbian and gay studies is dominated now by the queer impulse. Lesbian feminism is conspicuous by its absence. Lesbian feminism starts from the understanding that the interests of lesbians and gay men are in many respects very different because lesbians are members of the political class of women. Lesbian liberation requires, according to this analysis, the destruction of men's power over women. In queer theory and queer studies, lesbians seem to appear only where they can assimilate seamlessly into gay male culture and politics. No difference is generally recognised in interests, culture, history between lesbians and gay men. The new field of the study of 'sexuality' seems similarly to be dominated by gay male sexual politics and interests. Both areas are remarkably free of feminist influence. As I discuss here, there is seldom any mention in queer theorising of sexuality of issues which are of concern to feminists and lesbian feminists, such as sexual violence and pornography or any politics of sexual desire or practice, and there is no recognition of the specificity of lesbian experience. Within traditional Women's Studies, lesbian students and teachers have long been angry at the 'lesbian-free' nature of courses and textbooks. A good example is Rosemarie Tong's Women's Studies reader Feminist Thought (1989). Although many of the feminist theorists covered in the book are lesbians, lesbian feminism is not one of the varieties of feminist thought included here. The index directs the reader to find lesbian feminist thought in three pages under the heading of 'Radical feminism and sexuality' (Tong, 1989). Lesbians might well have expected to find the new lesbian and gay studies more sympathetic to their interests, but that is only true in practice if they see themselves as a variety of gay men rather than as women. The new lesbian and gay studies is 'feminismfree.' By not recognising the different interests, history, culture, experience of lesbians, lesbian and gay studies homogenises the interests of women into those of men. It was precisely this disappearance of women's interests and experience in the malestream academic world which caused the development of Women's Studies in the first place. It cannot therefore be an unalloyed cause for celebration in the 1990s that lesbian and gay studies are becoming sufficiently well recognised to have a whole new journal GLQ and a first reader, The Lesbian and Gay Studies Reader (Abelove, Barale, & Halperin, 1993). Both are American in origin and content. Even a casual glance at these publications suggests that lesbians and feminists have considerable cause for concern. It is not simply an abstract desire to right the injustice of lesbian disappearance which motivates my concern at the way that lesbian and gay studies are going. The work of this new field does and will increasingly influence the ideas and practices of lesbian and gay culture. Academia is not hermetically sealed but reflects and influences the world outside the academy. The disappearance of lesbians into an economically powerful commercial gay culture in the streets and the clubs will be exacerbated by what is happening in queer theory. The editorial of the first issue of GLQ celebrates its commitment to 'queer' politics. The queer perspective is not a gender-neutral one. Many lesbians, perhaps the vast majority of lesbian feminists, feel nothing but hostility toward and alienation from the word queer and see queer politics as very specifically masculine. The editorial tells us that the journal will approach all topics through a queer lens. "We seek to publish a journal that will bring a queer perspective to bear on any and all topics touching on sex and sexuality" (Dinshaw & Halperin, GLQ, 1993; p. iii). We are told that the Q in the title of the journal GLQ has two meanings, quarterly and also "the fractious, the disruptive, the irritable, the impatient, the unapologetic, the bitchy, the camp, the queer" (p. iii). This definition of the word 'queer' should alert readers to its masculine bias. The adjectives accompanying it here refer to male gay culture. They arise from traditional notions of what is camp. Camp, as we shall see, lies at the very foundation of queer theory and politics and is inimical to women's and lesbian interests. But before looking at the problems with camp in detail, it is worth considering another way in which this list of adjectives might not sit well with lesbian feminism. Although gay men's rebellion against oppression might well have been so mild that it could be expressed in terms like irritability, this has not been the way that lesbians have traditionally phrased their rebellion. Perhaps because lesbians have a great deal more to fight, that is, the whole system of male supremacy, rage has been a more prevalent emotion than irritability. The early womanifesto of lesbian feminism, the Woman- Identified-Woman paper, expressed it thus: "A Lesbian is the rage of all women condensed to the point of explosion" (Radicalesbians, 1988, p. 17). Irritable is how one might feel about not having garbage collected, not about ending the rape, murder, and torture of women, including lesbians. Some queer studies writers are currently seeking to establish that 'camp' is a fundamental part of 'queer.' There is still a controversy about what constitutes camp, with gay male critics opposing their own notions to that expressed in the famous Susan Sontag piece and pointing out that her version is heterosexist (Miller, 1993; Sontag, 1986). Sontag saw camp as a sensibility and one that was not necessarily queer or gay. Moe Meyer, in the volume the POLITICS and POETICS of CAMP, which is said on the blurb inside the cover to contain essays by "some of the foremost critics working in queer theory" says that camp is "solely a queer discourse" and certainly not just a "sensibility" but "a suppressed and denied oppositional critique embodied in the signifying practices that processually constitute queer identities" (Meyer, 1994b; p. 1). Rather, the function of camp is the "production of queer social visibility" and the "total body of performative practices and strategies used to enact a queer identity" (Meyer, 1994b; p. 5). So camp is defined here not just as one aspect of what it is to be queer, but as absolutely fundamental to queer identity. Camp appears, on examination, to be based largely on a male gay notion of the feminine. As his example of camp political tactics, Meyer uses the Black drag queen, Joan Jett Blakk, who ran as a mayoral candidate in Chicago in 1991. This man ran as a 'Queer Nation' candidate. He is referred to by female pronouns throughout this piece, which raises some difficulties in itself for women who wish to recognize themselves in the text. Meyer tells us that there were some objections from what he calls "assimilationist gays" who saw the drag queen political tactic as "flippant and demeaning." The implication is that men who objected did so for conservative motives, whereas in fact they might have been expressing profeminist sympathies. For women and lesbians who have rejected femininity, the celebration of it by a gay man is likely to be seen as insulting rather than as something with which to identify in 'queer' solidarity. Actually, women might well want more women in parliament rather than men wearing the clothing that has been culturally assigned to women.

### 1NC -- Turn -- Materiality

**Queer theory fails**

**Saffin 8** BODIES THAT (DON'T) MATTER: SYSTEMS OF GENDER REGULATION AND INSTITUTIONS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST TRANSGENDER PERSONS: A QUEER/CRITICAL RACE FEMINIST CRITIQUE By LORI A. SAFFIN DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY WASHINGTON STATE UNIVERSITY Program of American Studies AUGUST 2008

Despite the productive and effective strategies offered by Queer Theorizing, I am hesitant to firmly adhere only to this body of knowledge. Many academics and activists alike have challenged the political efficacy of queer theory, pointing out that the pluralizing of identity, though important, continues to denigrate the importance of race, class, and gender, as sexuality becomes the signifying element of identification. Likewise, I have concerns about the open ended politics proclaimed under Queer Theory. As John D'Emilio illustrates in 12 his account of American gay and lesbian politics, "identity" and "difference" have simultaneously served as the crux as well as the crisis for most gay and lesbian organizing.13 So, if "queer" is fluid, boundariless, oppositional, and multiplicitous, how do "we" organize around "difference" or ground in politics? What are these politics, and who sets the agenda? Queer Theory seeks ^definition in order to combat the inherent divisiveness created within identity politics and disrupt rigidly constructed binaries. However, materiality, material reality, and the lived experiences of individuals/communities residing in the margins and overlaps of structural racism, classism, sexism, and heterosexism seem overlooked. Therefore, Queer Theory, perhaps, purports alternative and liberatory strategies in theory, but encounters many difficulties when attempting coalitional politics and everyday activism

#### Queer theory fails — it provides no solution to improve real living conditions for LGBTQ individuals

Kirsch 2k — Max Kirsch, Associate Professor of Anthropology at Florida Atlantic University, 2000 (“Roles and Subversions: Professing Parody,”*Queer Theory and Social Change*, PPublished by Routledge Press, ISBN: 0415221854, p. 97-98)

Queerness as a deviant form of heterosexuality results in oppression. When this fact is not confronted, it can lead to maladaptive responses that include the markings of internalized homophobia: depression, psychosis, resignation, and apathy. These are very much reactions to the ways in which we view ourselves, which in turn are, at least in part, due to the ways in which we are constantly told to view ourselves. Here, the production of consciousness takes a very concrete form. Those enduring this form of violence cannot, even in the academy, simply decide to disengage. We cannot simply refuse to acknowledge these facts of social life in our present society, and hope that our circumstances will change. Although the lack of definition is what has inspired the use of "queer," it cannot, as Butler herself asserts, "overcome its constituent history of injury" (1993b: 223). Be that as it may, "queer," as put forward by Queer theorists, has no inherent historical or social context. We continually return to the following question: to whom does it belong and what does it represent? These advocates of "queer" do not acknowledge that *queer* is produced by social relations, and therefore contains the attributes of existing social relations. As I have shown, Queer theory, particularly as it is expressed in Butler's writings on performativity, dichotomizes the political as personal and the political as social action into a binary that positions political action in impossible terms. The nature of the "political" is never clearly discussed, and remains a chasm (cf. Kaufman and Martin, 1994). However appealing the notion of positioning the self through a reinterpretation of the "I" may be, it is misguided as political action: it cannot generate the collective energy and organization necessary to challenge existing structures of power. As Michael Aglietta observes, "There is no magical road where the most abstract concepts magically command the movement of society" (1979: 43). The question of polities, then, brings us back to where we began: what is the nature of the political and how do we address it? Is it beneficial to maintain alliances with established political parties? Can we adopt the dominant values of our culture and still hope to change the dynamics of those values? How do we form alliances with other oppressed groups? Is there a structural economic basis for such an alliance, or should we look elsewhere? Perhaps most importantly: is it possible, given the tremendous resources represented by the dominant and coercive ideology of our present social relations, to maintain the energy necessary to develop and continue modes of resistance that counter it? In the last question, as I will show, lies an answer to the issue of alliances and structural identification. But first, we need to refocus the discussion.

### 1NC -- Turn -- Futurism Bad

#### The promise of better future begs the question of whether future will ever arrive. This future is underwritten by black, brown, and queer death. The only starting point is a refusal of the future that demands the endless accumulation of these deaths. This turns the case which invests in futurity.

Dillon 13

[Stephen Dillon, “’It’s here, it’s that time:’ Race, queer futurity, and the temporality of violence in *Born in Flames*. Women & Performance, 2013, 38-51. At 44-6. MYY]

Throughout Born in Flames, countless members of theWomen’s Army declare: “This is our time.” The time of the revolution was not the time to abolish anti-blackness, white supremacy, and heteropatriarchy. It was a time that left behind and captured poor (queer) women of color through the progress of democracy and equality. In this way, “our time” and state time are two antagonistic temporalities of violence in the film. As James Scott argues, the modern state’s utopian aim is to reduce the disorderly and chaotic social order under its purview into a mirror of the administrative knowledge central to its observations and governance. The state works to produce temporal and spatial intelligibility with the goal of manufacturing the orderly administration and regulation of the nation’s population, resources, and infrastructure. By disrupting and dismantling spaces, populations, and 0epistemologies that are illegible to its regimes of knowing and governance, the modern state creates a utopia of visibility and legibility that is open to policing and control (Scott 1998, 82). The management of time is central to this process. “Our time” is what the state seeks to capture. In Born in Flames, state time extends and expands the violence of the past, while “our time” is a temporal regime that exceeds and undoes state time. Again, Fanon proves useful for understanding these differences. In The Wretched of the Earth, Fanon describes a “time lag, or a difference of rhythm, between the leaders of a nationalist party and the mass of the people” (Fanon 1963, 107). According to Fanon, the rank and file of anti-colonial rebellions demand the complete and utter immediate destruction of the forms of power that render them “more dead than alive,” while both colonial and nationalist governments attempt to manage, temper, and restrain the demands of those who have no more time to give to the promises of a future that is always coming, but never arrives (51). For example, in the film, the state promises that “in the future” there will be jobs, an end to sexual violence, and racial and gender equality. But for Fanon, the “hopeless dregs of humanity” (or the wretched of the earth) are filled with an “uncontrollable rage” and thus exist in a temporal regime apart from that of the party or the nation. This is a time of intensity and immediacy (“the slaves of modern times are impatient”), where the future of the present as it is means no future at all (74). Like the financial, epistemological, and racialized legacies of slavery Baucom sees intensifying in our current moment, Fanon diagnoses the future of colonialism as the accumulation of the social, biological, and living death of the native. The native lives a death in life produced by the racism of slavery and colonialism. The future’s horizon is the accumulation of past forms of racial terror and violence. In this way, Baucom and Fanon draw connections between race and time that are crucial to questions of queer futurity. The relationship between race, gender, death, and the future is central to the immediacy and spontaneity of the Women’s Army and is foundational to the film’s critique of the future. We can turn to the Fanonian-inspired prison writings of George Jackson to further explore the relationship between death, race, and the future. In his 1972 text Blood in My Eye, published shortly after he was shot and killed by guards at San Quentin prison, Jackson writes of racism, death, and revolution: Their line is: “Ain’t nobody but black folks gonna die in the revolution.” This argument completely overlooks the fact that we have always done most of the dying, and still do: dying at the stake, through social neglect or in U.S. foreign wars. The point is now to construct a situation where someone else will join in the dying. If it fails and we have to do most of the dying anyway, we’re certainly no worse off than before. (Jackson 1972, 6) Here, Jackson argues that the social order of the United States is saturated with an anti-blackness that produces, in the words of RuthWilson Gilmore, “the state-sanctioned or extralegal production and exploitation of group-differentiated vulnerability to premature death” (2007, 28). Jackson’s text is littered with a polemic that links race and death in a way that preemptively echoes Michel Foucault’s declaration that racism is the process of “introducing a break into the domain of life that is under power’s control: the break between what must live and what must die” (Foucault 2003, 254). When Jackson, Gilmore, and Foucault define race as the production of premature death, they make a connection between race and the future. Race is the accumulation of premature death and dying. For Jackson, race fractures the future so that the future looks like incarceration or the premature death of malnutrition, disease, and exhaustion. The future was not the hopefulness of unknown possibilities. It was rather the devastating weight of knowing that death was coming cloaked in abandonment, neglect, incarceration, or murder. In other words, according to Jackson, death was always and already rushing towards the present of blackness. In the last line of No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive, Lee Edelman similarly connects the future to premature death when he references the murder of Matthew Shepard. He writes: “Somewhere, someone else will be savagely beaten and left to die – sacrificed to a future whose beat goes on, like a pulse or a heart – and another corpse will be left like a mangled scarecrow to frighten the birds who are gathering now, who are beating their wings, and who, like the death drive, keep on coming” (Edelman 2004, 154). For Edelman, the future will necessarily continue to produce a world that is unlivable for queer people. In this way, the polemics of black liberation and Edelman’s anti-social thesis share an affinity around the theorization of the future as overdetermined by premature death, yet they diverge in how they imagine death’s relationship to race and power. For Edelman, the future looks like repetition of the death of Matthew Shepard (a white gay man), while for Jackson, it looks like the premature death of incarceration, the ghetto, and chattel slavery’s haunting contortion of the present. In other words, the state and anti-blackness were central to the anti-sociality of the black liberation movement. Within Jackson’s analysis, the state is the primary mechanism for unevenly distributing racialized regimes of value and disposability. Following the writing of Fanon, Jackson argued that for this relationship to be abolished: “The government of the U.S.A and all that it stands for, all that it represents, must be destroyed. This is the starting point, and the end” (Jackson 1972, 54). Jackson’s polemic crescendos when he describes the future he desires: We must accept the eventuality of bringing the U.S.A to its knees; accept the closing off of critical sections of the city with barbed wire, armed pig carriers criss-crossing the city streets, soldiers everywhere, tommy guns pointed at stomach level, smoke curling black against the daylight sky, the smell of cordite, house-to-house searches, doors being kicked down, the commonness of death. (Jackson 1972, 55) If the past and present have produced the accumulation of the premature death of black people, then Jackson imagines the complete undoing of the social order as the way out of temporal capture. The future of the social order means no future, and so the future must come to an end. Fanon similarly imagines the relationship between the native and the future of the social order: “They won’t be reformed characters to please colonial society, fitting in with the morality of its rulers; quite on the contrary, they take for granted the impossibility of their entering the city save by hand grenades and revolvers” (Fanon 1963, 130). Here, the invitation to the safety and security of the city (or the social order as it is) is an offer to continue a life that is a half-life. Possibility comes from a starting point that is an end.

### 1NC -- Turn -- Politics Good

#### Their theory of the political is incorrect – politics is a site of reform – that’s why people vote, care about the environment and live in communities – there is value in tangible improvements in the human condition

**Brenkman 2** (John, Distinguished Professor of English and Comprative Literature at CUNY Graduate Center, Narrative, “Queer Post-Politics”, Volume 10, Issue 2, p. 174-180, Project Muse)

But Edelman interprets this nonrecognition in very different terms from those I have just used. When he asserts that "there are no queers in that future as there can be no future for queers," he is not making a mere statement of protest; rather, he is announcing the theoretical position that is the explicit stake of his entire argument. I [End Page 175] now want to turn to his theoretical project, which involves an argument in political theory and an argument from psychoanalysis and a link between the two. The Political Theory Argument For Edelman the image of the child-as-future is more than a powerful trope in the political discourse of the moment. It in effect defines the political realm: "For politics, however radical the means by which some of its practitioners seek to effect a more desirable social order, is conservative insofar as it necessarily works to affirm a social order, defining various strategies aimed at actualizing social reality and transmitting it into the future it aims to bequeath to its inner child" (19). The burden of this argument is that a genuinely critical discourse cannot arise via the marking or symbolizing of the gap between the present and the future. Such symbolizing has indeed been the defining feature of modern critical social discourse, whether among the Enlightenment's philosophes, French revolutionaries, Marxists, social democrats, or contemporary socialists and democrats. Jürgen Habermas, in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, defines modern time-consciousness itself as a taking of responsibility for the future. Edelman sees in such a time-consciousness an inescapable trap. For him any such political discourse or activity steps into "the logic by which political engagement serves always as the medium for reproducing our social reality" (26). Certainly the political realm—whether viewed from the perspective of the state, the political community and citizenship, or political movements—is a medium of social reproduction, in the sense that it serves the relative continuity of innumerable economic and non-economic institutions. **But it is not simply a mechanism of social reproduction; it is also the site and instrument of social change.** Nor is it simply the field of existing power relations; it is also the terrain of contestation and compromise. Edelman compounds his reductive concept of the political realm by in turn postulating an ironclad intermeshing of social reproduction and sexual reproduction. Here too he takes a fundamental feature of modern society, or any society, and **absolutizes it.** Sexual reproduction is a necessary dimension of social reproduction, almost by definition, in the sense that a society's survival depends upon, among many other things, the fact that its members reproduce. Kinship practices, customs, religious authorities, and civil and criminal law variously regulate sexual reproduction. However, that is **not to say** that the imperatives of social reproduction **dictate** or **determine** or fully functionalize the institutions and practices of sexual reproduction. **The failure to recognize the relative autonomy of those institutions and practices underestimates how seriously** feminism and **the gay and lesbian movement have already challenged** the norms and institutions of compulsory **heterosexuality** in our society. They have done so **through creative transformations in civil society and everyday life and through cultural initiatives and political and legal reforms.** The anti-abortion and anti-gay activism of the Christian Right arose, in response, to alter and reverse the fundamental achievements of these movements. How then to analyze or theorize this struggle? A motif in Edelman's analysis [End Page 176] takes the rhetoric and imagery of the Christian Right and traditional Catholicism to be a more insightful discourse than liberalism when it comes to understanding the underlying politics of sexuality today. I think this is extremely misguided. The Right does not have a truer sense of the social-symbolic order than liberals and radicals; it simply has more reactionary aims and has mobilized with significant effect to impose its phobic and repressive values on civil society and through the state. The Christian Right is itself a "new social movement" that contests the feminist and gay and lesbian social movements. To grant the Right the status of exemplary articulators of "the" social order strikes me as **politically self-destructive** and **theoretically just plain wrong.**

#### Democratic politics can transform social relations without reaffirming homophobia – the affirmative conflates contingent flaws with structural antagonisms.

**Brenkman 2**

John, Professor of English and Comparative Literature, CUNY Graduate School, “Politics, Mortal and Natal: An Arendtian Rejoinder,” Narrative 10:2, <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/narrative/v010/10.2brenkman02.html>, p. 187-8,

In my view, Edelman effaces this difference between democracy and totalitarianism. He attributes to democracy the workings of totalitarianism: he makes no distinction between civil society and the state, equates "the social order" with politics as such, and equates both with the symbolic order. This misconception of democratic politics is what anchors his call for "a true oppositional politics" whose meaning-dissolving, identity-dissolving ironies would come from "the space outside the frame within which 'politics' appears" ("Post-Partum" 181). The democratic state, as opposed to the totalitarian, does not rule civil society but secures its possibility and flourishing; conversely, civil society is the nonpolitical realm from which emerge those initiatives that transform, moderately or radically, the political realm of laws and rights. For that very reason, the political frame of laws and rights, and of debate and decision, is intrinsically inadequate to the plurality of projects and the social divisions within society—there is always a gap in its political representation of the "real" of the social—and for that very reason the political realm itself is **open to change and innovation**. Innovation is a crucial concept for understanding the gay and lesbian movement, which emerged from within civil society as citizens who were stigmatized and often criminalized for their sexual lives created new forms of association, transformed their own lifeworld, and organized a political offensive on behalf of political and social reforms. There was an innovation of rights and freedoms, and what I have called innovations in sociality. Contrary to the liberal interpretation of liberal rights and freedoms, I do not think that gays and lesbians have merely sought their place at the table. Their struggle has radically altered the scope and meaning of the liberal rights and freedoms they sought, first and foremost by making them include sexuality, sexual practices, and the shape of household and family. Where the movement has succeeded in changing the laws of the state, it has also opened up new possibilities within civil society. To take an obvious example, wherever it becomes unlawful to deny housing to individuals because they are gay, there is set in motion a transformation of the everyday life of neighborhoods, including the lives of heterosexuals and their children. Within civil society, this is a work of enlightenment, however uneven and fraught and frequently dangerous. It is **not** a reaffirmation of the symbolic and structural underpinnings of homophobia; on the contrary, it is a challenge to homophobia and a volatilizing of social relations within the nonpolitical realm.

#### The 1AC’s reductive conceptualization of the political homogenizes queer subjectivity -- locks in oppression and makes change impossible

**Power 9** (Nina, Professor at Roehampton University, “Non-Reproductive Futurism” p. 5-6 <http://www.borderlands.net.au/vol8no2_2009/power_futurism.pdf>)

**The supposed futural ‘reason’ of** representative **politics is in effect profoundly fractured and contradictory,** not in the least bit reconciled to either its image of the child, or to its image of itself. **Edelman’s notion of the queer** nevertheless **seems to depend on an overly homogenous picture of the social world. To write, as Edelman** claims to, from ‘the space outside the framework within which politics as we know it appears and so outside the conflict of visions that share as their presupposition that the body politic must survive’ (Edelman, 2004: 3) **involves deliberately superimposing various ‘political’ categories onto various non-political categories**. Thus, **Edelman conflates democracy with the child, rationality with a naïve concept of progress and heterosexuality with reproduction, sweeping away the possibility of collective organisation and action.** As John Brenkman puts it: ‘**Edelman compounds his reductive concept of the political realm by in turn postulating an ironclad intermeshing of social reproduction and sexual reproduction’** (Brenkman, 2002: 176). By neglecting the contradictory economic imperatives at work in political conceptions of the family and fusing politics with reason **Edelman leaves no room at all for what we could call a ‘queer reason’– queer from the standpoint of representational politics, and neither committed to the child nor to sexual essentialism**. It is here that Rancière’s ideas are relevant. **If a ‘queer reason’ is to make any sense, it is important to separate out two different kinds of rationalism, which Edelman refuses to do**. In a section in Disagreement entitled ‘The Rationality of Disagreement,’ Rancière states the following: Political rationality is only thinkable precisely on the condition that it be freed from the alternative in which a certain rationalism would like to keep it reined in, either as exchange between partners putting their interests or standards up for discussion, or else the violence of the irrational (Rancière, 1999: 43).

## FW -- Supplement

### 1NC---FW

#### The impact is clash- Advocating actions outside the resolution overstretches negative research burdens, which destroys second-level understanding and turns the case

Grossberg 15 **-** Morris Davis Distinguished Professor University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (Lawrence, We All Want to Change the World THE PARADOX OF THE U.S. LEFT A POLEMIC, http://www.lwbooks.co.uk/ebooks/we\_all\_want\_to\_change\_the\_world.pdf)

I will, in the following description, focus on the situation in the human sciences (rather than the hard sciences), where the explosion of publication creates an ever-expanding circle in which there is always too much to read—too many positions, too many arguments, too much contradictory evidence—so that scholars have to rely on either the author's stature or theoretical and/or political agreement. It has become almost impossible to read everything one must read, everything necessary to legitimate, at least in traditional terms, the claim of academic expertise or scholarship. In fact, given this situation (and its consequences as I will describe below), the most surprising thing is how much good work continues to be produced. This situation has serious consequences: First, one's expertise becomes defined in increasingly narrow terms, resulting in the proliferation of sub-fields.9 **[insert footnote 9]** For example, one might point to security studies, surveillance studies, transition studies, game studies, code studies, hip-hop studies, horror studies, etc. **[Footnote 9 ends]** And while each of them is valuable for their interdisciplinary efforts around a new empirical field, they all too often act as if the questions (and the realities they interrogate) are new; unfortunately, they rarely say anything new or surprising, anything that has not been said elsewhere. They frequently simply re-discover in their own empirical "pocket" universe what others have said previously in other fields. For example, all sorts of technologically defined sub-fields rediscover the rather old assumption that media audiences are active. This is partly because, within each subfield, one gets the impression of witnessing endless redistributions of a highly circumscribed set of citations and authors, under a series of ever-changing terms to describe their fields or positions. So, academics create ever shrinking circles in which authors cite a few theoretically and politically compatible works, and then follow the footnotes, all of which ultimately lead back to the original authors, creating an endlessly self-referential closed system of citations, a numbingly predictable, circular tissue of references. Second, one is less likely to read work that appears tangential but may nevertheless be absolutely decisive to producing truly interesting and insightful research. Asking significant questions should demand that one makes reference to all sorts of concepts and questions which would lead one to follow other unexpected traditions and lines of research, since any investigation (e.g., around questions of participation, publics, or leadership, to use only a few examples that have irked me recently) is likely to open up to an entire history of problematization, of conversations and debates, but who can afford the time and energy anymore. Third, one tends to read only the most recent work since so much is being published—in various media—so rapidly that there is little time to go back and read. Fourth, one tends to select one's sources according to criteria that have more to do with theoretical and political sympathies than with an understanding of research as a conversation with difference. One reads selectively, finding those ideas that are already in line with what one assumes one already knows, and one establishes a body of near-sacred texts; fifth, one selects topics that are au courant, partly because there is less scaffolding that one has to build upon and partly because one's work is more likely to gain visibility and impact. Sixth, complexity goes out the door as one increasingly "sees the world in a grain of sand." One can no longer be satisfied claiming to have discovered merely a new piece of a complex puzzle or even an interesting redeployment of an older practice or structure, because such claims do not bring fame and glory—either to oneself or the university. Instead, one has to have discovered the leading edge, the new key or essence. One good but relatively small idea is expanded into a metonym for the entire economy, culture or society. Instead of seeking new discursive forms to embody complexity, uncertainty and humility, one goes with elegance, hyperbole and the ever receding new.

#### Debates over the specific details of the implementation of a plan breaks cycles of polarization- debates about value systems in the abstract reinforce it.

Wray Herbert 12 {Wray Herbert is the author of the book On Second Thought: Outsmarting Your Mind's Hard-Wired Habits. He is an award-winning journalist who has been writing about psychological science for more than 25 years. He’s citing Philip Fernbach, a psychological scientist at the University of Colorado. 9/26/2012. “Extremist Politics: Debating the Nuts and Bolts.” <https://www.huffpost.com/entry/extremist-politics-debating-the-nuts-and-bolts_b_1914307>}//JM

Starting next week and through October, President Barack Obama and Gov. Mitt Romney will face off in a series of four televised debates, designed to clarify the candidates’ positions on the most pressing public policy issues confronting the nation today. In place of the ideals and elegant rhetoric of the campaign trail, the leaders of the two major parties will have an opportunity to describe the nitty-gritty of governing: how they will deal with complex matters like affordable health care, foreign policy in the Middle East, job creation, equitable taxation, and more.

But the unfortunate reality is that Americans won’t get much in the way of detail and explanation. If history is any guide, the debate moderators will not press very hard for nuts and bolts, instead allowing the candidates to evade and attack and talk in unhelpful generalities. They will preach in pre-tested catch phrases to the already converted rather than really explaining the difficult day-to-day realities of decision making in a democracy.

Cynics will say that it doesn’t matter, that voters’ minds are made up anyway. But if national debates aren’t the venue for challenging citizens’ thinking, then what is? Voters need to understand the prosaic details of complex policies. Most have staked out positions on these issues, but they are not often reasoned positions, which take hard intellectual work. Most citizens opt instead for simplistic explanations, assuming wrongly that they comprehend the nuances of issues.

Psychological scientists have a name for this easy, automatic, simplistic thinking: the illusion of explanatory depth. We strongly believe that we understand complex matters, when in fact we are clueless, and these false and extreme beliefs shape our preferences, judgments, and actions — including our votes.

Is it possible to shake such deep-rooted convictions? That’s the question that Philip Fernbach, a psychological scientist at the University of Colorado’s Leeds School of Business, wanted to explore. Fernbach and his colleagues wondered if forcing people to explain complex policies in detail — not cheerleading for a position but really considering the mechanics of implementation — might force them to confront their ignorance and thus weaken their extremist stands on issues. They ran a series of lab experiments to test this idea.

They started by recruiting a group of volunteers in their 30s — Democrats, Republicans, and Independents — and asking them to state their positions on a variety of issues, from a national flat tax to a cap-and-trade system for carbon emissions. They indicated how strongly the felt about each issue and also rated their own understanding of the issues. Then the volunteers were instructed to write elaborate explanations of two issues. If the issue was cap and trade, for example, they would first explain precisely what cap and trade means, how it is implemented, whom it benefits and whom it could hurt, the sources of carbon emissions, and so forth. They were not asked for value judgments about the policy or about the environment or business, but only for a highly detailed description of the mechanics of the policy in action.

Let’s be honest: Most of us never do this. Fernbach’s idea was that such an exercise would force many to realize just how little they really know about cap and trade, and confronted with their own ignorance, they would dampen their own enthusiasm. They would be humbled and as a result take less extreme positions. And that’s just what happened. Trying — and failing — to explain complex policies undermined the extremists’ illusions about being well-informed. They became more moderate in their views as a result.

Being forced to articulate the nuts and bolts of a policy is not the same as trying to sell that policy. In fact, talking about one’s views can often strengthen them. Fernbach believes it’s the slow, cognitive work — the deliberate analysis — that changes people’s judgments, but he wanted to check this in another experiment. This one was very similar to the first, but some volunteers, instead of explaining a policy, merely listed reasons for liking it. Consider universal health care, for example: It’s highly complex and challenging to explain, but much easier to label it “compassionate” or, alternatively, “European” or “socialist.” So some volunteers were assigned to do the hard explaining and others the simplistic labeling.

The results were clear. As described in a forthcoming issue of the journal Psychological Science, those who simply listed reasons for their positions — articulating their values — were less shaken in their views. They continued to think they understood the policies in their complexity, and, notably, they remained extreme in their passion for their positions. In a final version of the study, volunteers who were forced to confront their inadequate knowledge actually gave less money to the cause, suggesting that with their extremism attenuated, they actually acted more moderately.

Americans in 2012 are about as polarized and partisan as they’ve ever been, and such polarization tends to reinforce itself. People are unaware of their own ignorance, and they seek out information that bolsters their views, often without knowing it. They also process new information in biased ways, and they hang out with people like themselves. All of these psychological forces increase political extremism, and no simple measure will change that. But forcing the candidates to provide concrete and elaborate plans might be a start; it gives citizens a starting place. As former presidential hopeful Ross Perot famously stated, “The devil is in the details.”

#### Educational governmental simulation more likely to produce ethical students than unethical ones

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(“NEGOTIATING NONPROLIFERATION: Scholarship, Pedagogy, and Nuclear Weapons Policy,” 2/17 The Nonproliferation Review, 19:1)

These government or quasi-government think tank simulations often provide very similar lessons for high-level players as are learned by students in educational simulations. Government participants learn about the importance of understanding foreign perspectives, the need to practice internal coordination, and the necessity to compromise and coordinate with other governments in negotiations and crises. During the Cold War, political scientist Robert Mandel noted how crisis exercises and war games forced government officials to overcome ‘‘bureaucratic myopia,’’ moving beyond their normal organizational roles and thinking more creatively about how others might react in a crisis or conflict.6 The skills of imagination and the subsequent ability to predict foreign interests and reactions remain critical for real-world foreign policy makers. For example, simulations of the Iranian nuclear crisis\*held in 2009 and 2010 at the Brookings Institution’s Saban Center and at Harvard University’s Belfer Center, and involving former US senior officials and regional experts\*highlighted the dangers of misunderstanding foreign governments’ preferences and misinterpreting their subsequent behavior. In both simulations, the primary criticism of the US negotiating team lay in a failure to predict accurately how other states, both allies and adversaries, would behave in response to US policy initiatives.7∂ By university age, students often have a pre-defined view of international affairs, and the literature on simulations in education has long emphasized how such exercises force students to challenge their assumptions about how other governments behave and how their own government works.8 Since simulations became more common as a teaching tool in the late 1950s, educational literature has expounded on their benefits, from encouraging engagement by breaking from the typical lecture format, to improving communication skills, to promoting teamwork.9 More broadly, simulations can deepen understanding by asking students to link fact and theory, providing a context for facts while bringing theory into the realm of practice.10 These exercises are particularly valuable in teaching international affairs for many of the same reasons they are useful for policy makers: they force participants to ‘‘grapple with the issues arising from a world in flux.’’11 Simulations have been used successfully to teach students about such disparate topics as European politics, the Kashmir crisis, and US response to the mass killings in Darfur.12 Role-playing exercises certainly encourage students to learn political and technical facts\* but they learn them in a more active style. Rather than sitting in a classroom and merely receiving knowledge, students actively research ‘‘their’’ government’s positions and actively argue, brief, and negotiate with others.13 Facts can change quickly; simulations teach students how to contextualize and act on information.14

#### Policy simulation key to agency -- the detachment that they criticize is key to its revolutionary benefits.

Eijkman 12 The role of simulations in the authentic learning for national security policy development: Implications for Practice / Dr. Henk Simon Eijkman. [electronic resource] <http://nsc.anu.edu.au/test/documents/Sims_in_authentic_learning_report.pdf>. Dr Henk Eijkman is currently an independent consultant as well as visiting fellow at the University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy and is Visiting Professor of Academic Development, Annasaheb Dange College of Engineering and Technology in India. As a sociologist he developed an active interest in tertiary learning and teaching with a focus on socially inclusive innovation and culture change. He has taught at various institutions in the social sciences and his work as an adult learning specialist has taken him to South Africa, Malaysia, Palestine, and India. He publishes widely in international journals, serves on Conference Committees and editorial boards of edited books and international journal

Policy simulations stimulate Creativity Participation in policy games has proved to be a highly effective way of developing new combinations of experience and creativity, which is precisely what innovation requires (Geurts et al. 2007: 548). Gaming, whether in analog or digital mode, has the power to stimulate creativity, and is one of the most engaging and liberating ways for making group work productive, challenging and enjoyable. Geurts et al. (2007) cite one instance where, in a National Health Care policy change environment, ‘the many parties involved accepted the invitation to participate in what was a revolutionary and politically very sensitive experiment precisely because it was a game’ (Geurts et al. 2007: 547). Data from other policy simulations also indicate the uncovering of issues of which participants were not aware, the emergence of new ideas not anticipated, and a perception that policy simulations are also an enjoyable way to formulate strategy (Geurts et al. 2007). Gaming puts the players in an ‘experiential learning’ situation, where they discover a concrete, realistic and complex initial situation, and the gaming process of going through multiple learning cycles helps them work through the situation as it unfolds. Policy gaming stimulates ‘learning how to learn’, as in a game, and learning by doing alternates with reflection and discussion. The progression through learning cycles can also be much faster than in real-life (Geurts et al. 2007: 548). The bottom line is that problem solving in policy development processes requires creative experimentation. This cannot be primarily taught via ‘camp-fire’ story telling learning mode but demands hands-on ‘veld learning’ that allow for safe creative and productive experimentation. This is exactly what good policy simulations provide (De Geus, 1997; Ringland, 2006). In simulations participants cannot view issues solely from either their own perspective or that of one dominant stakeholder (Geurts et al. 2007). Policy simulations enable the seeking of Consensus Games are popular because historically people seek and enjoy the tension of competition, positive rivalry and the procedural justice of impartiality in safe and regulated environments. As in games, simulations temporarily remove the participants from their daily routines, political pressures, and the restrictions of real-life protocols. In consensus building, participants engage in extensive debate and need to act on a shared set of meanings and beliefs to guide the policy process in the desired direction

#### “Resolved” before colon denotes a formal resolution

**AWS ’13** [Army Writing Style; August 24th; Online resource dedicated to all major writing requirements in the Army; Army Writing Style, "Punctuation — The Colon and Semicolon," <https://armywritingstyle.com/punctuation-the-colon-and-semicolon/>]

The colon introduces the following:

a.  A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis.

b.  A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.)

c.  A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it?

d.  A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment.

e.  After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f.  The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock

g.  A formal resolution, after the word "resolved:". Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.

#### The “United States federal government” is the three branches

U.S. Legal ’16 [U.S. Legal; 2016; Organization offering legal assistance and attorney access; U.S. Legal, “United States Federal Government Law and Legal Definition,” <https://definitions.uslegal.com/u/united-states-federal-government/>]

The United States Federal Government is established by the US Constitution. The Federal Government shares sovereignty over the United Sates with the individual governments of the States of US. The Federal government has three branches: i) the legislature, which is the US Congress, ii) Executive, comprised of the President and Vice president of the US and iii) Judiciary. The US Constitution prescribes a system of separation of powers and ‘checks and balances’ for the smooth functioning of all the three branches of the Federal Government. The US Constitution limits the powers of the Federal Government to the powers assigned to it; all powers not expressly assigned to the Federal Government are reserved to the States or to the people.

## K -- Settler Colonialism

### 1NC -- Link -- Transgression

#### The AFF’s conception of “queerness as transgression” presumes a foundational whiteness which privileges fluidity, ability, and mobility at the expense of racialized peoples. This upholds an individualist liberal humanism complicit with capitalism and American exceptionalism.

Puar 7 [Jasbir K., Associate Professor of Women's & Gender Studies at Rutgers University, *Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times*, 2007, p. 21-24]

Some may strenuously object to the suggestion that queer identities, like their "less radical" counterparts, homosexual, gay, and lesbian identities, are also implicated in ascendant white American nationalist formations, preferring to see queerness as singularly transgressive of identity norms. This focus on transgression, however is precisely the term by which queerness narrates its own sexual exceptionalism. While we can point to the obvious problems with the emancipatory, missionary pulses of certain (U.S., western) feminisms and of gay and lesbian liberation, queerness has its own exceptionalist desires: exceptionalism is a founding impulse, indeed the very core of a queerness that claims itself as an anti-, trans-, or unidentity. The paradigm or gay liberation and emancipation has produced all sorts of troubling narratives: about the greater homophobia of immigrant communities and communities of color, about the stricter family values and mores in these communities, about a certain prerequisite migration from home, about coming-out teleologies. We have less understanding of queerness as a biopolitical project, one that both parallels and intersects with that of multiculturalism, the ascendancy of whiteness, and may collude with or collapse into liberationist paradigms. While liberal underpinnings serve to constantly recenter the normative gay or lesbian subject as exclusively liberatory, these same tendencies labor to insistently recenter the normative queer subject as an exclusively transgressive one. Queerness here is the modality through which "freedom from norms" becomes a regulatory queer ideal that demarcates the ideal queer. Arguing that "more reflection on queer attachments might allow us to avoid positing assimilation or transgression as choices," Sara Ahmed notes, "The idealization of movement, or transformation of movement into a fetish, depends on the exclusion of others who are already positioned as not free in the same way."55 Individual freedom becomes the barometer of choice in the valuation, and ultimately, regulation, of queerness. Ahmed's post-Marxian frame focuses on the material, cultural, and social capital and resources that might delimit "access" to queerness, suggesting that queerness can be an elite cosmopolitan formulation contingent upon various regimes of mobility. Ironically, "those that have access" to such cultural capital and material resources may constitute the very same populations that many would accuse of assimilation, living out queerness in the most apolitical or conservatively political ways. I am thinking of queerness as exceptional in a way that is wedded to individualism and the rational, liberal humanist subject, what Ahmed denotes as "attachments" and what I would qualify as deep psychic registers of investment that we often cannot account for and are sometimes best seen by others rather than ourselves. "Freedom from norms" resonates with liberal humanism’s authorization of the fully self-possessed speaking subject, untethered by hegemony or false consciousness, enabled by the life/stylization offerings of capitalism, rationally choosing modern individualism over the ensnaring bonds of family. In this problematic definition of queerness, individual agency is legible only as resistance to norms rather than complicity with them, thus equating resistance and agency. Both Saba Mahmood and Ahmed critique this conflation and redirect their attention to agency that supports and consolidates norms, but even this turn presupposes some general universal understanding of what counts as norm, resistance, and complicity. As Mahmood asks, "[Is it] possible to identify a universal category of acts—such as those of resistance—outside of the ethical and political conditions within which such acts acquire their particular meaning?"56 The rhetoric of freedom is also of course a mainstay in philosophies of liberal democracy and is indeed a foundational tenet of American exceptionalism. But finally, queerness as transgression (which is one step ahead of resistance, which has now become a normative act) relies on a normative notion of deviance, always defined in relation to normativity, often universalizing. Thus deviance, despite its claims to freedom and individuality, is ironically cohered to and by regulatory regimes of queerness—through, not despite, any claims to transgression. While Ahmed also looks to queerness as a challenge predominantly to heteronorms, queer theorists such as Cathy Cohen implicate queer politics in an intersectional model that should also ideally challenge race and class norms as they intersect with heteronorms.57 Other queer theorists might articulate queerness as a poststructuralist endeavor that deconstructs not only heteronorms, but the very logic of identity itself. In the first version of queerness, resistance to heteronorms may be privileged in a way that effaces the effects of this resistance in relation to possible complicities with other norms, such as racial, class, gender, and citizenship privileges. Queer intersectional analyses challenge this regulatory queerness, but in doing so may fail to subject their own frames to the very critique they deploy. In this second formulation, queer of color and queer immigrant communities (not to mention queer of color critique) are always beyond reproach, an untenable position given the (class, religious, gender-queer, national, regional, linguistic, generational) tensions within, among, and between queer diasporic, immigrant, and of color communities, thus obfuscating any of their own conservative proclivities. Conversely, it also holds queer of color organizing and theorizing to impossible standards and expectations, always beholden to spaces and actions of resistance, transgression, subversion. In the last instance, all (of one's) identities (not just gender and sexual) must be constantly troubled, reading to an impossible transcendent subject who is always already conscious of the normativizing forces of power and always ready and able to subvert, resist, or transgress them. It is precisely by denying culpability or assuming that one is not implicated in violent relations toward others, that one is outside of them, that violence can be perpetuated. Violence, especially of the liberal varieties, is often most easily perpetrated in the spaces and places where its possibility is unequivocally denounced.

#### The 1ACs approach to queerness as intrinsically subversive, counterhegemonic, and individuated cleaves the ontological from the political generating a settler neutrality that colludes with settler homo-nationalism and turns the case. The desire to dismantle the notion of identity is a settler desire for the elimination of native people.

Rosenburg 14 (Jordana Rosenberg, Literature Professor at UMass Amherst “The Molecularization of Sexuality: On Some Primitivisms of the Present,” *Theory & Event* Volume 17 Issue 2 GC)

To the extent that queer studies has shifted focus from queer objects to objects more generally, this shift has a double resonance. On the one hand, it represents the critical force of diasporic and queer of color critique to broaden the understanding of sexuality to a set of conjunctural questions that contextualizes the ontological illusion of subjectivity within what Roderick Ferguson describes as the ineluctably political field of subject formation and the production of desire: “If the intersections of race, gender, sexuality and class constitute social formations within liberal capitalism, then queer of color analysis obtains its genealogy within a variety of locations. We may say that women of color feminism names a crucial component of that genealogy as woman of color theorists have historically theorized intersections as the basis of social formations. Queer of color analysis extends women of color feminism by investigating how intersecting racial, gender, and sexual practices antagonize and/or conspire with the normative investments of nation-state and capital.”20

Queer of color critique insists that queerness cannot be understood in isolation from a range of social formations. In doing so, Ferguson notes that this composite of forces (“racial, gender, and sexual practices”) operates with a double valence: an “and/or” logic. It’s this “and/or” that has marked queer theory for the past decade or more. Even as queerness remains a site of resistance to what Elizabeth Freeman has indispensably termed “chrononormativity” – or, what we might understand as the demands of racial capitalism for certain forms of productivity and submission to the status quo – as Jasbir Puar has made clear, queerness has also, in crucial ways, become folded into chrononormativity. For Puar, the conspiring between queer subjects and the nation-state is marked by the “incorporation of queers into the domains of consumer markets and social recognition in the post-civil rights late twentieth century … [as] queers [enter into] the biopolitical optimization of life,” and become “tied to ideas of life and productivity.”21 In both accounts, however, we notice the ways that queer studies has expanded its focus from explicitly “queer” objects to an intersectional or conjunctural account of the social world.

In a special issue of Social Text, “What’s Queer About Queer Studies Now?,” David Eng, J. Jack Halberstam, and Jose Munoz describe this expansion as queer theory’s “subjectless turn”: “What might be called the ‘subjectless’ critique of queer studies disallows any positing of a proper subject of or object for the field by insisting that queer has no fixed political referent … A subjectless critique establishes … a focus on a ‘wide field of normalization’ as the site of social violence.”22 It should be said that this subjectless critique is, itself, marked by a kind of and/or logic. As Andrea Smith has argued, while the subjectless turn opens up queer work beyond the kind of “ethnographic multiculturalism” that attends the neoliberal Humanities more generally, there is also a tendency for this turn to ontologize queerness itself such that the fundamental plays of power that constitute that social world become normalized and de-specified. Drawing on Puar, Smith argues that the “subjectless” subject of queer critique often unwittingly puts into place a racialized subject that bears the burden of subjectivity: “Puar’s analysis of biopower suggests that modern white queer subjects can live only if racialized subjects trapped in primitive and unenlightened cultures pass away” (49).

Smith’s focus here has to do with explicating the relationship between settler colonialism and queerness – tracing how this relation comes to be encoded at the level of the body, of desire, and in the habitus of the everyday. More than this – and more to the point for our work here – Smith elucidates how origin narratives embed themselves at the heart of not only queer subject formation, but queer theory as well. Building on her claims regarding the subjectless turn, and citing Elizabeth Povinelli, Smith argues that: “queer politics and consciousness often rely on a primitivist notion of the indigenous as the space of free and unfettered sexuality that allows the white queer citizen to remake his or her [their] sexuality. However, once this sexual praxis is engaged, it does not translate into solidarity with indigenous peoples’ land struggles. The subjectless critique thus calls attention to both the importance of Native peoples within scholarly work and their disappearance within this work. At the same time, it may be the case that it is in fact a subjectless critique that disguises the fact that the queer, postcolonial, or environmentally conscious subject is simultaneously a settler subject” (52).

To reiterate: the despecification of the queer object, for Smith, runs the risk of despecifying, as well, the historical forces that make “queerness” appear legible as an ontologically abstract force in the first place: “what seems to disappear within queer theory’s subjectless critique are settler colonialism and the ongoing genocide of Native peoples” (49).23 When queerness comes to indicate an ontological or essential form of resistance, we can lose sight of the conditions that make queerness as such legible in the first place. Scott Morgensen describes this in terms of a “settler rationality” at the heart of Western queer subject-formation; “settler rationality” might thus be understood as a way for queer whiteness to appropriate fantasized forms of primitive indigeneity, so to naturalize the displacement and extermination of indigenous people from the settler colony.24

Although this is a necessarily hasty summary of recent developments in queer theory, we might say that the broadening of the ambit of queer study beyond the queer subject follows an “and/or” logic: it both reaches toward historical materialist and (pace Ferguson) intersectional analyses, and it has the potential to “conspire” with the erasure of the specificities of racial capitalism and the underlying settler-colonial logic of modern Western culture. Let us simply say, then, that the subjectless turn has been at once a turn toward the historical specification of queerness in the context of racial capitalism, and, at times, a flight into an ontological queerness that at times attenuates such specification.

### 1NC -- Link -- Competing Pedagogies

#### Engaging in critical theories and pedagogies in order to have a competing narrative of oppression distracts from the initial problem of settler colonialism that enabled that oppression in the first place

Byrd 11 (Jodi A., citizen of the Chickasaw Nation of Oklahoma and assistant professor of American Indian studies and English at the University of Illinois at Urbanandash;Champaign. “The Transit of Empire: Indigenous Critiques of Colonialism,” University of Minessota Press) AF

There is more than one way to frame the concerns of The Transit of Empire and more than one way to enter into the possibilities that transit might allow for comparative studies. On the one hand, I am seeking to join ongoing conversations about sovereignty, power, and indigeneity—and the epistemological debates that each of these terms engender—within and across disparate and at times incommensurable disciplines and geographies. American studies, queer studies, postcolonial studies, American In dian studies, and area studies have all attempted to apprehend injury and redress, melancholy and grief that exist in the distances and sutures of state recognitions and belongings. Those distances and sutures of recognitions and belongings, melancholy and grief, take this book from the worlds of Southeastern Indians to Hawai'i, from the Poston War Relocation Center to Jonestown, Guyana, in order to consider how ideas of “Indianness” have created conditions of possibility for U. S. empire to manifest its intent. As liberal multicultural settler colonialism attempts to flex the exceptions and exclusions that first constituted the United States to now provisionally include those people othered and abjected from the nation-states origins, it instead creates a cacophony of moral claims that help to deflect progressive and transformative activism from dismantling the ongoing conditions of colonialism that continue to make the United States a desired state formation within which to be included. That cacophony of competing strug gles for hegemony within and outside institutions of power, no matter how those struggles might challenge the state through loci of race, class, gender, and sexuality, serves to misdirect and cloud attention from the underlying structures of settler colonialism that made the United States possible as oppressor in the first place. As a result, the cacophony produced through U.S. colonialism and imperialism domestically and abroad often coerces struggles for social justice for queers, racial minorities, and immigrants into complicity with settler colonialism.

### 1NC -- Root Cause -- Heteropatriarchy

#### Heteronormativity in today’s society can be directly traced back to settler colonialism

**Morgensen 11** (Scott Lauria, assistant professor of gender studies at Queen’s University, “Spaces between Us: Queer Settler Colonialism and Indigenous Decolonization”, University of Minnesota Press, 11/17/11, pp. 31-53)//JSL

Modern sexuality arises in settler societies as a function of the biopolitics of settler colonialism. In the United States, the sexual colonization of Native peoples produced modern sexuality as "settler sexuality": a white and national heteronormativity formed by regulating native sexuality and gender while appearing to supplant them with the sexual modernity of settlers. Queer modernities in a settler society are produced in contextual relationship to the settler colonial conditions of modern sexuality. White settlers promulgating colonial heteropatriarchy queered native peoples and all racialized subject populations for elimination and regulation by the biopolitics of settler colonialism. Achille Mbembe has adapted Giorgio Agamben's account of biopower to colonial situations by explaining colonial rule as "necropolitics," or a positioning of the space-time of the colony in a state of exception to Western imperial rule.1 Mbembe invites revisiting the racialization and sexualization of colonial situations, including in white settler societies in the Americas that formed multiracial societies from the transatlantic slave trade, colonized indentured labor, and genocidal control of Indigenous peoples under European settlement. However, to pursue such an account, scholars must explain how the colony comes to be located in a state of exception in context of white-supremacist settler colonialism and the logic of Indigenous elimination. Mbembe's account limited its analysis to modern regimes of colonial biopolitics that arose in the nineteenth-century European franchise colonization of Africa and Asia. As a practice that is not past but continues today, the biopolitics of settler colonialism requires specific study.2 This chapter names necessary elements to such an account, narrowed to explain the settler colonial necropolitics that queered native peoples in the Americas by targeting modes of embodiment, desire, and kinship that Native queer and Two-Spirit people reclaim as their and their peoples' histories. I argue that the biopolitics of settler colonialism produces settler sexuality as the context traversed by non-Native and Native people formulating queer modernities. The queering of native peoples defined not only settler sexuality, broadly, but also the definition of queer subjects among white settlers: as a primitive, racialized sexual margin akin to what white settlers attempted to conquer among natives. when queer white settlers reversed such discourses—notably by laying claim to the colonial object berdache3—they argued their inclusion in settler society by traversing normative paths to settler citizenship, which incorporate and transcend ties to native roots to achieve national belonging. non-native queer modernities form by gathering a multiracial, transnational constituency as a diversity that exists in a non-native relationship to disappearing indigeneity. Yet, narrating native disappearance distinguishes non-native queer modernities from the survival of native queer people, who negotiate settler sexuality by recalling knowledges and practices queered by colonial hetero-patriarchy. native people defined unique identities, including two-Spirit, as modern, decolonizing native critiques of settler colonialism and its structuring of non-native queer projects. this chapter grounds my interpretation of non-native and native queer modernities within a genealogy of white-supremacist settler colonialism as the condition of sexual modernity and its contestation in a settler society.

#### Settler colonialism is at the core of the heteropatriarchy, and critiques of such heteronormativity that fail to first comprehend that role recreate settler colonialism – only a prior breakdown of the politics of the settler can resolve either impact

**Morgensen 11** (Scott Lauria, assistant professor of gender studies at Queen’s University, “Spaces between Us: Queer Settler Colonialism and Indigenous Decolonization”, University of Minnesota Press, 11/17/11, pp. 1-28)//JSL

This book examines how **settler colonial power relations among native and non-native people define the status "queer**." It argues that modern queer subjects, cultures, and politics have developed among natives and non-natives in linked, yet distinct, ways. The imposition of colonial heteropatriarchy relegates native people and all non-native people of color to queered statuses as racialized populations amid colonial efforts to eliminate native nationality and settle native lands. Modern sexuality comes into existence when the heteropatriarchal advancement of white settlers appears to vanquish sexual primitivity, which white settlers nevertheless adopt as their own history. When modern sexuality queers white settlers, their effort to reclaim a place within settler society produces white and non-native queer politics for recognition by the state. Yet memories and practices of discrepant sexual cultures among Indigenous peoples and peoples of color persistently trouble the white settler logics of sexual modernity. For instance, native modes of kinship, embodiment, and desire such as those today called "Two-Spirit" produce Native queer modernities that denaturalize settler colonialism. **the comparative studies in this book show settler colonialism as the context in which non-native and native people produce modern queer subjects, cultures, and politics**. A methodological shift in native studies heralded by such scholars as Linda Tuhiwai Smith and Robert warrior theorizes settler colonialism by tracing the "intellectual histories" (Warrior) and methods of Native peoples practicing survival, resistance, and decolonization.2 Scholarship in settler colonial studies must support this turn, as when Patrick Wolfe theorizes settler colonialism as "a structure, not an event" that calls for a sustained denaturalizing critique.3 Andrea Smith calls on Native studies to refuse its "ethnographic entrapment" in the description of Native cultures and instead become an interdisciplinary site for explaining and transforming a world defined by settler colonialism.4 She promotes this shift by invoking queer theory, which displaced the description of sexual minorities in gay/lesbian studies by theorizing heteronormativity as a power relation that conditions all subjects and social life.5 Scholars at the intersections of Native and queer studies have responded to these calls by demonstrating that each field is intrinsic to the other.6 Smith explains that "the heteronormativity of settler colonialism" has subjected Native and non-Native people to settler colonial rule and regimes of modern sexuality. In this context, "queer" statuses accrue to nonheteronormative identities—such as gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender, or queer—**after colonial heteropatriarchy first redefines embodiment, desire, and kinship to eliminate Native culture, control racialized populations, and secure**, in Sherene Razack's term, **a "white settler society**." In this book, queer will refer to statuses produced by the heteropatriarchal power of white supremacist settler colonialism. My analysis joins critics of homo-normativity in arguing that all "queer" statuses are not equivalent.7 Jasbir Puar critiques "homonationalism" as the process whereby whiteness and imperialism create U.S. queer subjects as "regulatory" over peoples queered by U.S. rule.8 I resituate Puar's account to argue that **in a white settler society, queer politics produces a settler homonationalism that will persist unless settler colonialism is challenged directly** as a condition of queer modernities.9 Native and queer studies must regard settler colonialism as a key condition of modern sexuality on stolen land, and use this analysis to explain the power of settler colonialism among Native and non-Native people. This book investigates how settler colonialism produces what I call "non-Native queer modernities," in which modern queers appear definitively not Native—separated from, yet in perpetual (negative) relationship to, the original peoples of the lands where they live. The phrase suggests a settler colonial logic that disappears indigeneity so it can be recalled by modern non-natives as a relationship to native culture and land that might reconcile them to inheriting conquest.10 Thus, "non-native" signifies not a racial or ethnic identity but a location within settler colonialism. non-native queer modernities naturalize settler colonialism when they confront queer differences as racial or diasporic in a manner that sustains native disappearance. If queer subjects align with whiteness or homonationalism, their settler colonial roots may seem clear. But **even multiracial and transnational queer critiques of racism and imperialism can erase native people and naturalize settler colonialism** in ways that indirectly or directly define queer modernity as not native. This book examines "native queer modernities" as projects that formed historically precisely to displace the settler colonial logics that sustain "non-native queer modernities."

#### Theorizations of queerness that don’t centralize settler colonialism recreate queer citizenship and homonationalism

**Morgensen 10** [2010, Scott Lauria Morgensen, SETTLER HOMONATIONALISM, GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies, Volume 16, Number 1-2: 105-131]

Modern sexuality arose in the United States as crucial to a colonial society of normalization. The violent sexual regulation of Native peoples became a proving ground for forming settler subjects as agents and beneficiaries of modern sexuality. Their subject positions arose relationally within the colonial biopolitics of modern sexuality and call for broad analysis in queer, American, and Native studies. 40 I now ask how colonial histories made settlement a primary condition of the formation of modern queer subjects and politics in the United States. I reexamine scholarship in queer studies that suggests this claim, and I mark how future queer scholarship can center the study of settler colonialism, including as a condition of homonationalism. Settler colonialism is the open secret in most historical work in U.S. sexuality studies and queer studies. Settler colonialism **conditioned every aspect of the history of sexuality in the United States**, but only rarely has it been made a focus of study. My account has suggested a convergence between the sexual colonization of Native peoples and the growth in the United States of techniques of modern sexuality. These proliferated in the decades following the frontier’s “closure,” a time that in fact represented a heyday of state and religious efforts to institute a colonial education of desire, as in the events at the Crow Agency or during the 1879 – 1918 tenure of the Carlisle Indian School. Far from reflecting finality, this period witnessed tense negotiations of active and contested settlement. In such a time, any iteration of modern sexuality that placed Native people in the past knew itself to be a contingent claim that remained open to challenge. Thus scholars must recognize that modern sexuality is not a product of settler colonialism, as if it came into being in the United States after settlement transpired. Modern sexuality arose in the United States as a method to produce settler colonialism, and settler subjects, by facilitating ongoing conquest and naturalizing its effects. The normative function of settlement is to appear inevitable and final. It is naturalized again **whenever sexuality or queer studies scholars inscribe it as an unexamined backdrop to the historical formation of modern U.S. sexual cultures** and politics. Scholars in Native and American studies have theorized settler colonialism as the social processes and narratives that displace Native people while granting settlers belonging to Native land and settler society. With Renée Bergland and James Cox, I examine how this displacement is enabled by settler narratives of Native absence or disappearance.41 Both terms share a quality of invoking the very thing being argued as not present. Stories of Native absence or disappearance thus precisely do not erase Native people but produce particular forms of knowledge about Native people, as already or inevitably gone. Cox argues that tales of Native disappearance should also be read as narratives of settlement. The very absence of Native people in a story is telling us a story about qualities of settler subjects, cultures, and social life. Queer scholarship on race and sexuality has been effective at marking colonial relations and discourses and inviting the study of settlement. Scholars reveal that in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, sexual sciences and civil institutions distinguished primitive from civilized sexuality in order to define queer margins for sexual normality. Eithne Luibhéid and Roderick Ferguson explain how Asian immigrants and conquered Mexicans after the midnineteenth century, and African Americans during slavery and the Jim Crow society, were produced as racial and sexual populations for national regulation.42 Queers of color in such contexts were targeted for control, but as emblems of entire racial populations to be queered as the primitive margins of national whiteness and its civilizational sexuality.43 In turn, Jennifer Terry and George Chauncey, among others, explain how sexual sciences classified perversions by documenting white subjects as degenerates who had regressed to prior stages of racial evolution. 44 In early activism, white sexual minorities reversed discourse on sexual primitivity in order to embrace it as a nature deserving recognition by modern citizenship. In the United States, Harry Hay organized the Mattachine Society by referencing stories of berdache as the primitive nature of sexual minorities and as a primitive model of acceptance that modern societies could emulate — themes that were sustained in homophile and gay and lesbian civil rights activism.45 Each such moment is illuminated by its relation to settlement. As Luibhéid’s remarkable historical research suggests, the structural locations of non- Native people of color within the biopolitics of modern sexuality in the colonial and imperial United States align with those assigned to Native peoples by sexual colonization.46 Their distinctive encounters with racial and sexual power thus may be examined as interrelated effects of the United States forming as a colonial power through processes of settlement. Yet studying their ties also will mark the many nonidentical locations occupied by non-Natives, including queers of color, in relation to Native people under colonial conditions of settlement. In turn, white U.S. sexual minorities who defended their sexual primitivity **articulated normative practices of settler citizenship**. Philip Deloria and Amy Kaplan have examined settler citizenship as based on the conquest and incorporation of primitivity, so that primitivity becomes a resource to be drawn on when asserting the unique strengths of a settler civilization.47 Modern sexuality discourses also taught white U.S. American men to tap and control their primitive roots, as when G. Stanley Hall’s recapitulation theory of play or youth health movements in the YMCA invited white youth to explore primitive developmental stages so as to become civilized adults with virile sex and sexuality.48 White U.S. sexual minorities thus organized in a political culture that already validated a journey to personhood and citizenship that translated primitive roots into settler modernity. Defending primitive sexual nature, which could include appropriating Native American culture as part of their history, translated their queer marginality into a normative assertion of settler citizenship. Focusing on settlement also marks the way that theories of degeneration assigned to modern queers in the early-twentieth-century United States presumed Native disappearance. As degenerates, modern queers appeared as failed subjects, incapable of representing either white civilization or authentic primitivity. Yet this framing **also naturalized them across racial differences as non-Native**, in that it presumed that authentic Native people had already disappeared from the modern and settled spaces where queer degenerates would be found. If living Native people ever did appear in those spaces, they tended to present as out of place. For instance, Nayan Shah’s compelling history of sexuality and migration cites a California police report from 1918, which criminalized a relationship between a South Asian migrant man and an American Indian youth by narrating it as sexual predation. This regulatory moment occurred amid recent histories of scalp bounties and massacres targeting Native peoples across Northern California, including only two years after the death of Ishi, famed survivor of the Yahi tribe. How might popular narratives of lost Native authenticity have shaped the police description of the youth only by his town of origin (Truckee) and his assimilation into a multiracial underclass? How, still, might tales of sexual primitivity persist, as his framing as the passive object of his racialized partner’s desire suggests (without naming) the logic of berdache? 49 In turn, Siobhan Somerville and Kevin Mumford have shown how popular stories and social practices in the early twentieth century linked homosexuality to miscegenation, including representing it as emblematic of white “slumming” for sexual adventure in African American districts of New York City and Chicago.50 Yet in the Northeast, blackness already connoted historical miscegenation with Indianness. Amy den Ouden has explained how in the wake of normative associations of Native people with blackness in New England, Native communities with black family lines could be marked by white authorities as racially inauthentic, thereby delegitimating their Native identities and land claims. In light of this, by the early twentieth century, how did discourses on sexual perversion tie Indianness and blackness to homosexuality, and how did they interlink? Did the histories of black-Indian communities and of their regulation shape modern racial theories of homosexuality? What would a queer history of homosexuality and miscegenation look like if Indianness — as an identity, or an object of colonial discourse — were crucial to analysis?51 Queer studies **must center settler colonialism** and processes of settlement in order to pursue these directions in scholarship. Settler colonialism appears in the relational of colonial and modern sexual regimes; in narratives of sexuality and gender based on Native absence and disappearance, despite evidence of Native survival and resistance; and in the normative formation of settler sexual subjects, cultures, and politics. I argue that queer **accounts of settler colonialism will be supported by studying the colonial biopolitics of modern sexuality**. The frame of colonial biopolitics makes the discursive and institutional relationality of Native and settler subject positions relevant to any account of modern sexuality in the United States. While such accounts have tended to exclude Native people, biopolitics marks erasure as meaningful to narrating settlement, even as that move can be investigated for evidence of the irruption of Native people amid stories of their demise. The frame of colonial biopolitics will also mark how the power relations structuring “Native” and “settler” articulate diverse people, cultures, and politics across differences of race, nation, class, disability, gender, and sexuality that exceed these two terms and their opposition. Yet the normativity of the terms within colonial biopolitics will still inform every U.S. formation of modern sexuality. Studying their relationality can recall that the locations they define for Native people always are exceeded by the discrepant histories and epistemologies of Native people’s interdependent and resistant lives. In turn, the term non-Native can help mark how subjects outside Native communities incompletely fit the term settler — whether excluded from it categorically or asked to pass through or appeal to it — as they negotiate varied non-Native lives in a settler society. Differences among non-Native people of color, or between them and white people, thus will not be erased by marking their shared inheritance of settler colonialism; indeed, doing so will mark those differences, even as their distinctive relationships to settler colonialism and its naturalization become relevant to study.52 In the process, analyzing the colonial biopolitics of modern sexuality will focus queer studies on the work of denaturalizing settlement. I mean here not just that settler colonialism will be marked as a condition of all modern sexual power in the United States but also that the meaningfulness of its naturalization will become a major area of study. We need many more, and more detailed accounts of the subjects, institutions, and power relations that form whenever settler colonialism is naturalized within modern queer projects in the United States. My argument invites scholars to return to **homonationalism and explain it as one crucial effect of the settler histories of modern sexuality** in the United States. We will see that if non-Native queers become sexual subjects of life, **they will do so by joining a colonial biopolitics of modern sexuality that functions to produce modern queers as settler subjects in relation to Native peoples**. Normatively white and national queer politics will arise here by naturalizing settler colonialism, notably when appeals to the settler state fail to trouble its colonial relation to Native peoples and its enforcement of a settler society.53 To invoke Puar, the settler formation of U.S. queer projects will make them “queer as regulatory” over Native peoples, whose social lives will appear distant in time and space despite the continued existence of collective and allied Native activisms for decolonization and calls to non-Natives to join. Homonationalism will arise here, where the historical and contemporary activity of settler colonialism conditions queer modernities in the United States.

#### Analyzing colonialism is a pre-req to addressing the patriarchy – they ignore the sovereignty of native nations

Smith 10 (Andrea, Smith is an American academic, feminist, and activist against violence. Smith's work focuses on issues of violence against women of color and their communities, specifically Native American women. A co-founder of INCITE! Women of Color Against Violence, the Boarding School Healing Project, and the Chicago chapter of Women of All Red Nations, Smith has based her activism and her scholarship on the lives of women of color and long claimed to be Cherokee. Formerly an assistant professor of American Culture and Women's Studies at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor, Michigan, Smith currently serves as an associate professor in the Department of Media and Cultural Studies at University of California, Riverside, “Queer Theory and Native Studies” pg 58-60 accessed 7/10 //um-tw)

The question arises, then, why is settler colonialism so seriously undertheorized in queer studies, even within queer of color critique? One possibility may be that∂ queer studies has not considered the possibility of alternative forms of national-ism that are not structured by nation-states. To be fair, queer theory does offer strong critiques of the heteronormativity of the nation-state as well as the heter-onormativity of the citizen, particularly the U.S. citizen. Puar’s and Gopinath’swork demonstrates how the noncitizen, particularly in the ﬁgure of the refugee or the immigrant, queers the state’s heteronormativity. Berlant also looks at how queer activist groups within the United States attempt to reconﬁgure citizenship within the current nation-state and even to question the “censoring imaginary of the state.”∂ 66∂ Muñoz similarly gestures to “beyond” the current political system when he says, “Our charge as spectators and actors is to continue disidentifying with this world until we achieve new ones.”∂ 67∂ Thus, queer theorists seem to exhibit some desire to think beyond the nation-state .At the same time, queer theory seems to lapse back into presuming the givenness of the nation-state in general, and the United States in particular. Forinstance, Berlant contends: “It must be emphasized . . . that disidentiﬁcation with U.S. nationality is not, at this moment, even a theoretical option for queer citizens. . . .We are compelled, then, to read America’s lips. What can we do to force the ofﬁ-cially constituted nation to speak a new political tongue?”∂ 68∂ This statement curi-ously occludes the struggles of many indigenous peoples who have articulated themselves as belonging to sovereign nations rather than as being U.S. citizens.The reason for this occlusion can be found in another statement: Berlant contendsthat Native peoples “have long experienced simultaneously the wish to be fullcitizens and the violence of their partial citizenship.”∂ 69∂ She collapses Native peo-ples into the category of racial minority rather than recognize them as colonized peoples struggling against a settler state. So the settler state is presumed within queer theory, while (as mentionedpreviously) indigenous nationhood is imagined as simply a primitive mirror image of a heteronormative state. However, many Native scholars and activists are offering internal critiques of contemporary Native politics to imagine potentially nonheter-onormative forms of indigenous nationhood. As Taiaiake Alfred, Glen Coulthard,Denetdale, and others note, Native sovereignty struggles are themselves often articulated within, rather than in resistance to, the logics of settler colonialism.∂ 70∂ That is, articulations of Native governance and sovereignty often mimic the logics of the settler state rather than draw on forms of indigenous governance that call into question many of the logics of nation-state forms of governance. As they argue, Native sovereignty struggles often focus on gaining recognition from the surround-ing settler state. To gain this recognition, Native nations model themselves after∂ colonial states, mirroring their similar colonial logics. Coulthard explains that this politics of recognition also entraps colonized peoples in a death dance with their colonizers. The “key problem with the politics of recognition when applied to thecolonial context . . . [is that it] rests on the problematic assumption that the ﬂour-ishing of Indigenous Peoples as distinct and self-determining agents is somehow dependent on their being granted recognition and institutional accommodation from the surrounding settler-state and society. . . . Not only will the terms of rec-ognition tend to remain the property of those in power to grant to their inferiorsin ways that they deem appropriate, but also under these conditions, the Indig-enous population will often come to see their limited and structurally constrained terms of recognition granted to them as∂ their own∂ . In effect, the colonized come to∂ identify∂ with ‘white liberty and white justice.’ ”∂ 71∂ He calls on indigenous activiststo shift their focus from seeking recognition from the settler state to seeking rec-ognition from each other as well as other oppressed communities. Native peoples’ethnographic entrapment within the academy presumes the politics of recognitionthat Coulthard critiques. That is, Native peoples are compelled to represent them-selves properly in order to gain recognition within the academy — they are notsupposed to deﬁne the terms of discourse itself. ∂ As I have discussed elsewhere, these alternative models of sovereignty are not based on a narrow deﬁnition of nation that entails a closely bounded com-munity and ethnic cleansing. Native activists often articulate indigenous forms of nationhood organized around a logic of citizenship based less on rights withina nation and more on a system of interrelatedness and mutual responsibility.∂ 72∂ Because these visions of national liberation do not necessarily entail a nation-state form of governance as their end goal, they do not imagine a social struc-ture based on social domination. As such, they can∂ potentially∂ challenge logics of heteronormativity because heteropatriarchy is a logic that naturalizes socialhierarchy. That is, if under the logic of heteropatriarchy, men are supposed torule women on the basis of biology, this social hierarchy becomes naturalized. As Karen Warren notes, social domination is effective primarily because it seemsnatural — otherwise, there is no reason why people would want to live under con-ditions of domination.∂ 73∂ Once we challenge the idea that domination is somehow “human nature,” we have the potential to question the naturalization of all its manifestations, including heteropatriarchy

#### Gender and settlerism are intrinsically tied together- Heteropatriarchal colonialism has sexualized indigenous lands while transforming native people into violable subjugated kin to be assimilated into white settler societies- colonial heteropatriarchy structures the lives of all indigenous persons, and that divesting from it will be necessary to collective work for decolonisation.

Scott Lauria Morgensen (2012) Theorising Gender, Sexualityand Settler Colonialism: An Introduction, Settler Colonial Studies, 2:2, 2-22, DOI:10.1080/2201473X.2012.10648839, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/2201473X.2012.10648839

Indigenous feminist and LGBTQ/Two-Spirit criticisms have established the ineluctably gendered and sexual quality of settlers’ attempted conquest of indigenous peoples. This literature teaches that heteropatriarchal colonialism has sexualised indigenous lands and peoples as violable, subjugated indigenous kin ties as perverse, attacked familial ties and traditional gender roles, and all to transform indigenous peoples for assimilation within or excision from the political and economic structures of white settler societies.1 Although these lessons are recorded in scholarly texts, the violences they name have been challenged by indigenous women and LGBTQ/Two-Spirit people who organise for their own and their people’s liberations. Among many examples, the Aboriginal women’s movement in Canada, Two-Spirit organising across North America, and takatapui organising in Aotearoa New Zealand offer grounded theories of gendered and sexual colonisation and of indigenous resistance.2 Crucially, such movements do not restrict their address to persons so-identified, for they argue that colonial heteropatriarchy structures the lives of all indigenous persons, and that divesting from it will be necessary to collective work for decolonisation. Activist and intellectual legacies such as these make possible this collection and its investigations of gender, sexuality, and settler colonialism, and recur continually in our accounts. ‘Calling’, Karangatia, invokes the opening of an exchange of words in which Morgensen, ‘Theorising Gender, Sexuality, and Settler Colonialism’ 5 many will listen and may eventually speak, but within a context first defined by indigenous women who call a diversity of gendered and sexual subjects into conversation. This title, by Michelle Erai’s suggestion, positions both the issue’s contents and our collaboration as co-editors. Whereas I write this introduction as sole author, I do so to present my response as a white settler critic to a context of speaking, listening, learning, and acting that has been defined by the calls of indigenous feminist and LGBTQ/Two-Spirit scholars and activists. With these histories in mind, this introduction and our collection theorise gender, sexuality, and settler colonialism by advancing beyond similar scholarship in colonial studies. For some time now, the very ubiquity of feminist and queer accounts in colonial studies has appeared to explain gender and sexuality in settler-colonial situations. Yet as recent scholarship indicates, the specificity of settler colonialism is obscured if it is presumed to have been explained by general theories of ‘colonialism’.3 All such theories must be revisited to ask if they erroneously generalise specific colonial situations, and to provincialise all such situations by positioning them comparatively. Scholars in colonial and postcolonial studies long have observed that colonial rule comes into being by mobilising gendered and sexual power. Yet this observation in itself does not denaturalise gender or sexuality, as is apparent when even major texts in these fields leave the impression that a natural gendered or sexual order underlies what colonial violence produced.4 Anticolonial feminist and queer accounts show that colonisation’s sexual and gendered methods are inventive, not foreordained; and that liberation will follow disturbing all that colonisation taught, so that distinctive ways of life might be recalled or imagined. Such accounts position ‘gender’ and ‘sexuality’ alongside ‘race’ and ‘nation’ as analytical categories that are freed from any universal referent, in that they designate power-laden arenas of contested knowledge and embodied practice that call for critical and creative engagement. While such insights appear diversely without cohering in any single body of work, they were made possible by the signal contributions of critics within feminist antiracist and anticolonial movements. Indigenous, Black, US/Third World, and women of Morgensen, ‘Theorising Gender, Sexuality, and Settler Colonialism’ 6 colour feminisms synergised with feminists engaged in anticolonial and postcolonial nationalism to displace white settler and Western feminist thought: a history that at the end of the 20th century produced postcolonial and transnational feminisms as arenas where scholars across the global north and south could form alliances in critiquing colonial, racial, gendered, and sexual power.5 The scholarly projects of queer of colour and queer diasporic critique formed in relation to these lineages, as have transnational queer studies that trouble racial or diasporic identity to address the global and imperial scales of sexual power.6 Denaturalising gender, sexuality, race, and nation is a hallmark of such work, as when Chandra Mohanty’s review of writings from the 1980s argued for ‘the inherently political definition of the term women of color’ as designating ‘a political constituency, not a biological or even sociological one’ that coheres around ‘a common context of struggle’. 7 Jacqui Alexander joined Chandra Mohanty in emphasising their commitments to decolonisation, arguing that if ‘decolonization involves thinking oneself out of the spaces of domination’, then this will transpire only ‘through praxis’, which they sought by holding their work responsible to ‘the concrete analyses of collective and organizational practice within feminist communities that offer provisional strategies for dismantling the psychic and social constellations put in place by colonization’. 8

#### Feminist work needs to center settler colonialism—the aff devolves to a liberal multiculturalism where the demands of Indigenous women can never be met. Decolonization is necessary to any true project of emancipation—anything else furthers whiteness and its global settling missions like the war on terror.

Arvin, Tuck, and Morrill 2013 (Maile, assistant professor of Ethnic Studies at UC Riverside, Eve, Associate Professor of Critical Race and Indigenous Studies at University of Toronto, Angie, Director of Title VI Indian Education Program for Portland Public Schools, “Decolonizing Feminism: Challenging Connections between Settler Colonialism and Heteropatriarchy, Feminist Formations, Vol. 25 No. 1, Spring)

Native feminist theories centrally address two intertwined ideas that are significant but often overlooked in feminist discourses: the United States and many other Western countries, including Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, are settler colonial nation-states, and settler colonialism has been and continues to be a gendered process. Because the United States is balanced upon notions of white supremacy and heteropatriarchy, everyone living in the country is not only racialized and gendered, but also has a relationship to settler colonialism. Native feminist theories offer new and reclaimed ways of thinking through not only how settler colonialism has impacted Indigenous and settler communities, but also how feminist theories can imagine and realize different modes of nationalism and alliances in the future (see also Smith 2007).1 This article highlights five central challenges that Native feminist theories pose to gender and women’s studies. With these challenges, we offer suggestions for meaningful engagement, arguing overall that attending to the links between heteropatriarchy and settler colonialism is intellectually and politically imperative. Although this article focuses primarily on gender and women’s studies, Native feminist theories also importantly highlight how ethnic studies has failed to adequately address settler colonialism. Attending to settler colonialism requires a significant departure from how gender and women’s studies and ethnic studies are regularly understood and taught. Conventionally, it is assumed that gender and women’s studies is inclusive of those who identify as women and indeed all people who are gendered, and that ethnic studies addresses Indigenous concerns, along with those of other ethnic groups. These fields teach people to think about themselves in relation to a gendered and racialized society (Omi and Winant 1994). However, engaging settler colonialism involves different frameworks from the ones these fields often prioritize. While both gender and women’s studies and ethnic studies unmask gender and race as social constructions, with often devastating material effects for women and nonwhite people, respectively, these fields also expose various mythologies about gender and race, including the myth of misogyny and racism as to-be-expected characteristics of human nature. Yet, within this important work, too often the consideration of Indigenous peoples remains rooted in understanding colonialism (like statesanctioned slavery) as an historical point in time away from which our society has progressed. Centering settler colonialism within gender and women’s studies and ethnic studies instead exposes the still-existing structure of settler colonization and its powerful effects on Indigenous peoples and others. This recognition within gender and women’s studies and ethnic studies makes possible new visions of what decolonization might look like for all peoples. It also opens up the possibility of new forms of activism based on critically thought-out alliances, rather than always taking the shape of alliances within and between seemingly naturally formed and identifiable groups of people—namely, women and people of color—as given. In fact, the prevalence of liberal multicultural discourses today effectively works to maintain settler colonialism because they make it easy to assume that all minorities and ethnic groups are different though working toward inclusion and equality, each in its own similar and parallel way. Justice is often put in terms that coincide with the expansion of the settler state (see Scott Lauria Morgensen [2011] for a discussion of the compatibility of queer politics with white normativity and settler society). While Indigenous peoples do form important alliances with people of color, Indigenous communities’ concerns are often not about achieving formal equality or civil rights within a nationstate, but instead achieving substantial independence from a Western nationstate— independence decided on their own terms. The feminist concerns of white women, women of color, and Indigenous women thus often differ and conflict with one another. In other words, within the context of land and settler colonialism, the issues facing Indigenous women, as inseparable from the issues facing Indigenous peoples as a whole, are resolved via decolonization and sovereignty, not (just) parity. We write as three Indigenous women–identified scholars situated variously in the disciplines of ethnic studies, education, and Indigenous studies.2 Each of us works to apply Indigenous theories and decolonizing frameworks to contemporary social realities in order to contest the rampant misrepresentations of Indigenous peoples and their lives in school curricula, the media, and the sociological imagination, and Native feminism has given us important tools to do such work. We believe that the challenges this article describes will be relevant to many disciplines, including our home disciplines of ethnic studies, education, and Indigenous studies, where feminist theories have long been important. Yet, we address this article primarily to theorists and activists of mainstream, or “whitestream,” feminism, as well as to other feminisms and nationalisms, including Asian, black, Latina, third world, transnational, and queer feminisms and nationalisms, because greater engagement between Native feminist theories and other feminisms is sorely needed.3 Our challenges respectfully push both conventional modes of feminism and more radical ones, as we see the need to interrogate everywhere what Rey Chow has termed “the ascendancy of whiteness,” a concept denoting the multiple ways that the condition of being white, and enjoying the often nationalist privileges of that whiteness, is made to seem neutral and inviting or inclusive of racial, sexual, and other minorities (Chow, qtd. in Morgensen 2010, 105; see also Puar 2007). By being included (whether by choice, coercion, or force) in whiteness, a wide array of Indigenous peoples, people of color, and queer communities are given the “opportunity” to take part in the settling processes that dispossess just such “other-ed” peoples globally. Such opportunities include everything from participating in the global War on Terror, as scholars like Jasbir K. Puar (2007) brilliantly critique, to naturalizing and maintaining settler colonialism in the United States. We argue that allying one’s self with feminism should not require consenting to inclusion within a larger agenda of whiteness; indeed, we believe that Native feminist theories demonstrate that feminisms, when allied with other key causes, hold a unique potential to decolonize the ascendancy of whiteness in many global contexts.

### 1NC -- Link -- Queer Subject Formation

#### Queer Subject formation depends upon indigeneity as a transitive site for the manifestation of desire as a subject.

Jodi A. Byrd 18 (citizen of the Chickasaw Nation of Oklahoma and associate professor of English and Gender and Women's Studies at the University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign where she is also a faculty affiliate at the National Center for Supercomputing Applications, “LOVING UNBECOMING: The Queer Politics of the Transitive Native,” CRITICALLY SOVEREIGN: Indigenous Gender, Sexuality, and Feminist Studies, joanne barker,-editor, /ejb)

As an emergent field in its own right, then, queer Indigenous studies has begun to stage difficult and important questions about the nature of identity and its discontents, posing quandaries about the possibilities and limits of the transformative politics of gender and sexuality especially where they intersect with race, transnationalism, and colonialism. As queer Indigenous studies begins to articulate some of the stakes for culturally and tribally inflected counter-practices of gender and sexuality, kinship, governance, and relationally, one of the remaining challenges for the field is to interrogate whether the queer in Indigenous studies is the same as the queer in queer studies. At first blush, it might be tempting to assume that the answer is self-evident, the question slightly coy. The question, however, might trouble some of the methodological, theoretical, and quotidian horizons that intersectionality and interdisciplinarity seek to make visible within the fields of Indigenous, gender, and sexuality studies. The queer within Indigenous studies has already come to signify a range of prescribed practices attached to decolonizing desire, gender performance, kinship socialities, and relationities to land and community. Faced with the quandaries that the colonial, racial, gendered, and historical disjunctions of encounter, contact, and orientation have left us, what can desire and grief mean to the colonized if they signal, at their core, modes of dispossession, undoing, firsting, and lasting? What might the subjectlessness that Andrea Smith suggests as intervention to ethnographic entrapment offer queer Indigenous critique if it disallows anything fixed, grounded, located, or, most important, accountable to community, relationality, and connection? As a concept, indigeneity admittedly has had and has required a political referent that is tied to land, relation, and community, even if such referents are fluid and mutable. But at the same time, and as an ideological referent that is always up for grabs, indigeneity remains elusive, ontologically ephemeral, temporally challenged, and captured within the discourses of discovery, enlightennment, and sovereignty. Caught within modes of possession and its lack, Indigenous subjectlessness at the site of the queer simultaneously straddles the threshold between the colonialist practices of replacing the Indigenous, on the one hand, and emptying the Indigenous of any prior signification, on the other. In the grammars of empire where subject formation occurs through the Hegelian dialectics of freedom and enslavement, ownership and property, civilized and savage, sovereign and beast, the Indigenous might be understood as the domain or register in which the tensions between and among these antagonisms become sensible. Indigeneity’s challenge to settler colonial subjectivity and its loss, then, requires us to shift the frame slightly askew to apprehend how the processes of subjectivity—be they queer or normative—cohere, entangle, and unravel in relation to what Elizabeth Povinelli has identified as the governance of the prior. That governance, defined as “the priority of the prior person (or people) as a natural right of all persons and the people as such emerged as an impediment to the previous logics of kingly seizure and to the emergent logic of colonial governance,” hinges on an unresolvable temporal paradox that produces the conditions of indigeneity as prior to and a priority of the law at the same time that the law abjects indigeneity from having any priority at all.24 Returning to a distinction within the conceptualization of subjectless critique may help parse some of these tensions that exist within and between the queer and the Indigenous that have made questions of subjectivity and its temporality so fraught. In Imagine Otherwise, Kandice Chuh advocates for the creation of subjectlessness as a way to “prioritize difference by foregrounding the discursive constructedness of subjectivity,” where the subject “only becomes recognizable and can act as such by conforming to certain regulatory matrices.”25 I want to pry open this space of subjectivity, its regulatory matrices, and its queer refusals to posit that a prior presence, whether we name it Indigenous or something else, retains key transitive properties that enable and, in fact, are required to adhere relationality within the intimacies and violence of empire. According to Karen Elizabeth Gordon, transitive verbs “are those that cannot complete their meaning without the help of a direct object.”26 Like vampires, such verbs feed off an object to sustain, fulfill, and extend themselves in embodied orientations that require the object in order to exist. Such orientations, after Sara Ahmed, “are about the intimacy of bodies and their dwelling places”; they “allow us then to rethink the phenomenality of space—that is, how space is dependent on bodily inhabitance.” 27 Caught in a transitive relationality with indigeneity, settlers cannot achieve their sovereign subjectivities and embodiments without the help of the Native as object to orient them. In other words, the discursive frameworks and “regulatory matrices” of the subject have already been formulated in response to the colonization of American Indians. Within the structuring elements of settler colonialism, subjectivity, claiming to be, and speaking for have gone hand in hand with the theft of lands, the politics of replacement, and the forced normativities of compulsory heterosexuality and lineal descent. The fraught and contradictory desires for and against subjectivities embedded within the ontological orientations of empire are located within the diversity of experiences that have shaped such positionalities as settler, arrivant, and Native. These colonial contexts inform modern claims to Indigenous identity within the racial regimes of U.S. neoliberal multiculturalism and intersect with those queer politics that disrupt static, essential, and normalized privileges of race, class, and gender, on the one hand, and Indigenous identities that are tied to community recognition, sovereignty, and land, on the other. How might desire—which, as Holland has argued, is imbricated within quotidian racist practices—function to reproduce the logics of dispossession at the site of reinvention and becoming for the other? The U.S. Supreme Court, building on an interlocking foundation of precedence for its juridical authority, issued four rulings in June 2013 that hinged on equal protection to arbitrate the triad of sexuality, race, and indigeneity. In the process of maintaining white normativity within heterosexual—and now, by extension, same-sex— family units, the court inveighed on Indigenous identity, fearing the possibility of a remote Indian ancestor to be a disability hampering a child’s full incorporation into the rights due her as a transracial Indian-into- white subject. That fear not only demonstrates the degree to which the legal normativities of embodied ability depend on racializing and colonizing logics to produce the righted subject, but also highlights the transitive form through which the law interpellates indigeneity as difference and recourse. But how did indigeneity become transitive within the regulative fictions of rights and liberties? That answer might be found within the racial integrity acts of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that the Loving v. Virginia landmark ruling in 1967 purportedly overturned. By framing these concerns at a slight slant, it is my hope that we might be able to begin to apprehend how desire and identity function within the context of an ongoing colonialism that adjudicates inclusion and exclusion through a transitive relationality that requires the Native other to make visible the biopolitical structures of race, sexuality, gender, and sovereignty

### 1NC -- Link -- Anti-Normativity

#### Adopting the position of queer anti-normativity inverts rather than eliminates the structures of oppression.

Oswin, 2008 (Natalie – Department of Geography @ the National University of Singapore, “Critical Geographies and the Uses of Sexuality: Deconstructing Queer Space”, *Progress in Human Geography* 32.1, shae)

This move to distinguish queer geographies from the mere study of sexual others is a productive one since queer is indeed not merely a synonym for LGBT. Queer theory is a critical approach that interrogates sexual normativities and orthodoxies. And it recognizes sexuality as a non-essential or unfixed aspect of subjectivity. But to state that subjectivity is unfixed is not to state that it is fluid and capable of obliterating boundaries. Browne states that she does not see ‘queer’ as a ‘simplistically appropriated identity category’ (2006a: 888). Yet she does not repudiate identity politics and ponders what constitutes queer subjectivities and queer spatialities. So, though not a straightforward process, for Browne it is possible to live queer lives. Even if we accept this proposition that queer is a thing that can be possessed or animated by individuals, we must call attention to the fact that no individual that lives in the social world is free-floating or disembodied. As Judith Halberstam argues, ‘postmodern gender theory has largely been (wrongly) interpreted as both a description of and a call for greater degrees of flexibility and fluidity’ (2005: 19). As are all binaries, the binary division of fluidity or rigidity is a fiction that is more productively deconstructed than embraced. So while I agree with Browne that queer and LGBT are not synonymous, I question the analytical usefulness of defining queer as fluid and beyond normativity. Such a move does not reconfigure the mapping of resistant/oppressive onto homosexuals/ heterosexuals. It merely supplants the homosexuals in this equation with ‘queers’ and dismisses Foucault’s lesson that ‘where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power’ (Foucault, 1978: 95).

### 1NC -- Link -- Queer Pessimism

#### The AFFs queer pessimism operationalizes nativeness and the state of nature in order to cohere death as queer. Reject the desire of biopolitical settler sovereignty to become native.

Schotten, 2018 (C. Heike – Associate Professor of Political Science @ the University of Massachusetts-Boston, Queer Terror: Life, Death, and Desire in the Settler Colony, p. 49-61, shae)

THE FUTURE IS SETTLER COLONIAL Despite my emphasis so far on life and survival, the production of "death" through the inauguration of temporality is just as important as the constitution of life. After all, if life only becomes recognizable as life retrospectively, the same can and must be true about death. Thus, while the sovereign is consistently presented as the beacon of peace in Leviathan, war and death are just as much his creations as are peace and life. This is one, merely formal way of substantiating the claim that biopolitics is simultaneously and necessarily a necropolitics. However, what is also evident in Hobbes (but notably absent in Edelman) is the important qualification of this bio/necropolitics as specifically colonial. Closer examination of the time/place that is the state of nature makes clear that Hobbes's championing of life is a celebration and protection only of the lives of those who are "civilized," a safeguarding that comes at the necessary expense, obliteration, transfer, removal, and dispossession of "savage" others. In other words, "life" in biopolitical sovereignty is specifically settler life, characterized as "civilization," while" death" demarcates "savagery," or all those who cannot or will not conform to this particular political formation, as its foremost threat. In other words, it is the specifically settler character of "life" that explains the simultaneity and coincidence of sovereignty's bio- and necropolitics. Returning once more to that notorious state of nature, recall my claim that time cannot exist there. Hobbes might potentially be seen as acknowledging this fact insofar as he refers to the state of nature as not only a "time" but also a "condition," two terms he seems to use interchangeably throughout chapter 13. For example, in the first sentence of the paragraph about war, he writes that "during the time men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre."68 Later, entertaining objections to his arguments about the state of nature, he muses, "It may peradventure be thought, there was never such a time, nor condition of warre as this." 69 He then further complicates things by proceeding to conflate time and condition with geographical location, noting immediately thereafter, "and I believe it was never generally so, over all the world: but there are many places, where they live so now"70 – for example, "the savage people in many places of America."71 These ambiguous and confusing characterizations of the state of nature nevertheless cohere around one feature that unites them, which is their ultimately civilizationalist character. First, as already discussed, if the state of nature is a time-an era, say, or an epoch-it is simultaneously a moment that is completely timeless, an existence lacking any dynamism or principle of change. Indeed, although Hobbes famously characterizes life in the state of nature as "solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short,"72 that last adjective is simply unwarranted given that no time is possible there. However rhetorically effective it may be, lodged at the end of a litany of dreary adjectives, life in the state of nature cannot be characterized as short any more than it can be characterized as long or even average because, as Hobbes makes clear, temporality does not pertain to it.73 However, if the state of nature is instead a condition, then it is one of "savagery," as Hobbes makes explicit. Bolstering the view that the state of nature is a story about humanity's prehistory, Hobbes here rehearses the colonialist trope of indigenous peoples as European humanity's ancestors or premodern childhood. Savagery is therefore associated with stalled temporality, timelessness, and the failure of forward movement or progress. Conclusively, however, when referenced as geographical location, Hobbes materializes the state of nature in "America" and the seventeenth-century European notion of the New World, an uncharted territory ripe for exploration and conquest. The specifications of the state of nature as premodern, timeless, "savage," and "America" make clear that the establishment of the commonwealth imposes a distinction not simply between life and death, peace and war, but also between progress and timelessness, modernity and backwardness, civilization and savagery. Each of these categorial pairs functions as a surrogate for the others; taken together, they suggest the deep implication of categories of life and death with colonization and conquest for European political theory. Once sovereignty, civilization, and peace are established as the domain of life, the state of nature, "savagery," and war are established as the domain of death. Nichols writes, "The 'savage' of the Americas thus becomes the symbolic negative – the embodiment of the state of nature itself, and thus all which is to be avoided by civilized men living in civil (political) society."74 The state of nature is most concrete, in Hobbes's varying descriptions of it, as a place-that is, "America." Immediately after declaring this, however, he concedes: But though there had never been any time, wherein particular men were in a condition of warre against one another; yet in all times, Kings, and Persons of Soveraigne authority, because of their Independency, are in continuall jealousies, and in the state and posture of Gladiators; having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their Forts, Garrisons, and Guns upon the Frontiers of their Kingdomes; and continuall Spyes upon their neighbours, which is a posture of War. But because they uphold thereby, the Industry of their Subjects; there does not follow from it, that misery, which accompanies the Liberty of particular men.75 Rescinding his prior example of native North Americans, Hobbes concedes that there never really was any such time or condition as this state of nature. Not only are native peoples not in a state of nature, then, but also, and quite literally, there is no state of nature because, as we have seen, no time is possible there. Instead, Hobbes now claims, in "all times," the situation of international relations is like that of the state of nature, because heads of state are in perpetual warfare with one another. The state of nature, then, is neither a time nor a condition nor a place but, rather, an allegory of interstate behavior. And yet, even in this new global location, anarchy does not lead to the misery of the state of nature Hobbes described earlier because, as he says, sovereigns engage in foreign wars in the interest of securing their domestic subjects (rather than their own personages, presumably). Thus even as a metaphor the state of nature does not exist. It is a time that is no time, a condition that cannot exist in its unconditionality, a place that is nowhere, a representation of the unrepresentable.76 Hobbes's vacillation, confusion, and ultimate retraction of any concrete examples of the state of nature can be productively deciphered by linking it to theories of settler colonialism, on the one hand, and Edelman's critique of futurism, on the other. Regarding the first, Lorenzo Veracini has argued that settler colonialism is distinct from other types of colonialism insofar as its seeks consistently to erase itself as settler colonial, to “supersede the conditions of its operation."77 Following Patrick Wolfe's argument that settler colonialism pursues a “logic of elimination" whereby settlers seek to replace the natives and indigenize themselves post facto,78 Veracini argues that because it aims at the elimination of the native, settler colonialism necessarily aims at its own elimination: The successful settler colonies "tame" a variety of wildernesses, end up establishing independent nations, effectively repress, co-opt, and extinguish indigenous alterities, and productively manage ethnic diversity. By the end of this trajectory, they claim to be no longer settler colonial (they are putatively "settled" and "postcolonial"-except that unsettling anxieties remain, and references to a postcolonial condition appear hollow as soon as indigenous disadvantage is taken into account). Settler colonialism thus covers its tracks and operates towards its self-supersession (this is why, paradoxically, settler colonialism is most recognizable when it is most imperfect-say, 1950s Kenya or 1970s Zimbabwe-and least visible in the settler cities).79 The truly “successful" settler colonial project, in other words, would manage to efface the native entirely, whether through genocide or assimilation or some other form of disappearance-more recently, via a politics of recognition, as Glen Coulthard has argued.80 One way this happens is through the narration of settlement itself, which disappears the native through discourses of nonexistence, invisibility, or terra nullius.81 In Hobbes, this emerges as his inability to definitively locate or circumscribe the state of nature. This is consistent with the originary imaginings of all settler polities. As Veracini observes, “It is not a coincidence that the cultural traditions of the settler polities often focus on real or imaginary locales putatively epitomising specific national attributes: the 'outback,' the 'backblocks,' and, most famously, the 'frontier.' Generally speaking, these are not specific locations, and their most important characteristic is to be always somewhere else.”82 The state of nature is one such highly abstract geographical imagining and, as we have seen, Hobbes displaces it from a time to a condition to a place to a metaphor, eventually determining that it never existed at all, even as a hermeneutic. Of course, regardless of how Hobbes defines or determines the "state of nature," the fact of the matter is that neither settlement nor indigenous people are, in fact, "elsewhere," but ever-present facts of the here and now.83 Yet Veracini argues that settler colonialism must nevertheless constantly imagine native peoples as elsewhere, an act of symbolic displacement that effaces the actual existence of native peoples and erases them even in their existence: If the indigene is fundamental to the settler relation, where the indigene is located does matter. Thus, the "real" indigence is always somewhere else; that is why, to play on Philip J. Deloria's insight, he is always "unexpected" in actual places. Likewise, indigenous peoples are generally not seen in the settler cities, the places where the settlers live. Examples abound; the main point is that discursive devices aimed at redirecting attention away from emplaced settler-indigenous relationships are indeed many. 84 Veracini suggests that all forms of indigenous removal can be characterized as different versions of "transfer," which he argues is foundational to the settler colonial project.85 Regardless of whether we call it transfer or elimination, however, unless and until it is accomplished, settler states engage in all sorts of contortions, both political and ideological, to obscure the native in order to naturalize conquest. In short, disappearance of the land's indigenous inhabitants and subsequent attempts to "indigenize" settlers are the means by which land expropriation is simultaneously naturalized and obscured. Veracini presents this iterative, imaginary displacement either as conceptually embedded in the definition of settler colonialism or else as a kind of bad faith on the settlers' part, potentially implying that a guilty conscience gives rise to a host of defense mechanisms to ward off (knowledge of) conquest. In other contexts, political theorists have considered that such recursive movement is definitive of sovereignty itself, which can establish the law only via a prior, extralegal, and illegitimate assertion of force. Yet the recursive ideological contortions of settler sovereignty are neither the result of guilt nor somehow intrinsic to its conceptual definitions. Robert Nichols has already persuasively argued that the recursive character of settlement is a means of facilitating dispossession, denying the existence of indigenous peoples, and disregarding their claims to land and sovereignty.86 So the materiality of this operation is clear. Yet what to make of the specifically ideological character of this recursivity? What explains the reiterative rationales for conquest that attempt to erase it as conquest at all? Borrowing from Edelman, one might say that while these ideological contortions are fundamental to settler colonialism, they are also fundamental to any futurist narrativization of "life." In other words, the reason why Hobbes cannot definitively locate or circumscribe the state of nature is the same the reason why the settler state seeks ideologically to naturalize settlers as native to the lands they have conquered. It is because, to use Edelman's vocabulary, both are futurist narrativizations of the drive, his Lacanian term for that aspect of human existence that resists any temporal or symbolic determination. Hobbes talks about this in terms of "endeavor." But Edelman's drive/Hobbes's endeavor is what in fact defines the unending present that is the time/condition/place of the state of nature; indeed, Hobbes's state of nature is effectively an attempt at a representation of this drive/endeavor, which both thinkers are clear is unrepresentable. For, while Hobbes defines the motion of human life in terms of desire and aversion, these terms are only appropriate monikers for motion once it becomes perceptible. Before it is manifest in the form of desire, it exists as "small beginnings of Motion, within the body of man, before they appear in walking, speaking, striking, and other visible actions."87 In other words, it is only once endeavor takes an object and becomes motion toward something that it becomes simultaneously apprehensible and also properly called desire, while endeavor away from an object "is generally called AVERSION."88 This drive/endeavor is not only prior to or outside of representation, but it also has no intrinsic justification, much less any clear or uncontroversial narrative articulation. It simply is. Thus any imposition of terms onto it – in order to render it apprehensible, coherent, or legible – is precisely that, an imposition, and thus an explicitly ideological move that serves a particular political agenda. For Edelman, this act of transforming the otherwise unsignifiable endeavor of human existence into "the fictive form of a narrative" 89 is the very definition of politics. As he says, "politics is a name for the temporalization of desire, for its translation into a narrative, for its teleological determination."90 This definition of politics explains his insistence that politics is necessarily "conservative" – because "it works to affirm a structure, to authenticate a social order"91 in its very existence – and also destined to fail. For Edelman, futurism perpetuates "the fantasy of meaning's eventual realization," a realization that is by definition impossible insofar as endeavor itself has no intrinsic meaning and "the future" as its justification is always only ever to come. As the future, it is just out of reach, ever beyond our grasp, “an always about-to-be-realized identity."92 Rather than confront its own, necessary impossibility, Edelman argues that futurism instead generates scapegoats to distract from and take the fall for it, people or places or events that become the displaced, villainized obstacles to futurism's otherwise successful realization. His name for these scapegoats is “queer." This queerness, also unrepresentable because it is another name for the drive/endeavor that politics (that is, narrativization) impossibly seeks to domesticate and resolve, takes on the figure of whatever or whoever threatens the disarticulation of the self and social order, which are ideologically presumed to be the prepolitical premises of our existence. This futile and fantasmatic futurism is a surprisingly apt characterization of the settler state, the full realization of which would, as Veracini notes, effect its erasure. Settler colonies resort to any number of destructive forms of managing futurism's failings, of course, from transfer and removal to outright extermination through war, massacre, starvation, and disease. (There are also a multitude of cultural forms of indigenous “transfer," whether it be the usage of indigenous peoples as sports team mascots, the fetishization of indigenous religious and spiritual practices in order to deny Indianness to Indians while claiming it for settlers, or the racialization of Indians into minority populations.) Yet this anxious, reiterative activity is wholly predictable from an Edelmanian perspective and ineliminable from the structure of settler sovereignty, because the futurist narration of the drive/endeavor has rendered settlers beholden to an unsustainable temporality that must produce queerness or death in order to continue to produce meaning, survival, and civilization for itself. Settler sovereignty cannot, in other words, do without the death-native it brings into being; the native as death must exist in order to purchase life and survival for the settler and is the figure of queerness in this futurist scheme. "Queerness" in Hobbes is represented, figured, or embodied by those who fail to conform to the lineaments of rationality that his particular sovereign formation takes for granted-in this case, the rational character of life and its value. Hobbes calls these figures "absurd" rather than queer, but the meaning is the same. The queer or absurd are those who do not seek to preserve themselves or flee death. Such figures barely show up in this text and are largely incomprehensible in his schema. They both instantiate death and invite it as the only proper response to their incomprehensible and insupportable rejection of the social order. For example, any remaining holdouts in the state of nature unwilling to join a majority decision to create a commonwealth must be forced to go along with them "or be left in the condition of warre he was in before; wherein he might without injustice be destroyed by any man whatsoever."93 This is the rationalization of conquest, however abstract, unmarked, or "rational" it may seem to be. For, as has become clear, those who do not recognize the value of life are not simply absurd or irrational; they are specifically those "savage" or precivilizational people(s) who have no concept of time or established system of governance. Of course, the "savage" as deathly threat has been produced precisely as that threat by the settler polity itself, which can only sustain itself via this anxious, recursive, and impossible-to-resolve dynamic of producing and eliminating the enemy of its own order, the enemy that it requires if it is to be an order at all and yet that it must eliminate if it is to "overcome" what it is. As Alyosha Goldstein observes, "United States colonialism is a continuously failing-or at least a perpetually incomplete-project that labors to find a workable means of resolution to sustain its logic of possession and inevitability by disavowing the ongoing contestation with which it is confronted and violent displacement that it demands."94 This constant aspiration toward an unrealizable future is a promise bought at the expense of effacing the founding violence that is the institution of settler sovereignty itself. Because that foundation is impossible to leave behind, because the native has not been finally eliminated once and for all, because the subjects of the commonwealth remain settlers, they cannot rest. They cannot rest until the last trace of the native has been eliminated, such that settlement can become a truly legitimate commonwealth founded on the basis of a free and equal social contract of its "native" citizens. In the face of the impossibility of this achievement, however, they must find other outlets for their anxious desire. This is how and why the settler colonial foundation of biopolitical sovereignty transforms itself into an expansionist, imperial security state that finds new enemies abroad, new obstacles to its endless expansion, thereby solving (albeit only ever temporarily and incompletely) the problem of futurist failure that constituted settlement to begin with. This transformation is immediately apparent in Hobbes's astute psychology of the life of futurist desire. Regarding desire, Hobbes claims that one seeks not simply "enjoyment" in the present or "to enjoy once onely, and for one instant of time." Rather, one seeks ''to assure for ever, the way of his future desire."95 If the nature of desire is such that we seek to assure satisfaction forever, indefinitely into the future, then life/desire is inevitably bound up with anxiety, on the one hand, and power-seeking, on the other. Perpetually uncertain about the prospects of successfully getting what we want, we must continually seek to enlarge our power in order to secure the objects of our desire. It is important to note that this ever-expanding sphere of influence is not the result of a snowballing or addictive sort of pleasure-seeking behavior, nor is it due to some essential will to power at the heart of human nature. It is, rather, simply what is required in order to preserve the status quo: ''It is not alwayes that a man hopes for a more intensive delight, than he has already attained to; or that he cannot be content with a moderate power: but because he cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he hath present, without the acquisition of more."96 Mere maintenance of the present, in other words, requires accumulation, undertaken in perpetual reference to an uncertain future. The successful maintenance of an indefinite present is, for Hobbes, the content of human happiness: "Continuall successe in obtaining those things which a man from time to time desireth, that is to say, continuall prospering, is that men call Felicity."97 Such felicity is impossible, of course, as Hobbes concedes in the very next sentence: "I mean the Felicity of this life. For there is no such thing as perpetuall Tranquillity of mind, while we live here; because Life itself is but Motion, and can never be without Desire, nor without Peare, no more than without Sense."98 Hobbes acknowledges, in other words, that, based on his own futurist accounting of life/desire and in fact precisely because of it, "happiness" (that is, getting what you want) is impossible. Even supposing one were able to secure the requisite amount of power necessary to maintain the status quo, such an (impossible) achievement would mean that our desire would be satisfied, and therefore extinguished. It would mean, in other words, no longer being alive, since "to have no desire is to be dead."99 As he explains, To which we are to consider, that the Felicity of this life, consisteth not in the repose of a mind satisfied. For there is no such Finis ultimus, (utmost ayme,) nor Summum Bon um, (greatest Good,) as is spoken of in the Books of the old Morall Philosophers. Nor can a man any more live, whose Desires are at an end, than he, whose Senses and Imaginations are at a stand. Felicity is a continuall progress of the desire, from one object to another; the attaining of the former, being still but the way to the later.100 Suggesting that (attainment of) the highest good of Aristotelian ethics is itself a kind of stasis or death, Hobbes plainly rejects the idea that the endless motion that characterizes human life could come to a halt in some fashion that does not entail death. Understood psychologically, he is making clear that human happiness-the only kind available to us in “this life" -means never actually being satisfied. The perpetuity of enjoyment at which desire aims is a consumption that is never, can never fully be (allowed to be) complete(d). Hobbes's specifically futurist and expansionist understanding of desire makes clear that, rather than confront the impossibility of security, happiness, and immortality, he instead offers the commonwealth and an everexpanding pursuit of power as a substitutive satisfaction. In other words, he both institutes life and pushes it forward via a futurist narrativization of endeavor into an insatiable, accumulative desire. Rather than face the founding violence that brought peace and "life itself" into being, Hobbes instead naturalizes this act by declaring it to be "a generall inclination of all mankind" to engage in "a perpetuall and restlesse desire of Power after power, that ceaseth onely in Death."101 Yet while desire may push us ever forward, ever beyond the initial moments of settlement, it cannot erase that settlement or relieve settler sovereignty of the burden of conquest. This is neither because of settler colonialism's theoretical definition nor because settlers secretly feel guilty about conquest, but rather because of the impossibility of fulfilling futurism's fantastical promises. Empire functions as a kind of substitutive satisfaction to compensate for the failure of settler sovereignty to finally and fully exterminate indigenous peoples. The pleasures of endless imperial expansion-the restless desire of "power after power" in an attempt to secure the future, once and for all-relieve the burden of the failed "completion" of the settler colonial project and the impossible promise of happiness. Empire is thus the settler impulse turned outward. It is a salve for settlement in its promise of an impossible, if now-externalized, future happiness and security.102 Built into Hobbes's understanding of desire, then (and, therefore, the Commonwealth), is the failed teleology of futurism, which, as Edelman instructs, is fundamentally and futilely political. The reason the commonwealth cannot alleviate the anxiety that runs apace with desire is because it cannot eliminate the foundations of its existence and the basis of its regime: on the one hand, indigenous removal and dispossession; on the other, the futurist constitution of "life" and/as desire. Indigenous removal and dispossession are accomplished, therefore, not only via the exertion of violence, domination, war, famine, genocide, and disease, but also via a specifically ideological imposition of the meaning of "life" and" death" that requires an indigenous removal and dispossession that it cannot accomplish without killing itself. This intractable dilemma explains the transformation of settler societies into security states, which reformulates the indigenous threat of "savagery" and death into external, terroristic opponents of its "way of life." As Jodi Byrd observes, "Indianness becomes a site through which U.S. empire orients and replicates itself by transforming those to be colonized into 'Indians' through continual reiterations of pioneer logics, whether in the Pacific, the Caribbean, or the Middle East."103 Empire, in other words, relocates the state of nature from the domain of the indigenous "savage" to the "wilderness" abroad, itself in need of taming and civilizing if life and its value are to be satisfactorily protected. Twenty-first-century empire is thus legible, as Byrd and others have argued, as an outgrowth of the settlement of the United States and a contemporary episode of its ongoing structure.104 Stephen Silliman has documented the US military's usage of "Indian country" to describe Iraq and Afghanistan in the War on Terror. While the Revolutionary War or Civil War possess just as much "resonance in the psyche of the United States as wars for freedom, unity, and democracy," nevertheless "soldiers in the Middle East draw on the 'Indian wars' of the 19th century to inform their daily experiences in combat."105 Silliman argues that ''The efficacy of this metaphor relies not in the accuracy of the historical or cultural details ... but on the believability and acceptability of them as part of a narrative of conquest and nation building."106 The "Indian country" characterization serves, in other words, to naturalize the "success" of the conquest of North America by casting contemporary US empire as an inevitably victorious, if now-worldwide, battle against ''savagery," this time in the form of lslam and ''terrorism." Of George W. Bush's expressed desire to "smoke" Osama Bin Laden ''out of his cave," for example, Alex Lubin writes, The invocation of the Western drama of settler colonialism has always animated American thinking about and activity in the Middle East, and Bush is merely tapping into a well of affective politics that links the United States to the Middle East as well as provides support for increased surveillance and the suspension of rights domestically. Yet, in the contemporary era of neoliberal globalization, the United States' comparative rendering of the Middle East through its own settler colonial past has been multiplied and transformed into a "global war on terror." That is, the United States' unparalleled superpower status enables it to universalize and globalize its comparative politics into a global "clash of civilizations."107 Simultaneously, then, as the "terrorist" obstacles to empire become projected versions of Indians, Indians become retroactively legible as the first or foundational examples of ''terrorism." Of the Declaration of Independence, for example, which complains that King George "has endeavored to bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers, the merciless Indian Savages whose known rule of warfare, is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes, and conditions," Byrd observes, The non-discriminating, proto-inclusive "merciless Indian Savage" stands as the terrorist, externalized from "our frontiers," and functions as abjected horror through whom civilization is articulated oppositionally. This non-recuperative category, a derealization of the Other, serves as a paranoid foundation for what Jasbir K. Puar defines in Terrorist Assemblages as Islamic "monster-terrorist-fags," the affectively produced and queered West Asian (including South Asian, Arab American, and Muslim) body that is targeted for surveillance and destruction by U.S. patriotic pathology.108 The "terrorist" of today, the contemporary obstacle to empire, is the native of an alleged “yesterday," the archaic obstacle to settlement. Whether in the domain of conquest or empire, however, the failed futurism of settler colonial sovereignty produces abjected queer repositories of death that stand as a threat to the civilized life of the settler society.109 Their interconnection is crucial; the logic that connects them continuous. Unsurprisingly, then, Hobbes's political theory serves as a justification for what it claimed only to describe. While an unmarked self-preservation and fear of death have typically been taken to be the natural and logical preconditions of the sovereign politics Hobbes institutes in Leviathan, an Edelmanian approach to this text reveals them to be the premier values settler sovereignty ideologically seeks retroactively to (re)produce and uphold. What this means, then, is that Hobbes's entire state of nature story is an anachronism. Like all origin stories, it is fundamentally ideological and offered primarily in order to legitimate an already-existing political order and the political commitment of its storyteller.110 The particular agenda being naturalized in Hobbes's biopolitical story of the state of nature is settler conquest, and its futurist determination is the reason why he cannot decide when and where it is, and also why settler colonial societies seek constantly to erase themselves as settler societies. m The insecurity lodged at the heart of settler colonialism's futurist desire renders satisfaction impossible, an impossibility that remains unacknowledged and is instead foisted onto those “savages” who refuse collaboration with its ideological ruses. Leviathan is thus a settler colonial text par excellence. Like Agamben in this regard, it is a rationalization of empire that ignores all those queered by its machinations. Unlike Agamben, however, it makes explicit the connection between the biopolitics of settler colonialism and that of contemporary empire, revealing the futurist temporality that links them together and renders them continuous projects.

#### Edleman is correct that the white child should not be the center of society but incorrect about futurity. The investment of no future is just a rehashing of settler colonial tactics. Any form of decolonization should grapple with the histories and futures of indigenous sovereignty and ways of knowing.

Arvin, Tuck, and Morrill 2013 (Maile, assistant professor of Ethnic Studies at UC Riverside, Eve, Associate Professor of Critical Race and Indigenous Studies at University of Toronto, Angie, Director of Title VI Indian Education Program for Portland Public Schools, “Decolonizing Feminism: Challenging Connections between Settler Colonialism and Heteropatriarchy, Feminist Formations, Vol. 25 No. 1, Spring)

As our discussions of Indigenous epistemologies about land and sovereignty have demonstrated, recognizing that Indigenous sovereignty struggles are gendered frequently requires revising conventional concepts of sovereignty, decolonization, and social change altogether. For us, the real promise of Native feminist theories lies precisely in the ways that, along with recognizing the very real challenges that Indigenous peoples face daily, these theories are simultaneously constructing what Smith (2008b) compellingly describes as “the history of the future of sovereignty, what sovereignty could mean for Native peoples” (257). By directing our attention toward the beautifully evocative “history of the future of sovereignty,” she is reframing futurity—a concept important to a number of disciplines, including queer studies and performance studies—with Indigenous peoples at the center. Thus, Smith demonstrates that one of the most radical and necessary moves toward decolonization requires imagining and enacting a future for Indigenous peoples—a future based on terms of their own making. In a GLQ special issue titled “Sexuality, Nationality, Indigeneity,” Smith (2010) specifically elaborates on the concept of futurity as theorized by queer theorist Lee Edelman. She notes that Edelman’s book No Future forwards a useful critique of the figure of “the Child” as the symbol of society’s reproductive future and an excuse for justifying the reproduction of the existing social order (46). Yet, Smith also demonstrates that refusing to participate in the reproduction of society by declining to reproduce the Child is a mode of radical activism that is only possible, desirable, and otherwise “thinkable” for certain economically privileged white queers. She argues that [a]n indigenous critique must question the value of “no future” in the context of genocide, where Native peoples have already been determined by settler colonialism to have no future. If the goal of queerness is to challenge the reproduction of the social order, then the Native child may already be queered. For instance, Colonel John Chivington, the leader of the famous massacre at Sand Creek, charged his followers to not only kill Native adults but to mutilate their reproductive organs and to kill their children because “nits make lice.” In this context, the Native Child is not the guarantor of the reproductive future of white supremacy; it is the nit that undoes it. (48) Smith’s critique exposes the ways that radical queer theory can participate in the “ascendancy of whiteness” even when it disavows it—in Edelman’s case, because he fails to acknowledge or consider the ways that having children is a privilege that has been historically denied to many nonwhite and nonaffluent people. Given the pervasive violence perpetuated on Indigenous peoples through campaigns focused on managing Indigenous reproduction and childrearing (from boarding schools to eugenics and forced sterilization), proposing to invest in “no future” seems not only irrelevant to Indigenous peoples, but a rehashing of previous settler colonial tactics. Smith’s critique is meant to be a generative one, insisting on making real connections between Native and queer studies for the future of both fields and all of the peoples these fields engage. She further argues that “while both ‘tradition’ and ‘the future’ must be critically engaged, it does not follow that they can be dismissed” (ibid.). We also place importance on ideas of Indigenous futures, which are always also interlaced with Indigenous traditions, histories, and even ghosts, in our own theories of decolonization. Eve Tuck (2009) has written about desire-based research as a key counterpoint to damage-centered research frameworks, which too often present Indigenous peoples as broken, arguing that “[d]esire is involved with the not yet and, at times, the not anymore. . . . Desire is about longing, about a present that is enriched by both the past and the future” (417). Angie Morrill (forthcoming) further writes that “[g]hosts haunt the future with expectations,” noting that we share desires with ghosts, therefore Native desire is a kind of time machine. For Maile Arvin (forthcoming), decolonization involves regeneration, which she defines as “desires and practices oriented by transforming settler colonial dispossession and recreating a people-possessed (rather than an individually self-possessed) Indigenous future.” In each of our approaches toward decolonization, we do not intend to recommend to our readers one proper set of decolonial practices, but rather create spaces in which decolonization can be deeply considered and experimented with in the specific contexts of different places. Overall, with this challenge to recognize Indigenous ways of knowing, we insist that it is most important to acknowledge Indigenous concepts and epistemologies as complex, knowledgeable, and full of both history and desire. Engaging Indigenous epistemologies, without appropriating them or viewing them merely as a mystical metaphor, is a method of decolonization that could play a significant role in creating a future for Indigenous peoples and Indigenous ways of knowing.

### 1NC -- Ontology

#### The settler colonial project requires the disappearance or assimilation of the Native, who produces Settler anxieties that confound national belonging – this is an ongoing genocide that also exists in premature moves to reconciliation and the desire to not have to deal with the Indian problem anymore.

Tuck & Yang 12 [Eve Tuck is Associate Professor of Critical Race and Indigenous Studies at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education (OISE), University of Toronto. She is Canada Research Chair of Indigenous Methodologies with Youth and Communities. K. Wayne Yang writes about decolonization and everyday epic organizing, particularly from underneath ghetto colonialism, often with his frequent collaborator, Eve Tuck. Currently, they are convening The Land Relationships Super Collective, editing the book series, Indigenous and Decolonizing Studies in Education, and editing the journal, Critical Ethnic Studies. He is interested in the complex role of cities in global affairs: cities as sites of settler colonialism, as stages for empire, as places of resettlement and gentrification, and as always-already on Indigenous lands. \*Sometimes he writes as la paperson, an avatar that irregularly calls.“Decolonization is not a metaphor,” *Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society* Vol 1 No 1 (2012) //tjb]

Recently in a symposium on the significance of Liberal Arts education in the United States, Eve presented an argument that **Liberal** **Arts education has historically excluded any attention to or analysis of settler colonialism.** **This, Eve posited, makes Liberal Arts education complicit in the project of settler colonialism and, more so, has rendered the truer project of Liberal Arts education something like trying to make the settler indigenous to the land he occupies.** The attendees were titillated by this idea, nodding and murmuring in approval and it was then that Eve realized that she was trying to say something incommensurable with what they expected her to say. She was completely misunderstood. **Many in the audience heard this observation: that the work of Liberal Arts education is in part to teach settlers to be indigenous, as something admirable, worthwhile, something wholesome, not as a problematic point of evidence about the reach of the settler colonial erasure.** Philip Deloria (1998) explores how and why the settler wants to be made indigenous, even if only through disguise, or other forms of playing Indian. Playing Indian is a powerful U.S. pastime, from the Boston Tea Party, to fraternal organizations, to new age trends, to even those aforementioned Native print underwear. Deloria maintains that, “From the colonial period to the present, the Indian has skulked in and out of the most important stories various Americans have told about themselves” (p. 5). The indeterminacy of American identities stems, in part, from the nation’s inability to deal with Indian people. Americans wanted to feel a natural affinity with the continent, and it was Indians who could teach them such aboriginal closeness. Yet, in order to control the landscape they had to destroy the original inhabitants. (Deloria, 1998, p.5) L. Frank Baum (author of The Wizard of Oz) famously asserted in 1890 that the safety of white settlers was only guaranteed by the “total annihilation of the few remaining Indians” (as quoted in Hastings, 2007). D.H. Lawrence, reading James Fenimore Cooper (discussed at length later in this article), Nathaniel Hawthorne, Hector St. John de Crevecoeur, Henry David Thoreau, Herman Melville, Walt Whitman and others for his Studies in Classic American Literature (1924), describes Americans’ fascination with Indigeneity as one of simultaneous desire and repulsion (Deloria, 1998). **“No place,” Lawrence observed, “exerts its full influence upon a newcomer until the old inhabitant is dead or absorbed.”** Lawrence argued that in order to meet the “demon of the continent” head on and this finalize the “unexpressed spirit of America,” white Americans needed either to destroy Indians of assimilate them into a white American world...both aimed at making Indians vanish from the landscape. (Lawrence, as quoted in Deloria, 1998, p. 4). Everything within a settler colonial society strains to destroy or assimilate the Native in order to disappear them from the land - this is how a society can have multiple simultaneous and conflicting messages about Indigenous peoples, such as all Indians are dead, located in faraway reservations, that contemporary Indigenous people are less indigenous than prior generations, and that all Americans are a “little bit Indian.” These desires to erase - to let time do its thing and wait for the older form of living to die out, or to even help speed things along (euthanize) because the death of pre-modern ways of life is thought to be inevitable - these are all desires for another kind of resolve to the colonial situation, resolved through the absolute and total destruction or assimilation of original inhabitants. Numerous scholars have observed that **Indigeneity prompts multiple forms of settler anxiety, even if only because the presence of Indigenous peoples - who make a priori claims to land and ways of being - is a constant reminder that the settler colonial project is incomplete** (Fanon, 1963; Vine Deloria, 1988; Grande, 2004; Bruyneel, 2007). The easy adoption of decolonization as a metaphor (and nothing else) is a form of this anxiety, because it is a premature attempt at reconciliation. The absorption of decolonization by settler social justice frameworks is one way the settler, disturbed by her own settler status, tries to escape or contain the unbearable searchlight of complicity, of having harmed others just by being one’s self. The desire to reconcile is just as relentless as the desire to disappear the Native; it is a desire to not have to deal with this (Indian) problem anymore.

### 1NC -- Alt -- Decolonization

#### The alternative is incommensurability – decolonization is a project that requires the repatriation of indigenous lands, the abolition of slavery and property, and the dismantling of the imperial metropole.

Tuck & Yang 12 [Eve Tuck is Associate Professor of Critical Race and Indigenous Studies at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education (OISE), University of Toronto. She is Canada Research Chair of Indigenous Methodologies with Youth and Communities. K. Wayne Yang writes about decolonization and everyday epic organizing, particularly from underneath ghetto colonialism, often with his frequent collaborator, Eve Tuck. Currently, they are convening The Land Relationships Super Collective, editing the book series, Indigenous and Decolonizing Studies in Education, and editing the journal, Critical Ethnic Studies. He is interested in the complex role of cities in global affairs: cities as sites of settler colonialism, as stages for empire, as places of resettlement and gentrification, and as always-already on Indigenous lands. \*Sometimes he writes as la paperson, an avatar that irregularly calls.“Decolonization is not a metaphor,” *Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society* Vol 1 No 1 (2012) //tjb]

**Having elaborated on settler moves to innocence, we give a synopsis of the imbrication of settler colonialism with transnationalist, abolitionist, and critical pedagogy movements - efforts that are often thought of as exempt from Indigenous decolonizing analyses - as a synthesis of how decolonization as material, not metaphor, unsettles the innocence of these movements.** **These are interruptions which destabilize, un-balance, and repatriate the very terms and assumptions of some of the most radical efforts to reimagine human power relations. We argue that the opportunities for solidarity lie in what is incommensurable rather than what is common across these efforts.** **We offer these perspectives on unsettling innocence because they are examples of what we might call an ethic of incommensurability, which recognizes what is distinct, what is sovereign for project(s) of decolonization in relation to human and civil rights based social justice projects.** There are portions of these projects that simply cannot speak to one another, cannot be aligned or allied. **We make these notations to highlight opportunities for what can only ever be strategic and contingent collaborations, and to indicate the reasons that lasting solidarities may be elusive, even undesirable.** Below we point to unsettling themes that challenge the coalescence of social justice endeavors broadly assembled into three areas: Transnational or Third World decolonizations, Abolition, and Critical Space-Place Pedagogies. For each of these areas, we offer entry points into the literature - beginning a sort of bibliography of incommensurability. Third world decolonizations **The anti-colonial turn towards the transnational can sometimes involve ignoring the settler colonial context where one resides and how that inhabitation is implicated in settler colonialism, in order to establish “global” solidarities that presumably suffer fewer complicities and complications.** This deliberate not-seeing is morally convenient but avoids an important feature of the aforementioned selective collapsibility of settler colonial-nations states. Expressions such as “the Global South within the Global North” and “the Third World in the First World” neglect the Four Directions via a Flat Earth perspective and ambiguate First Nations with Third World migrants. **For people writing on Third World decolonizations, but who do so upon Native land, we invite you to consider the permanent settler war as the theater for all imperial wars**: ● the Orientalism of Indigenous Americans (Berger, 2004; Marez, 2007) ● discovery, invasion, occupation, and Commons as the claims of settler sovereignty (Ford, 2010) ● heteropatriarchy as the imposition of settler sexuality (Morgensen, 2011) ● citizenship as coercive and forced assimilation into the white settler normative (Bruyneel, 2004; Somerville, 2010) ● religion as covenant for settler nation-state (A.J. Barker, 2009; Maldonado-Torres, 2008) ● the frontier as the first and always the site of invasion and war (Byrd, 2011), ● U.S. imperialism as the expansion of settler colonialism (ibid) ● Asian settler colonialism (Fujikane, 2012; Fujikane, & Okamura, 2008, Saranillio, 2010a, 2010b) ● the frontier as the language of ‘progress’ and discovery (Maldonado-Torres, 2008) ● rape as settler colonial structure (Deer, 2009; 2010) ● the discourse of terrorism as the terror of Native retribution (Tuck & Ree, forthcoming) ● Native Feminisms as incommensurable with other feminisms (Arvin, Tuck, Morrill, forthcoming; Goeman & Denetdale, 2009). Abolition **The abolition of slavery often presumes the expansion of settlers who own Native land and life via inclusion of emancipated slaves and prisoners into the settler nation-state.** As we have noted, it is no accident that the U.S. government promised 40 acres of Indian land as reparations for plantation slavery. Likewise, indentured European laborers were often awarded tracts of ‘unsettled’ Indigenous land as payment at the end of their service (McCoy, forthcoming). **Communal ownership of land has figured centrally in various movements for autonomous, self-determined communities. “The land belongs to those who work it,” disturbingly parrots Lockean justifications for seizing Native land as property, ‘earned’ through one’s labor in clearing and cultivating ‘virgin’ land.** For writers on the prison industrial complex, il/legality, and other forms of slavery, we urge you to consider how enslavement is a twofold procedure: removal from land and the creation of property (land and bodies). **Thus, abolition is likewise twofold, requiring the repatriation of land and the abolition of property (land and bodies).** Abolition means self-possession but not object-possession, repatriation but not reparation: ● “The animals of the world exist for their own reasons. They were not made for humans any more than black people were made for white, or women created for men” (Alice Walker, describing the work of Marjorie Spiegel, in the in the preface to Spigel’s 1988 book, The Dreaded Comparison). ● Enslavement/removal of Native Americans (Gallay, 2009) ● Slaves who become slave-owners, savagery as enslavability, chattel slavery as a sign of civilization (Gallay, 2009) ● Black fugitivity, undercommons, and radical dispossession (Moten, 2008; Moten & Harney, 2004; Moten & Harney, 2010) ● Incarceration as a settler colonialism strategy of land dispossession (Ross, 1998; Watson, 2007) ● Native land and Native people as co-constituitive (Meyer, 2008; Kawagley, 2010) Critical pedagogies The many critical pedagogies that engage emancipatory education, place based education, environmental education, critical multiculturalism, and urban education often position land as public Commons or seek commonalities between struggles. Although we believe that “we must be fluent” in each other’s stories and struggles (paraphrasing Alexander, 2002, p.91), we detect precisely this lack of fluency in land and Indigenous sovereignty. Yupiaq scholar, Oscar Kawagley’s assertion, “We know that Mother Nature has a culture, and it is a Native culture” (2010, p. xiii), directs us to think through land as “more than a site upon which humans make history or as a location that accumulates history” (Goeman, 2008, p.24). The forthcoming special issue in Environmental Education Research, “Land Education: Indigenous, postcolonial, and decolonizing perspectives on place and environmental education research” might be a good starting point to consider the incommensurability of place-based, environmentalist, urban pedagogies with land education. ● The urban as Indigenous (Bang, 2009; Belin, 1999; Friedel, 2011; Goeman, 2008; Intertribal Friendship House & Lobo, 2002) ● Indigenous storied land as disrupting settler maps (Goeman, 2008) ● Novels, poetry, and essays by Greg Sarris, Craig Womack, Joy Harjo, Gerald Vizenor ● To Remain an Indian (Lomawaima & McCarty, 2006) ● Shadow Curriculum (Richardson, 2011) ● Red Pedagogy (Grande, 2004) ● Land Education (McCoy, Tuck, McKenzie, forthcoming) More on incommensurability Incommensurability is an acknowledgement that decolonization will require a change in the order of the world (Fanon, 1963). This is not to say that Indigenous peoples or Black and brown peoples take positions of dominance over white settlers; the goal is not for everyone to merely swap spots on the settler-colonial triad, to take another turn on the merry-go-round. The goal is to break the relentless structuring of the triad - a break and not a compromise (Memmi, 1991). Breaking the settler colonial triad, in direct terms, means repatriating land to sovereign Native tribes and nations, abolition of slavery in its contemporary forms, and the dismantling of the imperial metropole. **Decolonization “here” is intimately connected to anti-imperialism elsewhere. However, decolonial struggles here/there are not parallel, not shared equally, nor do they bring neat closure to the concerns of all involved - particularly not for settlers.** Decolonization is not equivocal to other anti-colonial struggles. It is incommensurable. **There is so much that is incommensurable, so many overlaps that can’t be figured, that cannot be resolved.** **Settler colonialism fuels imperialism all around the globe.** Oil is the motor and motive for war and so was salt, so will be water. Settler sovereignty over these very pieces of earth, air, and water is what makes possible these imperialisms. The same yellow pollen in the water of the Laguna Pueblo reservation in New Mexico, Leslie Marmon Silko reminds us, is the same uranium that annihilated over 200,000 strangers in 2 flashes. The same yellow pollen that poisons the land from where it came. Used in the same war that took a generation of young Pueblo men. Through the voice of her character Betonie, Silko writes, “Thirty thousand years ago they were not strangers. You saw what the evil had done; you saw the witchery ranging as wide as the world" (Silko, 1982, p. 174). In Tucson, Arizona, where Silko lives, her books are now banned in schools. Only curricular materials affirming the settler innocence, ingenuity, and right to America may be taught. In “No”, her response to the 2003 United States invasion of Iraq, Mvskoke/Creek poet Joy Harjo (2004) writes, “Yes, that was me you saw shaking with bravery, with a government issued rifle on my back. I’m sorry I could not greet you, as you deserved, my relative.” Don’t Native Americans participate in greater rates in the military? asks the young-ish man from Viet Nam. **“Indian Country” was/is the term used in Viet Nam, Afghanistan, Iraq by the U.S. military for ‘enemy territory’.** The first Black American President said without blinking, “There was a point before folks had left, before we had gotten everybody back on the helicopter and were flying back to base, where they said Geronimo has been killed, and Geronimo was the code name for bin Laden.” Elmer Pratt, Black Panther leader, falsely imprisoned for 27 years, was a Vietnam Veteran, was nicknamed ‘Geronimo’. Geronimo is settler nickname for the Bedonkohe Apache warrior who fought Mexican and then U.S. expansion into Apache tribal lands. The Colt .45 was perfected to kill Indigenous people during the ‘liberation’ of what became the Philippines, but it was first invented for the ‘Indian Wars’ in North America alongside The Hotchkiss Canon- a gattling gun that shot canonballs. **The technologies of the permanent settler war are reserviced for foreign wars, including boarding schools, colonial schools, urban schools run by military personnel.** It is properly called Indian Country. Ideologies of US settler colonialism directly informed Australian settler colonialism. South African apartheid townships, the kill-zones in what became the Philippine colony, then nation-state, the checkerboarding of Palestinian land with checkpoints, were modeled after U.S. seizures of land and containments of Indian bodies to reservations. The racial science developed in the U.S. (a settler colonial racial science) informed Hitler’s designs on racial purity (“This book is my bible” he said of Madison Grant’s The Passing of the Great Race). The admiration is sometimes mutual, the doctors and administrators of forced sterilizations of black, Native, disabled, poor, and mostly female people - The Sterilization Act accompanied the Racial Integrity Act and the Pocohontas Exception - praised the Nazi eugenics program. Forced sterilizations became illegal in California in 1964.

## K -- Capitalism

### 1NC -- Link -- Transgression

#### The affirmative ossifies queerness as transgression that individuates resistance and precludes socialist struggle by engaging bourgeois myths.

Struggle Sessions, 21 [Struggle Sessions, run by Maoist revolutionaries from Peru, “Letter to the Editor: Class Struggle or Sexual Liberation?,” July 12, 2021]//Townes

We take the class stand of the proletariat, applying Marxism to our conditions and putting proletarian politics at the center of our theoretical work. Questions of sex and sexuality are secondary to the collective demands of revolutionary politics, in particular here the mobilization of working women for their emancipation through socialist revolution.

Postmodernism raises the specter of sexual liberation to combat the proletarian line of women’s emancipation through socialist revolution, creating a false politicization of sex which in fact functions to depoliticize, to remove the question of class standpoint and political struggle. With postmodernism, all questions are reduced to the interpersonal and the interpersonal, frequently, is reduced to sexual relations. This reduction to the interpersonal means stripping away the basis which determines social relations, i.e. the basis in production, the struggle for existence. Decadence, promiscuity, and non-conformity are hailed as liberatory while organizing women and the working class for collective liberation is labeled exclusionary and reductionist.

We call this what it is: hedonism, individualism, the personal liberation of the petite-bourgeoisie opposed to the collective liberation of the proletariat. Sex and personal relationships cannot be revolutionized except through subordinating them to proletarian discipline. Marxists do not view sexuality as a private affair, since humans are social animals and all things are subject to criticism from the standpoint of the proletariat. At the same time, we seek precisely to avoid the overemphasis on sex and personal identity that postmodernism uses to evade the question of class struggle and to replace political struggle with individual choice.

We repeat Lenin, who pointed out that an overemphasis on questions of sex plays a destructive role, especially among the youth and the petite-bourgeoisie.

Dissoluteness in sexual life is bourgeois, is a phenomenon of decay. The proletariat is a rising class. It doesn’t need intoxication as a narcotic or a stimulus. Intoxication as little by sexual exaggeration as by alcohol. [Lenin on the Women’s Question]

Capitalism alienates people from one another, and creates relationships based on economic calculation and base physical and emotional needs as a rule. Postmodernism worships these alienated relationships under the guise of individual choice, subordinating the collective to the individual instead of subordinating the individual to the collective.

Only repeated cultural revolutions under socialism will create a new man and woman and a new society, allowing the development of authentic relationships on the basis of love and social need. This orientation places the political question at the forefront: the struggle for socialist revolution followed by repeated cultural revolutions, and the subordination of personal relationships to the political needs of the revolution.

The facts of biological reproduction and the oppression of women rooted in private property divide society into men and women. While biological reproduction is the basis, which is reflected for instance in the struggle over reproductive rights, humans are primarily social animals and so social relationships conditioned by class society are primarily determinate on sex and sexuality. Hence homosexuality and transition to the social role of the opposite sex has an objective existence that is conditioned by the historical development of society.

On the other hand, the ideology that underlies non-binary identification is rooted in idealism and reactionary postmodernism. It argues that one can escape the contradiction between men and women at an individual level through personal feeling and superficial changes in presentation. This is positioned as progressive and liberating. We see this as part of the ‘sexual liberation’ thesis that one can change society solely by changing one’s ideas or behavior, or that the only thing which matters is one’s ideas or behaviors, a total idealism opposed to materialism. It obscures the basis of women’s emancipation which is an essential question for revolution.

The metaphysics behind the non-binary concept in fact ossifies the categories of men and women into a set of superficial traits. Rather than a historical materialist approach which studies how the man-woman contradiction as it exists today came into being conditioned by private property, and thus studies how it will pass away with the abolition of private property, this ideology poses that, for instance, women simply are a set of prescribed traits and to deviate from said traits is to deviate from womanhood. Instead of combating the negative traits associated with manhood and womanhood as part of understanding the historical basis and development of the man-woman contradiction, manhood and womanhood itself is combated, a metaphysical viewpoint that is distant from the reality of the masses. Marx puts this reality as such:

[A]s soon as the distribution of labour comes into being, each man has a particular, exclusive sphere of activity, which is forced upon him and from which he cannot escape. [The German Ideology]

We assert that men and women must be remolded in the process of revolution and social transformation to create a new socialist man and new socialist woman. Militarization and the reorganization of society have a transformative effect on men and women: the negative traits associated with manhood and womanhood will be combated not because men and women are to be abolished, but to serve the needs of the revolution. Personal relationships will be transformed on an egalitarian basis, not for their own sake detached from class struggle, but precisely to subordinate them to the demands of proletarian discipline and organization.

Contrary to postmodernism, Marxism places politics as primary and rejects the view that issues affecting a minority population without a key role in production is determinate in politics. LGBT people are not a distinct social force and do not have a decisive role in politics as such. Imperialism does not depend on the discrimination of LGBT people, and today ‘pink-washes’ itself by giving LGBT people a large degree of legal equality in order to create a false image of progressivism—the productive forces are developed enough in the imperialist countries that capitalism has lost its pressing need to reproduce the oppressed class as not every family needs to produce children to maintain a socially-necessary proletarian population. The most advanced revolutionary movements have arisen in the less ‘developed’ countries, and thus the question of reproduction plays a more prominent role. We should look at these phenomena in the context of economic development and remember that the new is born stamped with the old, and never as a ‘pure’ new thing.

We reiterate the message of the essay Consumer Options that monogamy and polyamory both are bourgeois and backwards; similarly both heterosexuality—understood as the superstructural support reproducing the economic unit of the family—and ‘queerness’ are old bourgeois forms that oppose the new, socialist social relations. In both cases the latter is pushed by postmodernism as the more progressive option, a new fad to jump onto. Just as the bourgeoisie cynically uses the people’s alienation and dissatisfaction with twisted and corrupted personal relationships to push false solutions like polyamory and ‘queerness,’ the monopoly media uses identity in their cultural productions to push the false solutions of inclusivity and positivity. This is the context in which non-binary was used in our recent essay Bourgeois Culture is a Cadaver, showing it to be a hip term cynically used by the bourgeoisie to paper over people’s subjective dissatisfaction and their oppression.

### 1NC -- Link -- Atonality

#### The aff starts from a politics of queer atonality – a reduction of queerness to basic deviance that deprives it of moral or political force – instead, we should have a politics of queer communality that refuses the 1AC’s strong commitment to anti-normativity in favor of direct institutional transformation

Galloway 2014 (Alexander, Professor of Media, Culture, and Communication at New York University, “Queer Atonality,” http://cultureandcommunication.org/galloway/queer-atonality)

Rosenberg devotes much of her attention to queer theory’s “subjectless turn” and the shift toward what David Eng, Judith Halberstam, and José Muñoz in 2005 called the “wide field of normalization.” Yet here the question is not so much a shift within queer theory, but a growing normalization--and a newfound trendiness perhaps--of the concept of queer in culture at large. Thus today any number of folks in straight relationships might still wish to label themselves “queer,” just as there is a growing trend to think about queer societies, queer animals, and indeed queer organisms, queer molecules, and queer ontologies. Rosenberg calls out Tim Morton's essay “Queer Ecology,” but the trend is wider than a single text can reveal, as evidenced by Karen Barad's work on “Nature’s Queer Performativity,” or the promulgation in other circles of what we might call a Queer-Deleuzian metaphysics. Borrowing the concept of the "atonal" (atone) from Badiou's theory of points, it is possible to assign a name to the specific form of queerness that Rosenberg finds unnerving: queer atonality. By queer atonality we mean the notion that queerness can be abstracted to mean deviation as such, aleatoriness as such, or openness as such, and thus, through such extreme abstraction, queerness may be assigned as a proper monicker for biological and even ontological systems. In other words, if biology is that thing that works via difference and radical openness, then it is, by definition, queer. Or if ontology is a scenario of swerves and deviations, then it is, by definition, queer. As Rosenberg puts it, on the one hand “biology [is understood] as a kind of sheer queerness (or, aleatoriness),” and, on the other, matter “is coded as ontologically 'queer.'” But “do we truly want to be unleashed into pure aleatoriness?” wonders Rosenberg. Such is the Pyrrhic victory of queer atonality: “If queerness is nothing but the productive force of matter, then why continue to call it queer?” As a deviation from normality, queerness has typically carried a kind of ethical or political force simply by virtue of intervening and resisting. We're here, we're queer demands acknowledgement, and thus a disruption of bourgeois morality. In this sense, queer means essentially "queering." As Nicholas de Villiers writes in his book on queer opacity, queering is a tactic aimed at appropriating, transforming, or deviating from a particular normative category. In this way, queer might have no ontological dimension per se, but rather might be defined as that thing unable to be integrated into existing symbolic economies, be they sexual or otherwise. But if today, following in the wake of the new queer metaphysics, matter and organic life themselves are queer, then the queer intervention becomes as atonal as anything else: the queerness of quantum superposition, the queerness of interspecies viral transfection, the queerness of non-carbon-based life forms. What started as a process of strategic intervention, has now congealed into a state of "sheer" queerness.Further, ontologizing queerness produces a number of secondary effects, not all of which we can discuss here. One important additional issue though--and this parallels some of my previous commentary on Catherine Malabou, whose work I find tremendously useful--is what might be called the “morality conundrum.” In short: if ontology is pure aleatoriness and if ontology has no particular political or moral valence, then, barring the kind of unmitigated nihilism that makes all politics impossible, one is obligated to graft on a secondary moral theory to supplement the primary ontological one. Consider Malabou: if all is plasticity, then how can an individual judge good plasticity from bad plasticity? By what criterion may we assert, with confidence, that capitalist precarity (one form of plasticity) is odious, while neuronal adaptiveness (another form of plasticity) is not? Such is the curious irony of queer atonality. What began as a movement that, in part, sought to purge itself of the priggish prejudices of sexual moralism, and the bigotry and oppression that goes with it, must now author its own treatise on morality! Having been elevated to the level of being, queer theory must demonstrate its own deviation from being. Having been neutralized, queerness must now un-neutralize itself. I follow this thread not to revel in futility, nor to expose queer theory to another kind of derision, now from the left rather than the right. Instead let's ask what we might gain from ontologizing queerness? And what we might lose? Or to put the question another way: if there were a queering of ontology, what should it look like? I can think of two ways to address the question, one more negative and the other more affirmative. But there are certainly many other possible approaches suggested by others. Response A: Viewed skeptically, queer ontology appears to be something of a contradiction in terms, simply because ontology itself is offensive and oppressive to queer life and identity. Ontology reproduces the very structure of queer alterity, given how ontology tends to be transcendental, abstracting, totalizing, and tied historically to concepts of hierarchy and morality, etc. “Ontology,” Frantz Fanon wrote in Black Skin, White Masks, “does not permit us to understand the being of the black man.” And thus, by homology, ontology does not permit us to understand the being of the queer. This response seems absolutely valid and yet at the same time somewhat limiting. Absolutely valid--in the sense that metaphysics has often been used as a weapon against the poor, women, people of color, or anyone on the losing end of moral or metaphysical models of alterity. But also limiting--in the sense that ignoring such questions will not magically cause them to disappear; any theoretical undertaking, when pursued long enough, must come to terms with questions of being, appearing, and existing. Indeed, ontology “does not permit”--as Fanon rightly said--but only when ontology is understood as representation or metaphysics. What if there were such a thing as a non-standard ontology? Could a non-standard ontology allow us to withdraw from structures of oppression? And could it facilitate such a withdrawal, while avoiding the problem of atonality and maintaining the many specificities of people's real culture and history? Response B: This leads to a second response, one that I see as much more useful: a queer theory of ontology is indeed possible. But how would it look? It might not “look queer” in the aforementioned sense of queer atonality that Rosenberg calls into question, that is, an ontology rooted in aleatoriness, deviation, non-normativity, and so on. Such a new queer theory of ontology would not be queer per se--that's by design--but would be roomy enough for queerness, along with other forms of life and other kinds of being in the world. Consider two different approaches. The first is a kind of hypertrophic instance of what, in theoretical circles, is called intersectionalism. We can understand such hypertrophic intersectionalism as a maximally heterogenous set of all forms of difference, brought into community without sacrificing the specificity and difference of all members of the set. This is not unlike how Hardt & Negri have defined the “multitude,” the multitude as capacious heterogeneity unmarked by homogenizing abstractions like “the masses” or “the people.” (It would take another blog post to demonstrate how the multitude is not simply a new form of queer atonality; but I think the argument can be made effectively.) The second approach comes from a different angle. If intersectionalism is maximally heterogenous, a different approach also exists, the minimally heterogenous. Here, the community of alterity is defined not in terms of radical difference, but radical commonality. Similar to the concept of the “generic” in Laruelle or Badiou, I see a new potential for queer ontology to be understood in terms of radical equality via axiomatic exploration of the insufficiency of identity. Indeed, Rosenberg links queerness to the concept of collectivity. This is the crucial step in my view. Summoning the allegorical style of Fredric Jameson, Rosenberg directs our attention not to “the subject per se, or 'the human,' but the collective.” And isn't this what materialism has always sought? “Surely the collective is that aleatory togetherness of which the ontological turn dreams.” So, instead of queerness as the productive force of aleatory matter, we might pursue instead the concept of a “queer event” or the “event of queer collectivity.” I suspect that such an event would not follow some of the more familiar models from the past: event as deviation, difference, or alterity. Given that queer atonality is simply the macro form of such smaller deviations--the model of turbulence and churn described so well in Queer Deleuzianism--such theories of deviation have a limited utility. In addition, the queer event would most certainly not follow a productive or reproductive mandate; this being one of the most powerful discoveries of queer theory, that the queer body is not obligated to make anything. Instead we might explore the concept of a queer communism, or what Rosenberg simply labels the collectivity. This strikes me as particularly useful and urgent today. In other words, Rosenberg's essay reveals that today's onto-primitivism is really a march toward proletarianization, which we might simply define as the bracketing of social collectivity in the name of material necessity. Such proletarianization must be identified as such, and resisted as frequently and as thoroughly as possible. Or as Rosenberg puts it, “Let it never be said of us that our consciousness was sheerly molecular, that we truly believed that all the baleful historical foreclosures of capitalism were ontologically true.” Never believe that capitalism is ontologically true... This is, in essence, the first step toward exploring any form of collectivity. Queer atonality blocks such a movement, not because queerness has been fully co-opted and hence has nothing more to offer. On the contrary, the problem with queer ontology lies in ontology not queerness, for the standard model of ontology is one that is sufficient to itself and thus promulgates a structure of transcendental mastery, rational autonomy, and sufficiency for all. Queer communism, by contrast, resides in the making-insufficient of such philosophical structures. Queer communism reorients queerness away from deviation and alterity and toward the “weak” insufficiency of collectivity, a life lived in common with others, whosoever they may be.

### 1NC -- Link -- Pessimism

#### Pessimism inhibits social change and fails to address the material changes in the status quo – not being able to recognize the necessity for change impedes anti-capitalist movements.

Sam Gindin, 2009, a Canadian intellectual and activist known for his expertise on the labour movement and the economics of the automobile industry. Gindin is a graduate of the University of Manitoba. (Transcending Pessimism: Rekindling Socialist Imagination). Mar 18, 2009 <https://socialistregister.com/index.php/srv/article/view/5731/2626>

At the same time, however, **we still live in an era of foreclosed hope in the possibility of a better world**. What makes the tragedy of Willie Loman so universal now is **that even people who wonder whether the capitalist dream isn’t the wrong dream see no way of realizing a life beyond capitalism**, or fear that any attempt to do so can only result in another nightmare. **Overcoming this debilitating political pessimism is the most important question anyone seriously interested in social change must confront**. Socialists search for what direction to take under these conditions, it helps to know that others before have faced the same problem. How to make ‘the defeated man ... try the outside world again’ was precisely the question that impelled Ernst Bloch in the 1930s to write his magnum opus, The Principle ofHope.2Pessimism – ‘paralysis per se’ – was the first obstacle to be confronted:...**people who do not believe at all in a happy end impede changing the world almost as much as the sweet swindlers**, the marriage-swindlers, the charlatans of apotheosis. **Unconditional pessimism therefore promotes the business of reaction not much less than artificially conditioned optimism; the latter is nevertheless not so ~~stupid~~ that it does not believe in anything at all. I**t does not immortalize the trudging of the little life, does not give humanity the face of a chloroformed gravestone. It does not give the world the deathly sad background in front of which it is not worth doing anything at all. In contrast to a pessimism which itself belongs to rotten-ness and may serve it, a tested optimism, when the scales fall from the eyes, does not deny the goal-belief in general; on the contrary, what matters now is to find the right one and to prove it… In recent years we have seen all too many **disillusioned people on the left ‘coming to their senses’ by abandoning the goal of socialism. Some have succumbed to a post-modernist pessimism, which has indeed proved to be ‘paralysis per se’.** Even more seem to have jumped from what Bloch called the ‘evils of putschist activism’ all the way to social democracy’s ‘third way’, **whose presumption that neo-liberal prescriptions of efficiency are compatible with social justice** is the contemporary expression of what Bloch designated as one of the key hallmarks of ideology – ‘the premature harmonization of social contradictions’ within the confines of existing social relations. **Frustrated by their inability to change the world overnight through sheer activism, they have not so much abandoned the idea of change but**, like the Greek God Procrustes **who adjusted the size of his guests to fit the size of his bed, they have shrunk the meaning of change to fit what capital and the state will accommodate.** Yet it is increasingly apparent from the extreme limitations of the ‘third way’ in practice that **reviving the goal of socialism is necessary even to make small improvements in the current state of the world.** As Bloch put it: ‘If the will-content of the goal is missing, then even the good probable is left undone; if the goal remains, however, then even the improbable can be done, or at least made more probable for later.’

#### Pessimism is a predictable response to the alienation capitalism creates but encouraging its practice leads many drifting towards the right and promoting liberalism – the very ideology the aff wants to challenge.

Terry Eagleton, 1996, is a British literary theorist, critic, and public intellectual. He is currently Distinguished Professor of English Literature at Lancaster University. Eagleton has published over forty books, but remains best known for Literary Theory: An Introduction, which has sold over 750,000 copies. (The Illusions of Postmodernism). Oxford: John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 1996. Print.

**Imagine a radical movement which had suffered an emphatic defeat. So emphatic, in fact, that it seemed unlikely to resurface for the length of a lifetime**, if even then. The defeat I have in mind is not just the kind of rebuff with which the political left is depressingly familiar, but a repulse so definitive that it seemed to discredit the very paradigms with which such politics had traditionally worked. It would now be less a matter of hotly contesting these notions than of contemplating them with something of the mild antiquarian interest with which one might regard Ptolemaic cosmology or the scholasticism of Duns Scotus. They, and the language of conventional society, would now seem less ferociously at odds than simply incommensurable– the discourses of different planets rather than of adjacent nations. **What if the left were suddenly to find itself less overwhelmed or out-manoeuvred than simply washed up, speaking a discourse so quaintly out of tune with the modern era that, as with the language of Gnosticism or courtly love, nobody even bothered any longer to enquire into its truth value?** What if the vanguard were to become the remnant, **its arguments still dimly intelligible but spinning off rapidly into some metaphysical outer space where they became nothing but a muffled cry?** What would be the likely reaction of the political left to such a defeat? **Many, no doubt, would drift either cynically or sincerely to the right, regretting their earlier views as infantile idealism.** Others would keep the faith out of habit or nostalgia, **clinging anxiously to an imaginary identity and risking the neurosis which this is likely to bring in its wake. There are, after all, those devotees for whom nothing whatsoever could count as a falsification of their beliefs**– those Christians, for example, who true to what the philosophers of science call the ‘under-determination of data by theory’, would continue to gather joyfully around the eucharistic table even if it had been shown to everyone else’s satisfaction that the gospels were fraudulent from start to finish. Indeed there are members of the Anglican church today who behave in more or less this way. But other responses could be expected too. **A small clutch of left triumphalists, incurably sanguine, would no doubt carry on detecting impending signs of revolution in the faintest flicker of militancy. In others the radical impulse would persist, but would be forced to migrate elsewhere. The governing assumption of such an epoch, one imagines, would be that the system itself was unbreachable; and a great many radical positions which might seem superficially unrelated could be seen to flow from this gloomy presupposition.** One might expect, for example, that there would be an upsurge of interest in the margins and crevices of the system– in those ambiguous, indeterminate spots where its power seemed less implacable, the shadowy margins where it trailed off into silence. The system could not be breached; but it could at least be momentarily transgressed, probed for those neuralgic points where its authority faltered and unravelled. Fascinated by these fault-lines, **one might even come to imagine that there is no centre to society after all; but while this might be a convenient way of rationalizing one’s own lack of power**, it could only be at the cost of acknowledging that there can logically be no margins either. One might expect this fact itself might be calculated into the theory– that a bleak awareness of the collusion between centre and margins, power and rupture, of the stealthy cat-and-mouse game played out between them, would go hand in hand with a more heady affirmation of whatever the system itself expelled as so much detritus, of whatever its ruling rationality seemed not to incorporate. One could envisage much celebration of the marginal and minority as positive in themselves– an absurd enough view, of course, since margins and minorities currently include neo-Nazis, UFO buffs, the international bourgeoisie and those who believe in lashing delinquent adolescents until the blood runs down their thighs. The idea of a creative majority movement, for this habit of mind as much as for the old-style liberalism of a John Stuart Mill, would come to seem like a contradiction in terms, precisely because this style of thought, suitably amnesiac, could no longer remember any instance of a beneficent system or an appealing mass movement. At its extreme, such a case ought to find it hard to cope with a previously marginal current becoming politically dominant (the African National Congress, for example), given its formalist prejudice against ‘dominance’ as such. Logically speaking, it could only hope that its own values would never come to power. **The ideas of system, consensus and organization would themselves become demonized in vaguely anarchistic fashion, denounced as absolute ills by those committed to a tolerant relativism.** The historical basis of this belief would be that political movements which were at once mass, central and productive had temporarily gone out of business; but it ill befits an historicizing brand of thought to generalize this to a universal doctrine**. It would be the theory of those who were too young to recall a mass radical politics, but who had a good deal of glum experience of drearily oppressive majorities**. The notions of law and authority might also be indiscriminately devalued, as though there was no such thing as a protective law or a benign authority. Theorists would mock the madness of the Law in suburban enclaves protected by private security guards, celebrating transgression as inherently good while worrying about child abuse. **Protest would still be possible; but because the system would instantly recongeal around this irritant like a jellyfish, the radical sensibility would be accordingly divided– between a brittle pessimism on the one hand, and an exhilarated vision of ceaseless difference, mobility, disruption on the other.**

Reform through the lens of identity politics tokenizes and commodifies